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A revised and updated single-source reference book accurately detailing the German field forces employed in Normandy in 1944 and their losses. In this book, military historian Dr. Niklas Zetterling provides a sobering analysis of the subject matter and debunks a number of popular myths concerning the Normandy campaign—the effectiveness of Allied air power; the preferential treatment of Waffen-SS formations in comparison to their army counterparts; etc. He supports his text with exhaustive footnoting and provides an organizational chart for most of the formations covered in the book. Also included are numerous organizational diagrams, charts, tables, and graphs. “A valuable reference for anyone seriously interested in the battle for Normandy.” —The NYMAS Review
This three-volume study examines the questions raised by the performance of the military institutions of France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and Italy in the period from 1914 to 1945. Leading military historians deal with the different national approaches to war and military power at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels. They form the basis for a fundamental re-examination of how military organizations have performed in the first half of the twentieth century. Volume 3 covers World War II. Volumes 1 and 2 address address World War I and the interwar period, respectively. Now in a new edition, with a new introduction by the editors, these classic volumes will remain invaluable for military historians and social scientists in their examination of national security and military issues. They will also be essential reading for future military leaders at Staff and War Colleges.
This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present.
Surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the formidable prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main tenets of which were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were adopted by American and Soviet armies. In the twentieth century, Germany's art of warfare dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation's crushing defeats in two world wars. In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the mid--nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military means.
Examines questions raised by the performance of the military institutions of France, Germany, Russia, the US, Great Britain, Japan and Italy between 1914 and 1945.
Military effectiveness is a common goal among military forces, but it is an ill-defined concept. Two divergent theories cover the ground of military effectiveness. One looks at the interaction of social structures, whereas the other looks at the effect organization has on military effectiveness. Using the interwar German military as a case study, both concepts are reviewed and seams are found in both approaches. Even when evaluating with both criteria, the answers do not consistently add up to the intuitive solution. A possible explanation lies in several areas left outside of the sociological and organizational approaches to measuring military effectiveness. Key findings of this monograph are the importance of adaptability in military organizations, and the crucial role played by the linkages among all levels of war. These linkages are an element of multiple ends, ways, means chains that also exist at and between each level of war. Finally, the importance of context cannot be ignored. Any potential adversary will be actively searching for ways to improve his own security situation without regard for the security of one's own nation. Tactical and operational level overmatch is no longer enough to ensure the security of the nation. It is a useful and necessary ability, but without the corresponding tight linkages to the higher levels of warfare it may lead to ultimate failure. An excellent test case for evaluating military effectiveness in all its dimensions is the German military during the interwar period. Coming out of the spectacular failure of the Great War, the German military was completely fettered by the Treaty of Versailles; it was limited in all four horizontal components as well as most of the vertical ones. But it was fairly well unbounded in the field of adaptability. Taking the two lenses of sociological thought and organizational method, this study looks at the interwar German military across the previously defined horizontal and vertical slices.
Creating Military Power examines how societies, cultures, political structures, and the global environment affect countries' military organizations. Unlike most analyses of countries' military power, which focus on material and basic resources—such as the size of populations, technological and industrial base, and GNP—this volume takes a more expansive view. The study's overarching argument is that states' global environments and the particularities of their cultures, social structures, and political institutions often affect how they organize and prepare for war, and ultimately impact their effectiveness in battle. The creation of military power is only partially dependent on states' basic material and human assets. Wealth, technology, and human capital certainly matter for a country's ability to create military power, but equally important are the ways a state uses those resources, and this often depends on the political and social environment in which military activity takes place.