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In this investigation of the German foreign office from 1871 to 1914, Lamar Cecil focuses on the people who conceived and executed German diplomacy rather than on diplomatic policies and stratagems. The author analyzes the men and their careers, isolating the characteristics common to the diplomats, the reasons for their selection, and the effect on their careers of various considerations of background, personality, and circumstance. His findings are based in part on the papers of Prince Bismarck and his family. The first part of the book discusses the criteria employed in choosing applicants and promoting senior diplomats. The structure of the foreign office and the conditions of entry are examined in detail, as is the association of the novice and more experienced individuals with the military element, which after 1871 found increasing accommodation in all ranks of the diplomatic establishment. The second part considers the problems with sovereigns, chancellors, and other bureaucrats encountered by members of the diplomatic service. Originally published in 1976. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
First Published in 2001. Looking at German Foreign Policy between 1847 to 1914 this Volume IX of the Foreign Policies of Great Powers collection. It includes the general framework of the Reich and European diplomacy, the second German empire's history and social structure, and moves into the Pre-Imperialist era of 1871-95 before the 'Welpolitik' up until 1912, and finally the coming of the war over the period of 1909-14 and the German War of Aggression aims in 1914.
This is a handy reference work and guide to German foreign policy in general and colonial policy in particular, covering the period from the dismissal of Bismarck to the outbreak of World War I. The major part of the book consists of an extensive, partly annotated bibliography. Apart from references to a large number of books, periodicals and documents relevant for the study of Namibia, there are also 73 entries specifically concerned with the territory. (Eriksen/Moorsom 1989).
First published in 1931, this volume publishes the Ford Lectures given at Oxford University in late 1929 by Alfred Francis Pribram in their original form. The primary motive has been that English scholars should realize how British foreign policy during the years 1871-1914 appears to a Continental historian. Pribram seeks to indicate the policy pursued by leading British statesmen in decisive international questions of their time and to reveal the principles which induced them to act as they did. He further outlines the policies of the leading statesmen of other European Great Powers and reproduce their opinion of British foreign policy.
Germany's rise to power before World War I from a Chinese persective, and the geopolitical lessons for today. A series of solemn anniversary events have marked the centenary of World War I. Could history repeat itself in today's geopolitics? Now, as then, a land power with a growing economy and a maritime power with global commitments are the two leading states in the international system. Most ominously, the outbreak of war in 1914 is a stark reminder that nations cannot rely on economic interdependence and ongoing diplomacy to keep the peace. In Fragile Rise, Xu Qiyu offers a Chinese perspective on the course of German grand strategy in the decades before World War I. Xu shows how Germany's diplomatic blunders turned its growing power into a liability instead of an asset. Bismarck's successors provoked tension and conflict with the other European great powers. Germany's attempts to build a powerful navy alienated Britain. Fearing an assertive Germany, France and Russia formed an alliance, leaving the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire as Germany's only major ally. Xu's account demonstrates that better strategy and statesmanship could have made a difference—for Germany and Europe. His analysis offers important lessons for the leaders of China and other countries. Fragile Rise reminds us that the emergence of a new great power creates risks that can be managed only by adroit diplomats, including the leaders of the emerging power. In the twenty-first century, another great war may not be inevitable. Heeding the lessons of Fragile Rise could make it even less likely.
Germany's rise to power before World War I from a Chinese persective, and the geopolitical lessons for today. A series of solemn anniversary events have marked the centenary of World War I. Could history repeat itself in today's geopolitics? Now, as then, a land power with a growing economy and a maritime power with global commitments are the two leading states in the international system. Most ominously, the outbreak of war in 1914 is a stark reminder that nations cannot rely on economic interdependence and ongoing diplomacy to keep the peace. In Fragile Rise, Xu Qiyu offers a Chinese perspective on the course of German grand strategy in the decades before World War I. Xu shows how Germany's diplomatic blunders turned its growing power into a liability instead of an asset. Bismarck's successors provoked tension and conflict with the other European great powers. Germany's attempts to build a powerful navy alienated Britain. Fearing an assertive Germany, France and Russia formed an alliance, leaving the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire as Germany's only major ally. Xu's account demonstrates that better strategy and statesmanship could have made a difference -- for Germany and Europe. His analysis offers important lessons for the leaders of China and other countries. Fragile Rise reminds us that the emergence of a new great power creates risks that can be managed only by adroit diplomats, including the leaders of the emerging power. In the twenty-first century, another great war may not be inevitable. Heeding the lessons of Fragile Rise could make it even less likely.
In this short outline history of Hitler's foreign policy, Professor Hildebrand contends that the National Socialist Party achieved popularity largely because it integrated all the political, economic and socio-political expectations prevailing in Germany since Bismarck. Thus, foreign policy under Hitler was a logical extension of the aims of the newly created German nation-state of 1871. Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics-backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase-European hegemony-was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third phases: American intervention and “racial purification.” The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.