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First Published in 2001. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
In this provocative book, David Calleo surveys German history - not to present new material but to look afresh at the old. He argues that recent explanations for Germany's external conflicts have focused on flaws in the country's traditional political institutions and culture. These German-centred explanations are convenient Calloe notes, for they tend to exonerate others from their responsibilities in bringing about two world wars, namely the American and Russian hegemonies in Europe. As a result of this approach the big questions in German history are still answered with the ageing clichés of a generation ago despite the proliferation of German historical studies. Throughout Professor Calleo examines with some scepticism the concept of Germany's uniqueness and its consequences. In effect, his study stresses the continuing relevance of traditional issues among the Western states. This book, he asserts, should be regarded as a modest dissent from the prevailing view that history either began or ended in 1945.
In this short outline history of Hitler's foreign policy, Professor Hildebrand contends that the National Socialist Party achieved popularity largely because it integrated all the political, economic and socio-political expectations prevailing in Germany since Bismarck. Thus, foreign policy under Hitler was a logical extension of the aims of the newly created German nation-state of 1871. Trading on his domestic economic successes, Hitler relied on the traditional methods of power politics-backing diplomacy with force. Had he pursued expansionist aims alone, using specific lighting wars as threats or instruments of conquest he might have been more successful. As it was, the scheme went awry when the first phase-European hegemony-was overtaken by and forced to run parallel with the second and third phases: American intervention and “racial purification.” The ideology became too great a burden to bear, stimulating internal resistance, and the Allies of course determined to wage total for a total surrender.
The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne. Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.
This volume offers a comprehensive account of the wars before the Great War and their role in undermining international instability.
The Golden Bull of 1356 (German: Goldene Bulle, Latin: Bulla Aurea) was a decree issued by the Imperial Diet at Nuremberg and Metz (Diet of Metz (1356/57)) headed by the Emperor Charles IV which fixed, for a period of more than four hundred years, important aspects of the constitutional structure of the Holy Roman Empire. It was named the Golden Bull for the golden seal it carried.
In this vivid fifty-year history of Germany from 1871-1918—which inspired events that forever changed the European continent—here is the story of the Second Reich from its violent beginnings and rise to power to its calamitous defeat in the First World War. Before 1871, Germany was not yet nation but simply an idea. Its founder, Otto von Bismarck, had a formidable task at hand. How would he bring thirty-nine individual states under the yoke of a single Kaiser? How would he convince proud Prussians, Bavarians, and Rhinelanders to become Germans? Once united, could the young European nation wield enough power to rival the empires of Britain and France—all without destroying itself in the process? In this unique study of five decades that changed the course of modern history, Katja Hoyer tells the story of the German Empire from its violent beginnings to its calamitous defeat in the First World War. This often startling narrative is a dramatic tale of national self-discovery, social upheaval, and realpolitik that ended, as it started, in blood and iron.
Originally published in English in 1986, this book offers a concise summary of the contribution Fritz Fischer and his school made to German historiography in the 20th century and in particular draws attention to continuity in the development and power structures of the German Reich between 1871 and 1945. After 1866 the traditional elites wanted to avoid fundamental changes in society, expecting a victorious war to secure their own position at home and to broaden the European base of the German Reich. Even as the Blitzkrieg expectations foundered, these ambitions persisted beyond 1918. In the face of working-class hostility, these elites were unable to mobilize mass support for their interests, but Hitler fashioned a mass party. The alliance between these unequal partners led to the Third Reich but with its collapse in 1945 the Prusso-German Reich came to an end. Only with the German Federal Republic did the liberal-democratic traditions of German history again come into their own.
Germany's rise to power before World War I from a Chinese persective, and the geopolitical lessons for today. A series of solemn anniversary events have marked the centenary of World War I. Could history repeat itself in today's geopolitics? Now, as then, a land power with a growing economy and a maritime power with global commitments are the two leading states in the international system. Most ominously, the outbreak of war in 1914 is a stark reminder that nations cannot rely on economic interdependence and ongoing diplomacy to keep the peace. In Fragile Rise, Xu Qiyu offers a Chinese perspective on the course of German grand strategy in the decades before World War I. Xu shows how Germany's diplomatic blunders turned its growing power into a liability instead of an asset. Bismarck's successors provoked tension and conflict with the other European great powers. Germany's attempts to build a powerful navy alienated Britain. Fearing an assertive Germany, France and Russia formed an alliance, leaving the declining Austro-Hungarian Empire as Germany's only major ally. Xu's account demonstrates that better strategy and statesmanship could have made a difference—for Germany and Europe. His analysis offers important lessons for the leaders of China and other countries. Fragile Rise reminds us that the emergence of a new great power creates risks that can be managed only by adroit diplomats, including the leaders of the emerging power. In the twenty-first century, another great war may not be inevitable. Heeding the lessons of Fragile Rise could make it even less likely.