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Clauseurtz observed Russia was a country which could only be subdued by its own weakness. To strike these vulnerable spots, Russia would have to be agitated at the very centre.
The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad.
This book examines in unprecedented detail the advance of Germany's Army Group Center through central Russia, toward Moscow, in the summer of 1941, followed by brief accounts of the Battle of Moscow and subsequent winter battles into early 1942. Based on hundreds of veterans' accounts, archival documents, and exhaustive study of the pertinent primary and secondary literature, the book offers new insights into Operation Barbarossa, Adolf Hitler's attack on Soviet Russia in June 1941. While the book meticulously explores the experiences of the German soldier in Russia, in the cauldron battles along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow axis, it places their experiences squarely within the strategic and operational context of the Barbarossa campaign. Controversial subjects, such as the culpability of the German eastern armies in war crimes against the Russian people, are also examined in detail. This book is the most detailed account to date of virtually all aspects of the German soldiers' experiences in Russia in 1941.
An authoritative revisionist account of the German Winter Campaign of 1941–1942, with maps: “Hair-raising . . . a page-turner.” —Kirkus Reviews Germany’s winter campaign of 1941–1942 is commonly seen as its first defeat. In Retreat from Moscow, a bold, gripping account of one of the seminal moments of World War II, David Stahel argues that instead it was its first strategic success in the East. The Soviet counteroffensive was in fact a Pyrrhic victory. Despite being pushed back from Moscow, the Wehrmacht lost far fewer men, frustrated its enemy’s strategy, and emerged in the spring unbroken and poised to recapture the initiative. Hitler’s strategic plan called for holding important Russian industrial cities, and the German army succeeded. The Soviets as of January 1942 aimed for nothing less than the destruction of Army Group Center, yet not a single German unit was ever destroyed. Lacking the professionalism, training, and experience of the Wehrmacht, the Red Army’s offensive attempting to break German lines in countless head-on assaults led to far more tactical defeats than victories. Using accounts from journals, memoirs, and wartime correspondence, Stahel takes us directly into the Wolf’s Lair to reveal a German command at war with itself as generals on the ground fought to maintain order and save their troops in the face of Hitler’s capricious, increasingly irrational directives. Excerpts from soldiers’ diaries and letters home paint a rich portrait of life and death on the front, where the men of the Ostheer battled frostbite nearly as deadly as Soviet artillery. With this latest installment of his pathbreaking series on the Eastern Front, David Stahel completes a military history of the highest order. “An engaging, fine-grained account of an epic struggle . . . Mr. Stahel describes these days brilliantly, switching among various levels of command while reminding us of the experiences of the soldiers on the ground and the civilians caught up in the Nazi ‘war of annihilation.’” —The Wall Street Journal
The aim of this edition is to present in a comprehensive way the strategy and military operations of the German army in the attack on Russia in World War 2. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. Contents: Strategic Planning Operational Planning The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941) Planning for Future Operations The Diversion and Reassembly The German Attack on Moscow The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942) Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942 Preparations for the German Summer Offensive Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942) The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942) Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942 List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942) Chronology of the Events
The book 'German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942)' by the U.S. Department of Defense meticulously examines the military strategies and operations carried out by the German forces during the early stages of World War II in Russia. The text is filled with detailed accounts of battles, troop movements, and strategic decisions, providing a comprehensive analysis of the campaign. Written in a concise and factual style, the book offers valuable insights into the challenges faced by the German military in the harsh Russian terrain and the factors that influenced their planning and decision-making process. This work is a must-read for military history enthusiasts and scholars alike, shedding light on a pivotal period in the war and its implications on both the Eastern Front and the overall conflict. The meticulous research and thorough analysis presented in this book make it an essential addition to any World War II history collection.
"The Battle of Moscow, 1941–1942: The Red Army’s Defensive Operations and Counteroffensive Along the Moscow Strategic Direction" is a detailed examination of one of the major turning points of World War II, as seen from the Soviet side. The Battle of Moscow marked the climax of Hitler’s “Operation Barbarossa,” which sought to destroy the Soviet Union in a single campaign and ensure German hegemony in Europe. The failure to do so condemned Germany to a prolonged war it could not win. This work originally appeared in 1943, under the title "Razgrom Nemetskikh Voisk pod Moskvoi" (The Rout of the German Forces Around Moscow). The work was produced by the Red Army General Staff’s military-historical section, which was charged with collecting and analyzing the war’s experience and disseminating it to the army’s higher echelons. This was a collective effort, featuring many different contributors, with Marshal Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, former chief of the Red Army General Staff and then head of the General Staff Academy, serving as general editor. The book is divided into three parts, each dealing with a specific phase of the battle. The first traces the Western Front’s defensive operations along the Moscow direction during Army Group Center’s final push toward the capital in November–December, 1941. The study pays particular attention to the Red Army’s resistance to the Germans’ attempts to outflank Moscow from the north. Equally important were the defensive operations to the south of Moscow, where the Germans sought to push forward their other encircling flank. The second part deals with the first phase of the Red Army’s counteroffensive, which was aimed at pushing back the German pincers and removing the immediate threat to Moscow. Here the Soviets were able to throw the Germans back and flatten both salients, particularly in the south, where they were able to make deep inroads into the enemy front to the west and northwest. The final section examines the further development of the counteroffensive until the end of January 1942. This section highlights the Soviet advance all along the front and their determined but unsuccessful attempts to cut off the Germans’ Rzhev–Vyaz’ma salient. It is from this point that the front essentially stabilized, after which events shifted to the south. This new translation into English makes available to a wider readership this valuable study.
This American Department of the Army publication is important to any study of the German campaign in Russia because it is one of the German Report Series which was issued after the Second World War, written by the German officers who had the most knowledge of the campaign. The publication looks above all at the planning for Operation Barbarossa in detail. The first discussions of July 1940, when Hitler ordered the German General Staff to prepare plans for the operation was followed by the genesis of a number of ideas for its execution. The Operations Order of February 1941 was followed by a number of changes. This led to the movement of the necessary troops to the east, and the strategic concentration of air and land elements prior to the attack. All of this is described in detail in the book. Operations are then shown in detail, with supporting maps, and the treatment is chronological. The halt before Moscow, and the indecision of 1942 is shown to have been the basis for the subsequent failure of the whole war against Russia. The effects of the Russian winter counter attack in 1942, the German summer offensive, the stagnation in the autumn of 1942 and the lead up to the Stalingrad debacle are all described in detail. The book is illustrated with a number of charts and 17 situation and planning maps. This publication is fundamental to a study of Operation Barbarossa partly because it sets the scene so well, and also because the failings of 1941 and 1942 are shown to be building into a cumulative disaster from which the German Army was unable to recover.
The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad.