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This book utilizes select elements of operational art from ADRP 3-0 to examine how General Lewis Walt employed operational art as the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) commander in Vietnam from June 1965-June 1967. This book addresses a significant shortfall in literature focused on Corps-level operational commanders during the Vietnam War. In combat, III MAF faced a hybrid threat of North Vietnamese regular forces and entrenched Viet Cong main force and guerrilla units. Apart from the significant challenges of combat operations, General Walt found himself confronted by vague and restricting U.S. policy, ineffective U.S. and South Vietnamese civilian and governmental agencies, a complex South Vietnamese civilian and military operating environment, and competing warfighting strategies and interservice rivalries between his U.S. Army combat chain-of-command and internal Marine Corps leadership. Despite these challenges, Walt developed and executed an effective operational approach which addressed substantial enemy threats while supporting the government of South Vietnam and its military forces.
This study investigates the significant effect of mobility, counter-mobility, survivability, and topographic engineering on the American Civil War Campaign of Chancellorsville. The operations occurred near Fredericksburg, Virginia, in April and May of 1863. In the battle, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia decisively defeated the Union Army of the Potomac. Engineer-related considerations contributed immensely to the Confederate victory. Engineer battlefield functions influenced the operations of both armies. The Union Engineer Brigade constructed numerous pontoon bridges to overcome the river obstacles prior to and following the battle. This capability allowed the Union Army to initially surprise and envelop the Confederate Army. The natural obstacles of the rivers and forests and manmade obstacles of abatis hindered maneuver. Survivability was a significant factor during the fighting. At Chancellorsville, the Confederates used entrenchments for the first time in open operations. This strengthened their economy of force in front of the Union Army and gave “Stonewall” Jackson mass during his successful enveloping attack. Finally, topographic engineering was important through map production and reconnaissance by engineers. This study concludes that the Confederate Army integrated the engineer battlefield functions more effectively than the Union Army. In part, this explains the decisive Confederate victory.
This is the second volume in a series of chronological histories prepared by the Marine Corps History and Museums Division to cover the entire span of Marine Corps involvement in the Vietnam War. This volume details the Marine activities during 1965, the year the war escalated and major American combat units were committed to the conflict. The narrative traces the landing of the nearly 5,000-man 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its transformation into the ΙII Marine Amphibious Force, which by the end of the year contained over 38,000 Marines. During this period, the Marines established three enclaves in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps, and their mission expanded from defense of the Da Nang Airbase to a balanced strategy involving base defense, offensive operations, and pacification. This volume continues to treat the activities of Marine advisors to the South Vietnamese armed forces but in less detail than its predecessor volume, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1964; The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era.
This is the fourth volume in an operational and chronological series covering the U.S. Marine Corps’ participation in the Vietnam War. This volume details the change in focus of the III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF), which fought in South Vietnam’s northernmost corps area, I Corps. This volume, like its predecessors, concentrates on the ground war in I Corps and III MAF’s perspective of the Vietnam War as an entity. It also covers the Marine Corps participation in the advisory effort, the operations of the two Special Landing Forces of the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, and the services of Marines with the staff of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. There are additional chapters on supporting arms and logistics, and a discussion of the Marine role in Vietnam in relation to the overall American effort.
General Abrams presents a sound historical example of the practical application of operational art as viewed through the lens of the Army Design Methodology. When General Abrams assumed command of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), he was able to frame his environment enabling him to enact measures to solve the correct problem which was, how to equip and train the ARVN while simultaneously focusing on population centric efforts in counterinsurgency-ultimately eliminating the need for U.S. presence in Vietnam. Under his authority, American forces were broken up into small units that would live with and train the South Vietnamese civilians to defend their villages from guerrilla or conventional Northern incursions. Not only did he successfully frame the problem in 1968 but he was able to re-frame in 1970 in accordance with the Nixon administration's abrupt announcement of a rapid withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. These efforts proved successful as evidenced by the ability of ARVN forces to repel a full-scale NVA Easter Offensive in 1972. This study validates the Army Design Methodology as a framework for the assessment operational art.
General Abrams presents a sound historical example of the practical application of operational art as viewed through the lens of the Army Design Methodology. When General Abrams' assumed command of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), he was able to frame his environment enabling him to enact measures to solve the correct problem which was, how to equip and train the ARVN while simultaneously focusing on population centric efforts in counterinsurgency-ultimately eliminating the need for U.S. presence in Vietnam. Under his authority, American forces were broken up into small units that would live with and train the South Vietnamese civilians to defend their villages from guerrilla or conventional Northern incursions. Not only did he successfully frame the problem in 1968 but he was able to re-frame in 1970 in accordance with the Nixon administration's abrupt announcement of a rapid withdrawal of forces from Vietnam. These efforts proved successful as evidenced by the ability of ARVN forces to repel a full-scale NVA Easter Offensive in 1972. This study validates the Army Design Methodology as a framework for the assessment operational art. Section I - Background * Section II - Abrams Takes Over: MACV from 1968 to 1970 * Section III - Vietnamization: A Reframing Moment * Section IV - MACV from 1970 to 1972: Proof of Principle The Vietnam War represents a prime example of how tactical actions, when not properly linked to strategic and political objectives, can have little to no effect on the success of any military endeavor. The undertakings of the civilian and military leadership in the early years of the war demonstrated the negative effects of non-existent operational art as evidenced by the state of affairs following the Tet Offensive in 1968. Operational art requires leaders that demonstrate a sound awareness and understanding of their environment as well as the ability to synchronize tactical assets and activities, in time and space, to achieve a strategic endstate. General Creighton Abrams and his performance as the commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) from 1968 until his ascendance to Chief of Staff of the Army in 1972 was an example of successful execution of operational art. An important aspect of operational art is the application of critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. This application is referred to, in the current Army lexicon, as the Army Design Methodology. While there is debate as to what a complex and ill-structured problem is, very few could argue against General Abrams' predicament when he assumed command of MACV in 1968 as such. He inherited an awkward chain of command, lack of unified operational control over South Vietnamese and other allied forces, severe geographical and procedural restrictions on the conduct of war and greatly diminished domestic support. Included in this complexity was the overarching problem of how to conduct operations to set strategic conditions for the deterrence of communist North Vietnamese influence in South Vietnam3 General Abrams' situation in 1968 definitely required the aforementioned aspect of operational art as defined in the Army Design Methodology.
The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense to conduct a program to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Vietnam War. The First Fight is the second title in a series dedicated to the Marine Corps' involvement in Southeast Asia from the early 1960s until 1975. This commemorative publication focuses on Operation Starlite, the first significant engagement between Marines and the Viet Cong with regimental-sized forces. It lasted from 18 to 24 August 1965, and in many ways foreshadowed the experience of American forces in Vietnam.
This book was donated as a part of the David H. Hugel Collection, an archival collection of the Special Collections & Archives, University of Baltimore.
United States Air Force in Southeast Asia. Documents the Air Force's support of the ground war in South Vietnam from 1965 to early 1968. Includes sections on the air campaign conducted during the Communists' siege of the Marine camp of Khe Sanh. Also contains several appendices, a glossary, and bibliographical notes.