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This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.” Throughout his career, Weyland was a staunch advocate of tactical airpower. As Patton’s Airman in World War II, Far East Air Force commander in Korea, and the commander of Tactical Air Command in the mid-1950s, Weyland helped the tactical air community to carve out its role as a critical instrument of national power.
From the time the Third Army became operational on August 1, 1944, until the guns fell silent on May 8, 1945, Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's troops covered more ground and took more enemy prisoners than any other Allied army in northwest Europe. Brig. Gen. Otto P. Weyland's XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC) provided air support every step of the way. Their combined success is something of an anomaly; air-ground relationships are notoriously confrontational and plagued with inter-service competition. How did Patton and Weyland work together to achieve such astounding success? Drawing on exclusive access to official records, David N. Spires finds that this success was due to four key developments: the maturation of tactical aviation doctrine, effective organizational procedures, a technical revolution in equipment, and, above all, the presence of pragmatic men of goodwill who made the system work. He focuses on the highly effective personal relationship between Patton and Weyland -- men who respected, trusted, and fully relied on each other and their respective subordinates. This collaboration extended all the way down the chain of command: Patton's ground troops and Weyland's airmen trained together in England, and so by the time they entered combat, they operated together as a single unit. Contrary to conventional wisdom, air-ground relationships in the field can be cooperative rather than confrontational. Today's air and ground officers can continue to benefit from the amazing success of the Third Army and the XIX TAC.
Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.