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Extending the well-known connection between classical linear potential theory and probability theory (through the interplay between harmonic functions and martingales) to the nonlinear case of tug-of-war games and their related partial differential equations, this unique book collects several results in this direction and puts them in an elementary perspective in a lucid and self-contained fashion.
Branches of mathematics and advanced mathematical algorithms can help solve daily problems throughout various fields of applied sciences. Domains like economics, mechanical engineering, and multi-person decision making benefit from the inclusion of mathematics to maximize utility and cooperation across disciplines. There is a need for studies seeking to understand the theories and practice of using differential mathematics to increase efficiency and order in the modern world. Emerging Applications of Differential Equations and Game Theory is a collection of innovative research that examines the recent advancements on interdisciplinary areas of applied mathematics. While highlighting topics such as artificial neuron networks, stochastic optimization, and dynamical systems, this publication is ideally designed for engineers, cryptologists, economists, computer scientists, business managers, mathematicians, mechanics, academicians, researchers, and students.
The theory of two-person, zero-sum differential games started at the be­ ginning of the 1960s with the works of R. Isaacs in the United States and L. S. Pontryagin and his school in the former Soviet Union. Isaacs based his work on the Dynamic Programming method. He analyzed many special cases of the partial differential equation now called Hamilton­ Jacobi-Isaacs-briefiy HJI-trying to solve them explicitly and synthe­ sizing optimal feedbacks from the solution. He began a study of singular surfaces that was continued mainly by J. Breakwell and P. Bernhard and led to the explicit solution of some low-dimensional but highly nontriv­ ial games; a recent survey of this theory can be found in the book by J. Lewin entitled Differential Games (Springer, 1994). Since the early stages of the theory, several authors worked on making the notion of value of a differential game precise and providing a rigorous derivation of the HJI equation, which does not have a classical solution in most cases; we mention here the works of W. Fleming, A. Friedman (see his book, Differential Games, Wiley, 1971), P. P. Varaiya, E. Roxin, R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton, N. N. Krasovskii, and A. I. Subbotin (see their book Po­ sitional Differential Games, Nauka, 1974, and Springer, 1988), and L. D. Berkovitz. A major breakthrough was the introduction in the 1980s of two new notions of generalized solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, namely, viscosity solutions, by M. G. Crandall and P. -L.
Résumé : "This will be a two-part handbook on Dynamic Game Theory and part of the Springer Reference program. Part I will be on the fundamentals and theory of dynamic games. It will serve as a quick reference and a source of detailed exposure to topics in dynamic games for a broad community of researchers, educators, practitioners, and students. Each topic will be covered in 2-3 chapters with one introducing basic theory and the other one or two covering recent advances and/or special topics. Part II will be on applications in fields such as economics, management science, engineering, biology, and the social sciences."
This book describes the latest advances in the theory of mean field games, which are optimal control problems with a continuum of players, each of them interacting with the whole statistical distribution of a population. While it originated in economics, this theory now has applications in areas as diverse as mathematical finance, crowd phenomena, epidemiology, and cybersecurity. Because mean field games concern the interactions of infinitely many players in an optimal control framework, one expects them to appear as the limit for Nash equilibria of differential games with finitely many players as the number of players tends to infinity. This book rigorously establishes this convergence, which has been an open problem until now. The limit of the system associated with differential games with finitely many players is described by the so-called master equation, a nonlocal transport equation in the space of measures. After defining a suitable notion of differentiability in the space of measures, the authors provide a complete self-contained analysis of the master equation. Their analysis includes the case of common noise problems in which all the players are affected by a common Brownian motion. They then go on to explain how to use the master equation to prove the mean field limit. This groundbreaking book presents two important new results in mean field games that contribute to a unified theoretical framework for this exciting and fast-developing area of mathematics.
This book reviews the basic theory of partial differential equations of the first and second order and discusses their applications in economics and finance. It starts with well-known applications to consumer and producer theory, and to the theory of option pricing and then introduces new applications that emerge from current research (some of which is the author's own) in bounded rationality, game theory, and multi-dimensional screening.
A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.
This volume contains fifteen articles on the topic of differential and dynamic games, focusing on both theory and applications. It covers a variety of areas and presents recent developments on topics of current interest. It should be useful to researchers in differential and dynamic games, systems and control, operations research and mathematical economics.
Our understanding of the fundamental processes of the natural world is based to a large extent on partial differential equations (PDEs). The second edition of Partial Differential Equations provides an introduction to the basic properties of PDEs and the ideas and techniques that have proven useful in analyzing them. It provides the student a broad perspective on the subject, illustrates the incredibly rich variety of phenomena encompassed by it, and imparts a working knowledge of the most important techniques of analysis of the solutions of the equations. In this book mathematical jargon is minimized. Our focus is on the three most classical PDEs: the wave, heat and Laplace equations. Advanced concepts are introduced frequently but with the least possible technicalities. The book is flexibly designed for juniors, seniors or beginning graduate students in science, engineering or mathematics.
​Mean field games and Mean field type control introduce new problems in Control Theory. The terminology “games” may be confusing. In fact they are control problems, in the sense that one is interested in a single decision maker, whom we can call the representative agent. However, these problems are not standard, since both the evolution of the state and the objective functional is influenced but terms which are not directly related to the state or the control of the decision maker. They are however, indirectly related to him, in the sense that they model a very large community of agents similar to the representative agent. All the agents behave similarly and impact the representative agent. However, because of the large number an aggregation effect takes place. The interesting consequence is that the impact of the community can be modeled by a mean field term, but when this is done, the problem is reduced to a control problem. ​