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Despite the growing consensus on the need for action to counteract climate change, complex economic and political forces have so far prevented international actors from making much headway toward resolving the problem. Most approaches to climate change are based in economics and environmental science; in this book, Parkash Chander argues that we can make further progress on the climate change impasse by considering a third approach—game theory. Chander shows that a game-theoretic approach, which offers insight into the nature of interactions between sovereign countries behaving strategically and the kinds of outcomes such interactions produce, can illuminate how best to achieve international agreements in support of climate-change mitigation strategies. Game Theory and Climate Change develops a conceptual framework with which to analyze climate change as a strategic or dynamic game, bringing together cooperative and noncooperative game theory and providing practical analyses of international negotiations. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and argues that the Paris Agreement may succeed where the Kyoto Protocol failed. Finally, Chander discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates, including a global agreement to support development of cleaner technologies on a global scale.
Parkash Chander argues that we can make progress on the climate-change impasse through incorporating the insights of game theory. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates.
This is the second installment of this annual review series presents invited papers published in collaboration with the United States Society for Ecological Economics. This issue will include in-depth reviews of topics such as: ecological economics of land degradation; assessing the true costs of coal; institutional change and ecological economics; energy and economic growth; systems theory of sustainable exploitation of ecosystems; payments for environmental services; climate change and game theory; the economic value of ecosystem services in the Great Barrier Reef; and core issues in the economics of biodiversity conservation. NOTE: Annals volumes are available for sale as individual books or as a journal. For information on institutional journal subscriptions, please click here. ACADEMY MEMBERS: Please contact the New York Academy of Sciences directly to place your order (www.nyas.org). Members of the New York Academy of Science receive full-text access to the Annals online and discounts on print volumes. Please visit http://www.nyas.org/MemberCenter/Join.aspx for more information about becoming a member.
The science and management of environmental problems is a vast area, comprising both the natural and social sciences, and the multidisciplinary links often make these issues challenging to comprehend. Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures aims to introduce students to the multidimensional character of international environmental problems in general, and climate change in particular.Ecology, economics, game theory and diplomacy are called upon and brought together in the common framework of a basic mathematical model. Within that framework, and using tools from these four disciplines, the book develops a theory that aims to explain and promote cooperation in international environmental affairs.Other books on the topic tend to be research-oriented volumes of various papers. Instead, this is a book that offers a reasonably-sized synthesis of the multidimensional societal problems of transfrontier pollution, particularly of climate change. It uses mathematical modeling of economic and game theory concepts to examine these environmental issues and demonstrate many results in an accessible fashion. Readers interested in understanding the links between ecology and economics, as well as the connection between economics and institutional decision-making, will find in this text not only answers to many of their queries but also questions for further thinking.
This book includes chapters by experts from developing and developed countries that apply game theory to issues in natural resources and the environment, demonstrating the usefulness of game theory in policy-making and appealing to a wide audience.
This book presents new research related to climate change policies and effects. It discusses the implications of climate change on issues pertaining to international relations and economic development, and the question of how climate change could jeopardize the international system as we have known it until today. It aims to provide an empirical basis and epistemological framework to discuss the effects of climate change on economic growth, social development and welfare as a global phenomenon influenced by policies carried out transnationally and by national governments. Case studies from around the globe are presented.
Game theory has emerged as a powerful tool in environmental economics, especially in the study of such transboundary pollution problems as global warming and acid rain. This book addresses key issues in the application of game theory to environmental economics and environmental management.
Over the last 25 years, evolutionary game theory has grown with theoretical contributions from the disciplines of mathematics, economics, computer science and biology. It is now ripe for applications. In this book, Daniel Friedman---an economist trained in mathematics---and Barry Sinervo---a biologist trained in mathematics---offer the first unified account of evolutionary game theory aimed at applied researchers. They show how to use a single set of tools to build useful models for three different worlds: the natural world studied by biologists; the social world studied by anthropologists, economists, political scientists and others; and the virtual world built by computer scientists and engineers. The first six chapters offer an accessible introduction to core concepts of evolutionary game theory. These include fitness, replicator dynamics, sexual dynamics, memes and genes, single and multiple population games, Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily stable states, noisy best response and other adaptive processes, the Price equation, and cellular automata. The material connects evolutionary game theory with classic population genetic models, and also with classical game theory. Notably, these chapters also show how to estimate payoff and choice parameters from the data. The last eight chapters present exemplary game theory applications. These include a new coevolutionary predator-prey learning model extending rock-paper-scissors; models that use human subject laboratory data to estimate learning dynamics; new approaches to plastic strategies and life cycle strategies, including estimates for male elephant seals; a comparison of machine learning techniques for preserving diversity to those seen in the natural world; analyses of congestion in traffic networks (either internet or highways) and the "price of anarchy"; environmental and trade policy analysis based on evolutionary games; the evolution of cooperation; and speciation. As an aid for instruction, a web site provides downloadable computational tools written in the R programming language, Matlab, Mathematica and Excel.
Environmental problems like global climate change and stratospheric ozone depletion can only be remedied if states cooperate with one another. But sovereign states usually care only about their own interests. So states must somehow restructure the incentives to make cooperation pay. This is what treaties are meant to do. A few treaties, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, succeed. Most, however, fail to alter the state behaviour appreciably. This book develops a theory that explains both the successes and the failures. In particular, the book explains when treaties are needed, why some work better than others, and how treaty design can be improved. The best treaties strategically manipulate the incentives states have to exploit the environment, and the theory developed in this book shows how treaties can do this. The theory integrates a number of disciplines, including economics, political science, international law, negotiation analysis, and game theory. It also offers a coherent and consistent approach. The essential assumption is that treaties be self-enforcing-that is, individually rational, collectively rational, and fair. The book applies the theory to a number of environmental problems. It provides information on more than three hundred treaties, and analyses a number of case studies in detail. These include depletion of the ozone layer, whaling, pollution of the Rhine, acid rain, over-fishing, pollution of the oceans, and global climate change. The essential lesson of the book is that treaties should not just tell countries what to do. Treaties must make it in the interests of countries to behave differently. That is, they must restructure the underlying game. Most importantly, they must create incentives for states to participate in a treaty and for parties to comply.
This book provides an evaluation of the science and policy debates on climate change and offers a reframing of the challenges they pose, as understood by key international experts and players in the field. It also gives an important and original perspective on interpreting climate action and provides compelling evidence of the weakness of arguments that frame climate policy as a win-or-lose situation. At the same time, the book goes beyond providing yet another description of climate change trends and policy processes. Its goal is to make available, in a series of in-depth reflections and insights by key international figures representing science, business, finance and civil society, what is really needed to link knowledge to action. Different contributions convincingly show that it is time – and possible – to reframe the climate debate in a completely new light, perhaps as a system transformative attractor for new green growth, sustainable development, and technological innovation. Reframing the Problem of Climate Change reflects a deep belief that dealing with climate change does not have to be a zero sum game, with winners and losers. The contributors argue that our societies can learn to respond to the challenge it presents and avoid both human suffering and large scale destruction of ecosystems; and that this does not necessarily require economic sacrifice. Therefore, it is vital reading for students, academics and policy makers involved in the debate surrounding climate change.