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Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use MATLAB® to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behavior, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modeling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modeling of these diverse biological phenomena.
Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use MATLAB® to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behavior, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modeling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modeling of these diverse biological phenomena.
This novel reassessment of the field presents the central concepts in evolutionary game theory and provides an authoritative and up-to-date account. The focus is on concepts that are important for biologists in their attempts to explain observations. This strong connection between concepts and applications is a recurrent theme throughout the book.
This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Specially selected from The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 2nd edition, each article within this compendium covers the fundamental themes within the discipline and is written by a leading practitioner in the field. A handy reference tool.
This volume in the Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, Second Edition, combines the main features of Game Theory, covering most of the fundamental theoretical aspects under the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, with the procedures of Agent-Based Modeling for studying complex systems composed of a large number of interacting entities with many degrees of freedom. In Game Theory, the cooperative approach focuses on the possible outcomes of the decision-makers’ interaction by abstracting from the "rational" actions or decisions that may lead to these outcomes. The non-cooperative approach focuses on the actions that the decision-makers can take. As John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern argued in their path-breaking book of 1944 entitled Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, most economic questions should be analyzed as games. The models of game theory are abstract representations of a number of real-life situations and have applications to economics, political science, computer science, evolutionary biology, social psychology, and law among others. Agent-Based Modeling (ABM) is a relatively new computational modeling paradigm which aims to construct the computational counterpart of a conceptual model of the system under study on the basis of discrete entities (i.e., the agent) with some properties and behavioral rules, and then to simulate them in a computer to mimic the real phenomena. Given the relative immaturity of this modeling paradigm, and the broad spectrum of disciplines in which it is applied, a clear cut and widely accepted definition of high level concepts of agents, environment, interactions and so on, is still lacking. This volume explores the state-of-the-art in the development of a real ABM ontology to address the epistemological issues related to this emerging paradigm for modeling complex systems.
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Covering the major topics of evolutionary game theory, Game-Theoretical Models in Biology, Second Edition presents both abstract and practical mathematical models of real biological situations. It discusses the static aspects of game theory in a mathematically rigorous way that is appealing to mathematicians. In addition, the authors explore many applications of game theory to biology, making the text useful to biologists as well. The book describes a wide range of topics in evolutionary games, including matrix games, replicator dynamics, the hawk-dove game, and the prisoner’s dilemma. It covers the evolutionarily stable strategy, a key concept in biological games, and offers in-depth details of the mathematical models. Most chapters illustrate how to use Python to solve various games. Important biological phenomena, such as the sex ratio of so many species being close to a half, the evolution of cooperative behaviour, and the existence of adornments (for example, the peacock’s tail), have been explained using ideas underpinned by game theoretical modelling. Suitable for readers studying and working at the interface of mathematics and the life sciences, this book shows how evolutionary game theory is used in the modelling of these diverse biological phenomena. In this thoroughly revised new edition, the authors have added three new chapters on the evolution of structured populations, biological signalling games, and a topical new chapter on evolutionary models of cancer. There are also new sections on games with time constraints that convert simple games to potentially complex nonlinear ones; new models on extortion strategies for the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and on social dilemmas; and on evolutionary models of vaccination, a timely section given the current Covid pandemic. Features Presents a wide range of biological applications of game theory. Suitable for researchers and professionals in mathematical biology and the life sciences, and as a text for postgraduate courses in mathematical biology. Provides numerous examples, exercises, and Python code.
​This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
This book brings together papers of well-known specialists in game theory and adjacent problems. It presents the basic results in dynamic games, stochastic games, applications of game theoretical methods in ecology and economics and methodological aspects of game theory.