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Kant’s conception of freedom is of special importance in the history of philosophy. It not only brings together older traditions but has great influence on later theories of freedom. The edited volume analyzes Kant’s theory, referring to the concepts of will, choice, autonomy, and reason. It consists of four parts: Kant’s theory in its historical context; Kant’s own conception as developed in his various philosophical works; central conceptions of freedom in German Idealism after Kant (including Reinhold, Schiller, Maimon, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer); the systematic relevance of Kant’s conception of freedom with regard to recent debates in analytic philosophy (agent causality, compatibilism and incompatibilism).
Kant’s theory of practical freedom represents a masterpiece of the philosophical inquiry into self-constitution, self-government, and volitional self-determination. It includes a sophisticated theory of action intrinsically determined by a specific concept of control over the processes that determine the contents of volition as well as those which facilitate the realization of ends. The most distinctive feature of this theory of action consists of the specific function of autonomously generated principles which, according to Kant, facilitate control over the process of volitional self-determination and thus constitute agency. Willensstruktur und Handlungsorganisation in Kants Theorie der praktischen Freiheit provides a detailed reconstruction of Kant’s theory of practical freedom and action as rationally guided volitional self-determination in his first and second "Critique".
Flach bringt Kants geltungs- und prinzipientheoretische Freiheitslehre zur Darstellung und sucht zu zeigen, welches Erklärungspotential diese Lehre in puncto Humanität hat. Krijnen bringt Hegels logische und geistphilosophische Freiheitslehre zur Darstellung und sucht zu zeigen, daß und wie in ihr ein fundamentaler Aspekt der Freiheit thematisch wird, der in Kants Lehre unterbeleuchtet bleibt. Die Diskussionsbeiträge zeigen, welchen Stellenwert dem einen und dem anderen Paradigma im aktuellen Urteil zuerkannt wird. Flach presents Kant’s conception of freedom as well as its potential for understanding what it means to be human. Krijnen presents Hegel’s conception of freedom and shows that Kant’s conception underestimates an essential feature of freedom. The contributions of other authors assess the results.
This book reconstructs the intense early post-Kantian debate on freedom of the will, choice, and moral imputability for the first time. It addresses the following questions: How is freedom of choice possible given the causal predetermination of the world? How can we escape skepticism about freedom of the will? What are the characteristics of moral freedom? Are we free to act immorally, and if so, how exactly? And finally: How can we conceive of our individual freedom as being compatible with nature and society?
Freedom is one of the main issues of modern philosophy and Kant’s philosophy of freedom a major source for comprehending it. Whereas in contemporary debates Kant’s concept of practical freedom is addressed frequently, the cosmological foundation of it is much less discussed and even mostly taken for granted. In Metaphysics of Freedom?, by contrast, Kant’s concept of cosmological freedom is scrutinized both in a historical and a systematic perspective. As a result, a deeper and broader understanding of Kant’s conception of freedom, its presuppositions, and problems emerges.
Die vorliegende Studie zeigt, inwieweit Kant in der Kritik der Urteilskraft versucht, die Prinzipien der theoretischen und der praktischen Philosophie durch das bloß subjektive transzendentale Prinzip der Urteilskraft zu einem System zu verbinden. Auf der Sachebene steht damit das Problem des Übergangs von der Natur zur Freiheit im Zentrum der Untersuchung. Viele Kantinterpretationen betrachten diesen Übergang entweder als unmöglich oder suchen die Möglichkeit einseitig unter der Perspektive der moralischen Freiheit zu klären. Dagegen setzt der Verfasser auf eine eingehende Analyse der Selbstgesetzlichkeit der Urteilskraft in ihrer Struktur und Funktion und legt damit eine Gesamtinterpretation der Kritik der Urteilskraft vor, die sich an alle wendet, die ein intensives Kantstudium anstreben. In der Bestimmung der Urteilskraft als Vermögen der "Darstellung" und "Reflexion", was mit der innerteleologischen Auffassung der Kantischen Vernunft übereinstimmt, welche die Vernunftkritik voraussetzt, tritt der Zusammenhang mit der ästhetischen Urteilskraft deutlich hervor. Als ausführende Instanz der Vernunftprinzipien bringt die Urteilskraft in ihrem reflektierenden Wirklichkeitsbezug das Zusammenwirken der Erkenntnisvermögen ans Licht. Die Einheit der drei Kritiken sowie die Einheit der beiden Hauptteile der Kritik der Urteilskraft selbst lassen sich nicht nur dadurch begreiflich machen, sondern der Übergang vom Sinnlichen zum Übersinnlichen gewinnt auch eine pragmatische Bedeutung im Kantischen Sinne.
This volume collects thirteen original essays that address the concept of will in Classical German Philosophy from Kant to Schopenhauer. During this short, but prolific period, the concept of will underwent various transformations. While Kant identifies the will with pure practical reason, Fichte introduces, in the wake of Reinhold, an originally biological concept of drive into his ethical theory, thereby expanding on the Kantian notion of the will. Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer take a step further and conceive the will either as a primal being (Schelling), as a socio-ontological entity (Hegel), or as a blindly striving, non-rational force (Schopenhauer). Thus, the history of the will is marked by a complex set of tensions between rational and non-rational aspects of practical volition. The book outlines these transformations from a historical and systematic point of view. It offers an overview of the most important theories of the will by the major figures of Classical German Philosophy, but also includes interpretations of conceptions developed by lesser-studied philosophers such as Maimon, Jacobi, Reinhold, and Bouterwek.
In this volume, Karl Ameriks explores "Kantian subjects" in three senses. In Part I, he first clarifies the most distinctive features-such as freedom and autonomy-of Kant's notion of what it is for us to be a subject. Other chapters then consider related "subjects" that are basic topics inother parts of Kant's philosophy, such as his notions of necessity and history. Part II examines the ways in which many of us, as "late modern," have been highly influenced by Kant's philosophy and its indirect effect on our self-conception through successive generations of post-Kantians, such asHegel and Schelling, and early Romantic writers such as Holderlin, Schlegel, and Novalis, thus making us "Kantian subjects" in a new historical sense. By defending the fundamentals of Kant's ethics in reaction to some of the latest scholarship in the opening chapters, Ameriks offers an extensiveargument that Holderlin expresses a valuable philosophical position that is much closer to Kant than has generally been recognized. He also argues that it was necessary for Kant's position to be supplemented by the new conception, introduced by the post-Kantians, of philosophy as fundamentallyhistorical, and that this conception has had a growing influence on the most interesting strands of Anglophone as well as Continental philosophy.
Research on federalism is rarely concerned with its philosophical foundations. However, arguments on why and how best to organise a plurality of states in a multilevel political order have first been discussed by philosophers and continue to inspire contemporary reasoning on international and supranational relations not only in political philosophy. This book offers a unique overview of the philosophical foundations of federalism from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The analyses proposed by renowned scholars from the US and from several European countries cover classic writers such as Hobbes and the authors of the Federalist Papers, Kant and Rawls, and range from anthropological justifications of federal orders to contemporary problems of EU constitutionalism, the principle of subsidiarity and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The book is of relevance to anyone interested in philosophical justifications of federalism.
This book offers translations of early critical reactions to Kant's account of free will. Spanning the years 1784-1800, the translations make available, for the first time in English, works by little-known thinkers including Pistorius, Ulrich, Heydenreich, Creuzer and others, as well as familiar figures including Reinhold, Fichte and Schelling. Together they are a testimony to the intense debates surrounding the reception of Kant's account of free will in the 1780s and 1790s, and throw into relief the controversies concerning the coherence of Kant's concept of transcendental freedom, the possibility of reconciling freedom with determinism, the relation between free will and moral imputation, and other arguments central to Kant's view. The volume also includes a helpful introduction, a glossary of key terms and biographical details of the critics, and will provide a valuable foundation for further research on free will in post-Kantian philosophy.