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Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.
Lon L Fuller's account of what he termed 'the internal morality of law' is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Much less accepted is his claim that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in these principles, with the result that his jurisprudence largely continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In 'Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller', Kristen Rundle offers a close textual analysis of Fuller's published writings and working papers to explain how his claims about the internal morality of law belong to a wider exploration of the ways in which the distinctive form of law introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power through its connection to human agency. By reading Fuller on his own terms, 'Forms Liberate' demonstrates why his challenge to a purely instrumental conception of law remains salient for twenty-first century legal scholarship.
Batteries 2: Research and Development in Non-Mechanical Electrical Power Sources provides information pertinent to the selection and operation of power source. This book focuses on the progress and further development in battery design. Organized into 38 chapters, this book begins with an overview of the metallurgical properties of a positive grid alloy as well as the properties of dispersion-strengthened lead. This text then explains the voltage maximum as being resistance polarization. Other chapters consider the standard heat of activation for the rate-determining step at the reversible potential and explain the difficulties of predicting the orbital performance of solar cells from terrestrial measurements. This book discusses as well the chemical changes occurring during the manufacture and life of lead–acid batteries. The final chapter deals with the mechanism of the processes that occur in fuel cells. This book is a valuable resource for chemical, electrical, telecommunications, electrochemical, and automotive engineers.
This thesis offers a reading of the legal philosophy of the mid-twentieth century legal scholar, Lon L. Fuller. By illuminating how Fuller's vision of law gravitates constantly to the relationship between the form of law and the status of the legal subject as an agent, this reading provides a basis for revisiting the issues in dispute in his famous exchanges with the legal positivist philosopher, H.L.A. Hart. The thesis as a whole seeks to meet two main objectives. First, I seek to demonstrate how Fuller's persistent concern for the way that the form of law instantiates respect for the legal subject lends his legal philosophy a coherence that has been insufficiently appreciated to this point. Second, I seek to elaborate the claim that once we appreciate the centrality of the relationship between legal form and agency to Fuller's thought, we come to understand why he insisted that law can and should be distinguished from other modes of ordering, and why it must also be regarded as distinctively moral. The thesis is comprised of five chapters. In Chapter 1, I introduce the context of Fuller's legal philosophy by surveying the concerns of his jurisprudential writings prior to the commencement of his exchanges with Hart. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I offer a close textual analysis of Fuller's position in the three major writings that are most readily associated with those exchanges: his reply to Hart in the 1958 Harvard Law Review, his 1964 book The Morality of Law, and the "Reply to Critics" that brought the Hart-Fuller debate to a close in 1969. In Chapter 5, I conclude the thesis by assessing the implications of my reading for prevailing debates in legal philosophy about the relationship between law and legality, and for our understanding of the questions at issue in the Hart-Fuller debate more generally.
What makes someone responsible for a crime and therefore liable tof punishment under the criminal law? Modern lawyers will quickly and easily point to the criminal law's requirement of concurrent actus reus and mens rea, doctrines of the criminal law which ensure that someone will only be found criminally responsible if they have committed criminal conduct while possessing capacities of understanding, awareness, and self-control at the time of offense. Any notion of criminal responsibility based on the character of the offender, meaning an implication of criminality based on reputation or the assumed disposition of the person, would seem to today's criminal lawyer a relic of the 18th Century. In this volume, Nicola Lacey demonstrates that the practice of character-based patterns of attribution was not laid to rest in 18th Century criminal law, but is alive and well in contemporary English criminal responsibility-attribution. Building upon the analysis of criminal responsibility in her previous book, Women, Crime, and Character, Lacey investigates the changing nature of criminal responsibility in English law from the mid-18th Century to the early 21st Century. Through a combined philosophical, historical, and socio-legal approach, this volume evidences how the theory behind criminal responsibility has shifted over time. The character and outcome responsibility which dominated criminal law in the 18th Century diminished in ideological importance in the following two centuries, when the idea of responsibility as founded in capacity was gradually established as the core of criminal law. Lacey traces the historical trajectory of responsibility into the 21st Century, arguing that ideas of character responsibility and the discourse of responsibility as founded in risk are enjoying a renaissance in the modern criminal law. These ideas of criminal responsibility are explored through an examination of the institutions through which they are produced, interpreted and executed; the interests which have shaped both doctrines and institutions; and the substantive social functions which criminal law and punishment have been expected to perform at different points in history.