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This historical study examines America’s Cold War diplomacy and covert operations intended to lure Cambodia from neutrality to alliance. Although most Americans paid little attention to Cambodia during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency, the global ideological struggle with the Soviet Union guaranteed US vigilance throughout Southeast Asia. Cambodia’s leader, Norodom Sihanouk, refused to take sides in the Cold War, a policy that disturbed US officials. From 1953 to 1961, his government avoided the political and military crises of neighboring Laos and South Vietnam. However, relations between Cambodia and the United States suffered a blow in 1959 when Sihanouk discovered CIA involvement in a plot to overthrow him. The failed coup only increased Sihanouk’s power and prestige, presenting new foreign policy challenges in the region. In Eisenhower and Cambodia, William J. Rust demonstrates that covert intervention in the political affairs of Cambodia proved to be a counterproductive tactic for advancing the United States’ anticommunist goals. Drawing on recently declassified sources, Rust skillfully traces the impact of “plausible deniability” on the formulation and execution of foreign policy. His meticulous study not only reveals a neglected chapter in Cold War history but also illuminates the intellectual and political origins of US strategy in Vietnam and the often-hidden influence of intelligence operations in foreign affairs.
Toczek provides the first description of the entire battle of Ap Bac and places it in the larger context of the Vietnam War. The study thoroughly examines the January 1963 battle, complete with detailed supporting maps. Ironically, Ap Bac's great importance lies in American policymakers' perception of the battle as unimportant; for all their intelligence and drive, senior American government officials missed the early warning signs of a flawed policy in Southeast Asia by ignoring the lessons of the defeat of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) on 2 January 1963. The outcome of Ap Bac was a direct reflection of how the U.S. Army organized, equipped, and trained the ARVN. With all the ARVN officer corps's shortcomings, the South Vietnamese Army could not successfully conduct an American combined arms operations against a smaller, less well-equipped enemy. American leadership, both military and civilian, failed to draw any connection between ARVN's dismal performance and American policies toward South Vietnam. Although certain tactical changes resulted from the battle, the larger issue of American policy remained unchanged, including the structure of the advisory system.
Between 1945 and 1968, the possibility of Mutual Assured Destruction led to a host of odd realities, including the creation of an affable cartoon turtle named Bert who taught millions of school children that nuclear war was survivable if they simply learned how to “duck and cover.” Meanwhile, fear of Communism played out against the backdrop of potential Armageddon to provide justification for a variety of covert operations involving regime change, political assassination, and sometimes bizarre plot twists. United States Foreign Policy 1945-1968: The Bomb, Spies, Stories, and Lies takes a fresh look at this complex, often confusing, and frequently farcical period in American and world history.
In Alliance Curse, Hilton Root illustrates that recent U.S. foreign policy is too often misguided, resulting in misdirected foreign aid and alliances that stunt political and economic development among partner regimes, leaving America on the wrong side of change. Many alliances with third world dictators, ostensibly of mutual benefit, reduce incentives to govern for prosperity and produce instead political and social instability and economic failure. Yet again, in the war on terror and in the name of preserving global stability, America is backing authoritarian regimes that practice repression and plunder. It is as if the cold war never ended. While espousing freedom and democracy, the U.S. contradicts itself by aiding governments that do not share those values. In addition to undercutting its own stated goal of promoting freedom, America makes the developing world even more wary of its intentions. Yes, the democracy we preach arouses aspirations and attracts immigrants, but those same individuals become our sternest critics; having learned to admire American values, they end up deploring U.S. policies toward their own countries. Long-term U.S. security is jeopardized by a legacy of resentment and distrust. A lliance Curse proposes an analytical foundation for national security that challenges long-held assumptions about foreign affairs. It questions the wisdom of diplomacy that depends on questionable linkages or outdated suppositions. The end of the Soviet Union did not portend the demise of communism, for example. Democracy and socialism are not incompatible systems. Promoting democracy by linking it with free trade risks overemphasizing the latter goal at the expense of the former. The growing tendency to play China against India in an effort to retain American global supremacy will hamper relations with both—an intolerable situation in today's interdependent world. Root buttresses his analysis with case studies of American foreign polic
This comparative study explores the involvement of the United States in four successful military coups in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. Focusing on military-to-military relations with the US in each country, the book offers insight into how external actors can impact the outcomes of coups, particularly through socialization via military training, education, and international organizations such as NATO. Drawing upon recently declassified government documents and a trove of unexplored interviews with high-ranking officials, Ömer Aslan also examines how coup plotters in both countries approached the issue of US reaction before, during, and after their coups. As armed forces have continued to make and unmake Turkish and Pakistani governments well into the twenty-first century, this volume offers original, probing analysis of the circumstances which make coups possible.
This book historically maps and examines the evolving, contemporary geostrategic and geopolitical imperatives of the United States within Pakistan and the South Asian region, especially after September 11, 2001. It offers a detailed and theoretical account of the rapidly changing context of US foreign policy towards Pakistan after 2001. The history of the US-Pakistan relationship has been a complex and inscrutable mix of cooperation and conflict has turned even more challenging after 9/11. This book covers the latest developments and relevant themes from world politics as it discusses the impact of the unprecedented rise in religious extremism in Pakistan, stemming from the US War on Terror as well as Pakistan’s economic vulnerability and military dictatorship, India’s offer to support the US in its war in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s nuclear capability, and the US administration’s decision to end financial aid to Pakistan. The study highlights the fact that, from the receding of British influence in the region through the Cold War and post-Cold War phases to the post-9/11 period, US-South Asia policy has been informed by the theoretical paradigm of the grand strategy of primacy. This topical book will be useful to scholars and researchers of international relations, politics, political studies, strategic and defence studies, security and peace studies, foreign policy, area studies, and South Asian studies. It will also interest diplomats, politicians, policymakers, security experts, journalists, and think tanks interested in India, Pakistan, and the United States on issues of international politics, world affairs, and terrorism.
The final set of volumes (Vol 18-21 sold separately) of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower contain 1,783 documents drawn from Eisenhower's second term as president from 20 January 1957 to 20 January 1961. Completing a monumental project that began with publication of The War Years in 1970, this final set of volumes of The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower contains 1,783 documents drawn from Eisenhower's second term as president from 20 January 1957 to 20 January 1961. In these years Eisenhower worked hard to hold the focus of American national politics on the two major objectives he had set for his presidency in 1952: to sustain the policy of containment without precipitating a war with the Soviet Union and to reduce the role of the federal government in U.S. domestic affairs. In both cases, events at home and abroad intruded—diverting attention to immediate problems, endangering the peace, and forcing the White House to devote most of its leadership to the crises of the day. As president during this tense period, Eisenhower maintained an extensive and revealing correspondence with prominent individuals as well as with personal friends. These letters, together with the occasional entries made in his diary, shed considerable light upon the major national concerns of the 1950s. The volumes also include private and secret correspondence previously unavailable to scholars. Some of these items have been only recently declassified, and many appear here in print for the first time. Taken as a whole, the Eisenhower papers from 1957-61 provide firm documentary evidence of the manner in which Eisenhower dealt with the complex internal and external problems faced by all of our modern political leaders.
On May 23, 1957, US Army Sergeant Robert Reynolds was acquitted of murdering Chinese officer Liu Ziran in Taiwan. Reynolds did not deny shooting Liu but claimed self-defense and, like all members of US military assistance and advisory groups, was protected under diplomatic immunity. Reynolds's acquittal sparked a series of riots across Taiwan that became an international crisis for the Eisenhower administration and raised serious questions about the legal status of US military forces positioned around the world. In American Justice in Taiwan, author Stephen G. Craft provides the first comprehensive study of the causes and consequences of the Reynolds trial and the ensuing protests. After more than a century of what they perceived as unfair treaties imposed by Western nations, the Taiwanese regarded the special legal status of resident American personnel with extreme distrust. While Eisenhower and his advisers considered Taiwan to be a vital ally against Chinese communism, the US believed that the Taiwanese government had instigated the unrest in order to protest the verdict and demand legal jurisdiction over GIs. Regardless, the events that transpired in 1957 exposed the enormous difficulty of applying the US's Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) across cultures. Employing meticulous research from both Western and Chinese archives, Craft demonstrates that the riots were only anti-American in that the Taiwanese rejected the UCMJ, the affording of diplomatic immunity to occupying US forces, and the military courts' interpretation of self-defense. His compelling study provides a new lens through which to examine US--Taiwan relations in the 1950s, US policy in Asia, and the incredibly charged and complex question of the legal status of US troops on foreign soil.