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Addresses the nature and extent of the international mobility of foreign direct investment and how tax competition is affecting the structure of national tax systems, and how efforts at international coordination of tax policy will affect such changes.
Each national report addresses, among other things, the following issues: - the sources of law and general principle of the law of evidence - the means of evidence - the role of the judge and the parties in the evidence procedure - the evaluation of evidence - the production of evidence - the registration of produced evidence - the possibilities to admit new evidence or to renew evidence in appeal proceedings.
Tax competition and coordination is one of the most pressing issues for tax authorities in modern economies, but it is a highly controversial subject. Some argue that tax competition is beneficial by forcing governments to impose efficient tax prices on residents for the provision of public services. Further, some argue that tax competition is also beneficial by limiting the power of governments to levy taxes. Others take a different view - in a world without coordinated tax policies, governments choose sub-optimal levels of public services financed by inefficient taxes that are either too high or too low by ignoring spillovers imposed on other jurisdictions. Capital Mobility and Tax Competition draws out the most important issues of uncoordinated tax policy at the international level for cross-border transactions. The discussion focuses on mobile tax bases, specifically in relation to investment and financial transactions. The main issue for consideration in this survey is whether taxation of income, specifically capital income will survive, how border crossing investment is taxed relative to domestic investment, and whether welfare gains can be achieved through international tax coordination. This survey derives some of the key results on the taxation of international investment in variants of one model of multinational investment. Finally, the authors emphasize the problem of tax competition and financial arbitrage, an issue which is somewhat neglected in the existing survey literature.
This paper brings out the special mechanism through which taxes influence bilateral FDI, when investment decisions are two-fold in the presence of fixed setup flows costs. For each pair of source-host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate FDI flows will occur at all, and a different set of factors determining the volume of FDI flows (provided they occur). We develop a two-country tax competition model which yield an asymmetric Nash-equilibrium with high corporate tax rate and high level of public good provision in the rich source country for FDI outflows and with low corporate tax rate and low level of public good provision in the poor host country for FDI outflows. This is akin to the asymmetry among the EU 15 and EU 10 in the enlarged European Union, as of 2004. We also demonstrate that the notion that the mere international tax differentials are a key factor behind the direction and magnitude of FDI flows, the traditional race to the bottom argument in tax competition are too simple.
Annotation This volume consists of two essays: the first one examines this issue in the context of Indonesia, the second provides a review of earlier literature.
Economic integration and mobility of capital have set the ground for a significant competition over resources. Tax competition for internationally mobile tax bases such as foreign direct investments has become an important matter of study. Nevertheless, literature has focused on a regional or geographical neighboring condition competition through taxes. This dissertation aims to test whether tax competition for foreign direct investment has changed its regional characteristic towards a global or world-wide competition. Global or world-wide tax competition can be thought of as uncooperative tax policy reactions between governments of different countries of the world not necessarily near each other geographically, but in similar economic conditions and with the purpose to influence the allocation of mobile tax bases world-wide. For the purpose of this study, export oriented foreign capital investment was referred to as the internationally mobile tax base. A theoretical model was constructed allowing for three countries, geographical distance, transportation costs, labor and technology skills, as well as four types of individuals: workers, capitalists, and two types of entrepreneurs. Optimal corporate statutory and average effective tax rates were obtained in order to serve as reaction functions between governments and evaluate the presence of tax competition. A spatial econometric model was used to estimate the empirical approximation of the theoretical model. Four types of weight matrices were computed: homogeneous weights, similar economic conditions, similar transportation costs from the FDI host country to the FDI home country, and neighboring conditions of FDI host countries. The sample covered 53 countries from different areas of the world from 1984 to 2002. Regarding the data, several variables were constructed, among those: the corporate average effective tax rate. The statutory corporate tax rate was discarded since it misses important factors for capital investment such as tax holidays and depreciation schedules. The principal result suggests that countries from the sample appear to behave in a tax competitive way not only in geographical neighboring terms but also in a global or world-wide approach. In fact, countries appear to compete in a stronger way in global or world-wide terms than when assuming a regional or neighboring condition.
A collection of papers on the determinants and consequences of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the real and financial sectors of industrial countries. The text sheds new light on the determinants of FDI, in particular the role of governmental incentives. Another main topic is the role of FDI in the east European accession countries. It provides insights into the question of whether EU enlargement will have consequences for capital flows into those countries. Since the start of European monetary union, the discussion on cross-border mergers in the European banking industry has intensified. The final part of the book contains contributions to this debate.
Tax incentives neither make up for serious deficiencies in a country's investment environment nor generate the desired externalities. But when other factors, such as infrastructure, transport costs, and political and economic stability are more or less equal, the taxes in one location may have a significant effect on investors' choices. This effect varies, however, depending on the tax instrument used, the characteristics of the multinational company, and the relationship between the tax systems of the home and recipient countries.