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The recent formation of a comprehensive Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is a critical first step in addressing the long-recognized inability of the nation to respond to emergent space needs of the warfighters in an adaptive and operationally- relevant timeframe. A proper assessment of the initial ORS source documents is crucial in identifying the key ORS elements and determining if Joint Functional Commander requirements will be better met by the envisioned processes and capabilities. This paper gives a brief review of the problem, assesses the key functions and activities proposed within U.S. Strategic Command's Concept of Operations, and explores the process needed to integrate ORS into the campaign planning process and operations execution. Finally, this paper will draw some conclusions concerning timely space support to the warfighter and identify further areas of effort required to increase the likelihood of program success.
Space-based observations have transformed our understanding of Earth, its environment, the solar system and the universe at large. During past decades, driven by increasingly advanced science questions, space observatories have become more sophisticated and more complex, with costs often growing to billions of dollars. Although these kinds of ever-more-sophisticated missions will continue into the future, small satellites, ranging in mass between 500 kg to 0.1 kg, are gaining momentum as an additional means to address targeted science questions in a rapid, and possibly more affordable, manner. Within the category of small satellites, CubeSats have emerged as a space-platform defined in terms of (10 cm x 10 cm x 10 cm)- sized cubic units of approximately 1.3 kg each called "U's." Historically, CubeSats were developed as training projects to expose students to the challenges of real-world engineering practices and system design. Yet, their use has rapidly spread within academia, industry, and government agencies both nationally and internationally. In particular, CubeSats have caught the attention of parts of the U.S. space science community, which sees this platform, despite its inherent constraints, as a way to affordably access space and perform unique measurements of scientific value. The first science results from such CubeSats have only recently become available; however, questions remain regarding the scientific potential and technological promise of CubeSats in the future. Achieving Science with CubeSats reviews the current state of the scientific potential and technological promise of CubeSats. This report focuses on the platform's promise to obtain high- priority science data, as defined in recent decadal surveys in astronomy and astrophysics, Earth science and applications from space, planetary science, and solar and space physics (heliophysics); the science priorities identified in the 2014 NASA Science Plan; and the potential for CubeSats to advance biology and microgravity research. It provides a list of sample science goals for CubeSats, many of which address targeted science, often in coordination with other spacecraft, or use "sacrificial," or high-risk, orbits that lead to the demise of the satellite after critical data have been collected. Other goals relate to the use of CubeSats as constellations or swarms deploying tens to hundreds of CubeSats that function as one distributed array of measurements.
Launch activities performed by private entities deal with a complex legal environment. The Space Treaties provide a general liability framework. Launch participants are subject to regulatory or institutional control, and to domestic liability laws. Specific contractual practice has developed due to insurance limitations, the inter-participants' waivers of liability and claims. This book synthesizes information on the norms of play, to allow the grasp of their relative weight and interactions in the assessment of liability risk for launch activities. It reveals a legal framework presently lacking sufficient predictability for an efficient liability risk management: the waivers of liability suffer weaknesses as do all such clauses, and lack uniformity and reliability; and the Space Treaties contain ambiguous terms preventing predictable determination of the States responsible for authorizing and supervising launch activities and for damage compensation, and do not reflect the liability of launch operators. This book offers suggestions of new approaches for: harmonizing waivers of liability to improve their consistency, validity and flow-down; and improving the Space Treaties for their implementation to non-governmental launch activities. In the launch community, the need for lawmaking is less compelling than in fields such as aviation. Nevertheless, adjustments to the present framework are proposed through model clauses and an international instrument, for further thinking and contribution by those sharing the opinion that creative lawmaking is needed now to prepare for tomorrow's endeavors.
In fiscal year 2003, the Department of Defense expects to spend more than $18 billion to develop, acquire, and operate satellites and other space-related systems. Satellite systems collect information on the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries. They enable military forces to be warned of a missile attack and to communicate and navigate while avoiding hostile action. And they provide information that allows forces to precisely attack targets in ways that minimize collateral damage and loss of life. DOD's satellites also enable global communications, television broadcasts, weather forecasting; navigation of ships, planes, trucks, and cars; and synchronization of computers, communications, and electric power grids. Congress requested that we review reports we issued on satellite and other space-related programs over the past two decades and identify common problems affecting these programs. The majority of satellite programs cost more than expected and took longer to develop and launch than planned. In reviewing our past reports, we found that these results were commonly tied to the following problems. Requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must perform were not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or were changed significantly once the program had already begun. Investment practices were weak. For example, potentially more cost-effective approaches were not examined and cost estimates were optimistic. Acquisition strategies were poorly executed. For example, competition was reduced for the sake of schedule or DOD did not adequately oversee contractors. Technologies were not mature enough to be included in product development. Several factors contributed to these problems. First, DOD often took a schedule-driven instead of a knowledge-driven approach to the acquisition process. As a result, activities essential to containing costs, maximizing competition among contractors and testing technologies were compressed or not done. Second, there is a diverse array of organizations with competing interests involved in overall satellite development--from the individual military services, to testing organizations, contractors, civilian agencies, and in some cases international partners. This created challenges in making tough tradeoff decisions, particularly since, for many years, there was no high-level official within the Office of the Secretary of Defense dedicated to developing and enforcing an overall investment strategy for space. Third, space acquisition programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability. This approach made it difficult to match requirements to available resources (in terms of time, money, and technology). Other factors also created challenges for the satellite acquisition programs we reviewed. These include a shrinking industrial base, a declining space workforce, difficulties associated with testing satellites in a realistic environment, as well as challenges associated with launching satellites.
Ever since the completion of the Apollo program, there has been a lack of consensus about the future of human spaceflight. The Columbia tragedy in February 2003 rekindled public debate about this question. In November 2003, the Space Studies Board and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board organized a workshop to explore aspects of the question, what should be the principal purpose, goals, and priorities of the U.S. civil space program? This report presents a factual summary of that workshop, which identified past lessons learned and guiding principles for the future of the civil space program. Seven broad themes emerged from the workshop, and these themes are highlighted in the report. The report also presents discussions of strategies for the human spaceflight program and guiding principles of and boundary conditions for a 21st century space policy.
In March 2005, the NASA History Division and the Division of Space History at the National Air and Space Museum brought together a distinguished group of scholars to consider the state of the discipline of space history. This volume is a collection of essays based on those deliberations. The meeting took place at a time of extraordinary transformation for NASA, stemming from the new Vision of Space Exploration announced by President George W. Bush in January 204: to go to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. This Vision, in turn, stemmed from a deep reevaluation of NASA?s goals in the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident and the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. The new goals were seen as initiating a "New Age of Exploration" and were placed in the context of the importance of exploration and discovery to the American experiences. (Amazon).
In responding to the political and military challenges of the Cold War, and the urge to explore and exploit outer space, the United States developed a capable fleet of space transportation systems for carrying cargo and people into space, and for ensuring a credible strategic nuclear deterrent. These systems are owned and managed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and private industry. In recent years, increasing federal budget constraints, commercial competition from foreign launch firms, and a desire to continue an ambitious space program have created pressures within the United States to reduce the costs of access to space. Significantly lower space transportation costs would make the U.S. space industry more commercially competitive, foster the expansion and creation of new space markets, and ensure access to space for government payloads and manned missions. This report, prepared for the House Committee on Science, is the first in a broad assessment of the health and future prospects of the U.S. space transportation technology and industrial base. The report focuses on the Clinton Administration's National Space Transportation Policy, which was released last fall. It examines administration policy in light of the implementation plans prepared by NASA, DOD, and the Transportation and Commerce Departments. As the report notes, the new policy brings a welcome measure of order to the sometimes chaotic structure of U.S. space transportation activities. The policy also emphasizes the important contribution private industry can make to the direction and development of U.S. space transportation capabilities. However, an analysis of the policy and implementation plans also raises some issues that might be of interest to Congress as it debates space transportation legislation, oversight, and funding.