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Political boundaries are often porous to finance, financial intermediation, and financial distress. Yet they are highly impervious to financial regulation. When inhabitants of a country suffering a deficit of purchasing power are able to access and deploy funds flowing in from a country with a surfeit of such power, the inhabitants of both countries may benefit. They may also benefit when institutions undertaking such cross-border financial intermediation experience economies of scale and are able to innovate and to offer funds and services at lower costs. Inevitably, however, at least some such institutions will sometimes act imprudently, some of the projects in which such funds are deployed may be unwise, and other such projects can suffer from unforeseen circumstances. As a result of such factors, a financial institution may suffer distress in one country, and may then transmit such distress to other countries in which it operates. The efficacy of any response to such cross-border transmission of distress may turn on the response being given due effect in both (or all) the territories in which the distressed financial institution operates. This situation creates a conundrum for policymakers, legislators, and regulators who wish to enable those subject to their jurisdiction to access the benefits of cross-border financial intermediation, yet cannot make rules and regulations that would have effect outside that jurisdiction. This book explores this conundrum and offers a response. It does so by drawing on and adding to the literatures on financial intermediation, regulation, and distress, and on existing hard and soft laws and regulations. The book advocates for the creation of a model law that would address the full range of financial institutions, including insurance companies, and that would enable relevant authorities to cooperate with counterparts in advance of the onset of distress and to give appropriate effect in their jurisdiction to measures taken by counterpart authorities in other jurisdictions in which the distressed institution also operates.
"In the East Asian crisis, "connections" - with industrial groups or influential families - increased the probability of distress for financial institutions. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely, suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, suggesting a "too big to fail" policy"--Cover.
The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of early identification of weak banks: when problems are identified late, solutions are much more costly. Until recently, Europe has seen only a small number of outright bank failures, which made the estimation of early warning models for bank supervision very difficult. This paper presents a unique database of individual bank distress across the European Union from mid-1990s to 2008. Using this data set, we analyze the causes of banking distress in Europe. We identify a set of indicators and thresholds that can help to distinguish sound banks from those vulnerable to financial distress.
A comprehensive look at the enormous growth and evolution of distressed debt, corporate bankruptcy, and credit risk default This Third Edition of the most authoritative finance book on the topic updates and expands its discussion of corporate distress and bankruptcy, as well as the related markets dealing with high-yield and distressed debt, and offers state-of-the-art analysis and research on the costs of bankruptcy, credit default prediction, the post-emergence period performance of bankrupt firms, and more.
The understanding of the economic and legal structure of the institutions of bankruptcy has increased considerably over the past decade. This publication describes the state of current knowledge. Containing both theoretical studies and evidence from recent case studies, it shows the possibilities and methods of legal reform and the pitfalls of misguided political action.
This paper describes the situation of bank distress which developed in Bangladesh since 1983-84. Since the key problem banks are state-owned, there has been no banking crisis, although costs to the economy have been high. Main causes of distress included preferential and directed lending, and administered interest rates. Inadequate supervision and managerial weaknesses were other contributory factors. Macroeconomic trends played a small role only. The authorities have recently taken major corrective measures. The paper calls for determination in the implementation of these measures to swiftly restore financial stability and limit the overall cost of this long-running distress situation.
"The goals of financial restructuring are to reestablish the creditor-debtor relationships on which the economy depends for an efficient allocation of capital, and to accomplish that objective at minimal cost. Costs include direct costs to taxpayers of financial assistance and the indirect costs to the economy that result from misallocations of capital and incentive problems resulting from the restructuring. Calomiris, Klingebiel, and Laeven review cases in which countries used alternative mechanisms to restructure their financial and corporate sectors. Countries typically apply a combination of tools, including decentralized, market-based mechanisms, and government-managed programs. Market-based strategies seek to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and borrowers to enable them to renegotiate debt and resume new credit supply. Government-led restructuring strategies often include the establishment of an entity to which nonperforming loans are transferred or the government's sale of financial institutions, sometimes to foreign entrants. Market-based mechanisms can, in principle, resolve coordination problems that countries face in the wake of massive debtor and creditor insolvency, with acceptably low direct and indirect costs, particularly when those mechanisms are effective in achieving the desirable objective of selectivity. However, these mechanisms depend for their success on an efficient judicial system, a credible supervisory framework and authority with sufficient enforcement capacity, and a lack of corruption in implementation. Government-managed programs may not seem to depend as much on efficient legal and supervisory institutions for their success, but in fact these approaches, in particular the transfer of assets to government-owned asset management companies, also depend on effective legal, regulatory, and political institutions for their success. Further, a lack of attention to incentive problems when designing specific rules governing financial assistance can aggravate moral hazard problems, unnecessarily raising the costs of resolution. These results suggest that policymakers in emerging market economies with weak institutions should not expect to achieve the same level of success in financial restructuring as other countries, and that they should design resolution mechanisms accordingly. Despite the theoretical attraction of some complex market-based mechanisms, simpler mechanisms that afford quick resolution of outstanding debts that improve financial system competitiveness, and that offer little discretion to governments, are most effective. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector and Operations Policy Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study the containment and resolution of financial crises"--World Bank web site.
Faced with a systemic financial sector crisis, policymakers need to make difficult choices under pressure. Based on the experience of many countries in recent years, few have been able to achieve a speedy, lasting and low-cost resolution. This volume considers the strengths and weaknesses of the various policy options, covering both microeconomic (including recapitalization of banks, bank closures, subsidies for distressed borrowers, capital adequacy rules and corporate governance and bankruptcy law requirements) and macroeconomic (including monetary and fiscal policy) dimensions. The contributors explore the important but little understood trade-offs that are involved, such as between policies which take effect quickly, those which minimize long-term fiscal and economic costs, and those which create favorable incentives for future stability. Successfully implementing crisis management and crisis resolution policy required attention to detail and a good flow of information.
A World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Brookings Institution publication More than three years have elapsed since the East Asian financial crisis erupted, threatening economic and financial stability in the region and beyond. Although many of the region's economies have since staged a remarkable turnaround, much additional restructuring and reform is needed. Managing Financial and Corporate Distress: Lessons from Asia, stands out from other works on the East Asian crisis by moving beyond macroeconomic assessments to offer an institutional treatment of the microeconomic aspects of the corporate and bank restructuring. Contributors draw on their practical, hands-on expertise in various aspects of finance to provide complementary perspectives on how best to set in place strong and responsive institutions that might be able to resolve and avoid future crises in other emerging markets.