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This book explains why governments respond differently to macroeconomic problems and why necessary reforms are sometimes delayed until a serious financial crisis erupts. It argues that voter vulnerability to different reform strategies varies, and that these vulnerabilities influence the type and timing of governments' policy responses to economic crises. Empirical analyses at both the individual level across a broad range of countries and case studies of national policy responses to financial and economic crises in Asia and Eastern Europe support the argument.
This is a collection of essays offering comparative analysis of the divergent experiences of developing countries responding to economic crises by adopting macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment policies.
The Great Financial Crisis that began in 2007-2008 reminds us with devastating force that financial instability and crises are endemic to capitalist economies. This Handbook describes the theoretical, institutional, and historical factors that can help us understand the forces that create financial crises.
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
This paper reviews the literature on financial crises focusing on three specific aspects. First, what are the main factors explaining financial crises? Since many theories on the sources of financial crises highlight the importance of sharp fluctuations in asset and credit markets, the paper briefly reviews theoretical and empirical studies on developments in these markets around financial crises. Second, what are the major types of financial crises? The paper focuses on the main theoretical and empirical explanations of four types of financial crises—currency crises, sudden stops, debt crises, and banking crises—and presents a survey of the literature that attempts to identify these episodes. Third, what are the real and financial sector implications of crises? The paper briefly reviews the short- and medium-run implications of crises for the real economy and financial sector. It concludes with a summary of the main lessons from the literature and future research directions.
The lingering effects of the economic crisis are still visible—this shows a clear need to improve our understanding of financial crises. This book surveys a wide range of crises, including banking, balance of payments, and sovereign debt crises. It begins with an overview of the various types of crises and introduces a comprehensive database of crises. Broad lessons on crisis prevention and management, as well as the short-term economic effects of crises, recessions, and recoveries, are discussed.
An empirical investigation of financial crises during the last 800 years.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.
"A Brookings Institution Press and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) publication Financial crises in emerging economies are very different today than they were in the past. Between 1940 and the 1970s, such traumas involved large fiscal deficits, repressed domestic financial systems, and balance of payments situations that were associated with a sharp worsening of terms of trade. In recent years, however, a ""new variety"" of crisis has evolved in Asia and Latin America. Many of the emerging economies that have experienced financial trauma have been considered very successful until the crises explode. This collection focuses on such economies. The five contributors provide policy-oriented analysis that seeks to identify crucial variables that affect the probability or intensity of crisis. Joséeacute; Antonio Ocampo (ECLAC) and Ricardo Ffrench-Davis explore the variables that play a part in determining whether a financial crisis is likely to occur. They analyze ""vulnerability zones"" for certain key variables--such as net liquid external liabilities, current-account deficits, and real exchange rates--and examine how and why capital surges have contributed to worsen marcoeconomic fundamentals in emerging economies. Manuel Agosin (University of Chile) draws a parallel between Korea and Taiwan, showing how the two countries had similar histories between the mid-1960s and the early 1990s, then followed different paths during the 1990s. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (ECLAC) concentrates on Chile's experience with three ""positive"" financial shocks: in the 1970s, in 1991-94, and in 1995-97. Jaime Ros (Notre Dame University) explores contrasting situations in Mexico in 1991-94 and 1996-97, and discusses the variables that explain the marked differences between the two episodes. Ricardo Ffrench-Davis is principal regional adviser at ECLAC and co-founder of the Center for Economic Research on Latin America (CIEPLAN). He is the author or editor of fifteen books on international economics, development, strategies, foreign financial, and Latin American economies, including Reforming the Reforms: Macro, Trade, Finance (Palgrave/Macmillan, 1999). "