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Pamphlet on final offer compulsory arbitration procedures in the public sector of the USA - includes statistical tables on some dispute settlement experiences, etc. References.
Final offer arbitration is a relatively new method of resolving labor disputes. Its use is confined almost exclusively to the public sector where it applies to essential employees. By providing for the selection of one party's best offer, final offer arbitration statutes represent a compromise between interest arbitration statutes and laws prohibiting strikes by essential public employees. The Eugene Oregon Code's package system focuses upon the creation of a “strike-like” risk while the Michigan statute's “issue-by-issue” method concentrates more on achieving an equitable result. This article proposes a model statute which involves a broader selection method to achieve both these goals.
Monograph comprising three case studies of collective bargaining and arbitration involving essential public sector employees (fire fighters, police) in the USA - comments on labour legislation concerning compulsory arbitration and conciliation, etc. References and statistical tables.
Final offer arbitration is a conflict resolution device that has been the subject of extensive theoretical and empirical research during the last 30 years. Data from 1985 to 2008 Major League Baseball salary negotiations are used to answer three questions concerning bargaining in the presence of final offer arbitration. First, what explains the player's decision to threaten his team with final offer arbitration? In particular, does previous salary inequity truly predict arbitration filing as reported by Fizel, Krautmann, and Hadley (2002)? I find that previous salary inequity is unrelated to the threat of filing for arbitration except for the specific time period used by Fizel, Krautmann, and Hadley. Second, what factors underlie both parties' final offers and their initial disagreement? Specifically, does relative performance significantly impact the players' salary demands and team offers? I find that relative performance is important to offer formation and initial disagreement, though the results are sensitive to the time period under analysis and the type of relative comparison that is made. Finally, what factors predict negotiation impasse that results in arbitration? In particular, does increased offer aggressiveness always imply that a private resolution is less likely as found by Farmer, Pecorino, and Stango (2004)? Furthermore, is the definition of offer aggressiveness important to this conclusion? Fizel (1996), Farmer, Pecorino, and Stango (2004), and Hadley and Ruggiero (2006) each propose a different technique of estimating offer aggressiveness. I find that disputes containing aggressive offers were more likely to result in bargaining impasse for salary negotiations prior to 2003. In addition, the definition of offer aggression is important.
The U.S. recession which began in the fall of 2007 continues to severely affect many organizations in the private and public sectors. Many governmental entities and unions have been forced to negotiate during period of stagnant or declining tax revenues combined with continuously rising health insurance and pension costs. These economic realities have resulted in a substantial number of contract talks leading to impasse. In the public sector the laws providing for collective bargaining also often require certain forms of alternative dispute resolution to resolve impasse, primarily mediation and fact finding or advisory arbitration. Both of these methods however, contain major limitations - primarily no guaranteed settlement. Final-offer arbitration, also called “last, best offer” or “baseball” arbitration, has been used by some governments as an ADR method that guarantees a settlement. A new Indiana law covering public sector teachers and school employers contains some unique features that should be considered by public sector organizations seeking changes in their current impasse resolution method. This paper reviews the topic of public sector collective bargaining during the current recession, the new Indiana law, final-offer arbitration as a means of resolving impasse, and final-offer issues for consideration.
Amended final-offer arbitration (AFOA) has been developed as an attractive alternative mechanism to final-offer arbitration (FOA). Under AFOA, more reasonable offers win, but the outcome is determined by the loser's offer and the arbitrator's value. In AFOA, disputants making extreme offers are penalized, thereby encouraging compromise. This article compares the theoretical and behavioral properties of AFOA and FOA. Controlled laboratory experiments indicate that AFOA significantly outperforms FOA, generating substantially greater prearbitration settlement. Consistent with theoretical predictions, offers converge under AFOA; however, FOA offers neither converge nor are consistent with theoretical predictions. This work suggests practitioners should consider adopting AFOA over FOA.