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This book deals with two significant issues: the peculiar and paradoxical question of why regular armies, better suited to fighting conventional high-intensity wars, adopt inappropriate measures when fighting guerilla wars; and the evolution of the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine over the last decade. In addition, the book also includes the first detailed analysis of the trajectory of the army's counterinsurgency doctrine, arguing that while it was consolidated only over the last decade, the essential elements of the doctrine may in fact be traced back to the army's first confrontation with the Naga guerillas in the 1950s. It outlines the three essential elements that make up the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine: that there are no military solutions to an insurgency; that military force can only help to reduce levels of violence to enable political solutions; and that there should be limited use of military force. Rajagopalan argues that international circumstances -- particularly the need to counter conventional military threats from Pakistan and China -- led to a counterinsurgency doctrine that had a strong conventional war bias. This bias also conditioned the organisational culture of the Indian army.
This book deals with two significant issues: the peculiar and paradoxical question of why regular armies, better suited to fighting conventional high-intensity wars, adopt inappropriate measures when fighting guerilla wars; and the evolution of the Indian army’s counterinsurgency doctrine over the last decade. In addition, the book also includes the first detailed analysis of the trajectory of the army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, arguing that while it was consolidated only over the last decade, the essential elements of the doctrine may in fact be traced back to the army’s first confrontation with the Naga guerillas in the 1950s. It outlines the three essential elements that make up the Indian army’s counterinsurgency doctrine: that there are no military solutions to an insurgency; that military force can only help to reduce levels of violence to enable political solutions; and that there should be limited use of military force. Rajagopalan argues that international circumstances — particularly the need to counter conventional military threats from Pakistan and China — led to a counterinsurgency doctrine that had a strong conventional war bias. This bias also conditioned the organisational culture of the Indian army.
A Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General David Petraeus, Kilcullen's vision of war dramatically influenced America's decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq. Now, Kilcullen provides a remarkably fresh perspective on the War on Terror.
The first documented, systematic study of a truly revolutionary subject, this 1937 text remains the definitive guide to guerrilla warfare. It concisely explains unorthodox strategies that transform disadvantages into benefits.
As fitting for the 21st century as von Clausewitz's "On War" was in its own time, "Invisible Armies" is a complete global history of guerrilla uprisings through the ages.
Total Resistance: The Swiss Army Guide to Guerrilla Warfare and Underground Operations Originally published in 1965, the Panther Publications English translation of Swiss Army Major Hans von Dach's classic Der totale Widerstand brings one of the most influential guerrilla manuals back into print in its original format, right down to the distinctive red covers of the Panther Publications first printing. Universally known as being more complete than the later Paladin Press editions which have been widely reproduced, this edition is the best translation available. Total Resistance is a comprehensive guide to guerrilla warfare, designed to empower civilians to resist occupation by a foreign power through sabotage, assassination, and the organization of underground movements. This translation preserves the detailed tactics and strategies that made the original a vital resource during the Cold War. With chapters covering everything from creating sabotage cells and conducting ambushes to psychological warfare and intelligence gathering, Total Resistance remains a cornerstone in the study of unconventional warfare. Over the decades, von Dach's manual has been both revered and controversial, influencing resistance movements across the globe. Its use by various insurgent groups during the 1960s and 1970s, as well as its relevance in modern conflict zones, underscores the enduring importance of this text. This edition is perfect for historians, military enthusiasts, and anyone interested in the principles of asymmetric warfare. Whether you're studying the Cold War era, exploring military strategy, or looking for insights into modern resistance movements, Total Resistance offers a wealth of knowledge on the power of civilian-based defense. Rediscover this seminal work that continues to shape the doctrine of guerrilla warfare and underground operations around the world.
From one of the most important army officers of his generation, a memoir of the revolution in warfare he helped lead, in combat and in Washington When John Nagl was an army tank commander in the first Gulf War of 1991, fresh out of West Point and Oxford, he could already see that America’s military superiority meant that the age of conventional combat was nearing an end. Nagl was an early convert to the view that America’s greatest future threats would come from asymmetric warfare—guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents. But that made him an outsider within the army; and as if to double down on his dissidence, he scorned the conventional path to a general’s stars and got the military to send him back to Oxford to study the history of counterinsurgency in earnest, searching for guideposts for America. The result would become the bible of the counterinsurgency movement, a book called Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. But it would take the events of 9/11 and the botched aftermath of the Iraq invasion to give counterinsurgency urgent contemporary relevance. John Nagl’s ideas finally met their war. But even as his book began ricocheting around the Pentagon, Nagl, now operations officer of a tank battalion of the 1st Infantry Division, deployed to a particularly unsettled quadrant of Iraq. Here theory met practice, violently. No one knew how messy even the most successful counterinsurgency campaign is better than Nagl, and his experience in Anbar Province cemented his view. After a year’s hard fighting, Nagl was sent to the Pentagon to work for Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, where he was tapped by General David Petraeus to coauthor the new army and marine counterinsurgency field manual, rewriting core army doctrine in the middle of two bloody land wars and helping the new ideas win acceptance in one of the planet’s most conservative bureaucracies. That doctrine changed the course of two wars and the thinking of an army. Nagl is not blind to the costs or consequences of counterinsurgency, a policy he compared to “eating soup with a knife.” The men who died under his command in Iraq will haunt him to his grave. When it comes to war, there are only bad choices; the question is only which ones are better and which worse. Nagl’s memoir is a profound education in modern war—in theory, in practice, and in the often tortured relationship between the two. It is essential reading for anyone who cares about the fate of America’s soldiers and the purposes for which their lives are put at risk.
Indhold: Principles of Urban Guerrilla Warfare; The Urban Base of Operations; Improvised Explosives and Chemicals; Improvised Weapons and Munitions; The Ambush; Counter-Insurgency Operations; Security and Communications.