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Federal Reserve's second monetary policy report for 2005 : hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, on oversight on the monetary policy report to Congress pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, July 21, 2005.
Federal Reserve's second monetary policy report for 2005: hearing before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, first session, on oversight on the monetary policy report to Congress pursuant to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, July 21, 2005.
The United States Government Printing Office (GPO) was created in June 1860, and is an agency of the U.S. federal government based in Washington D.C. The office prints documents produced by and for the federal government, including Congress, the Supreme Court, the Executive Office of the President and other executive departments, and independent agencies. A hearing is a meeting of the Senate, House, joint or certain Government committee that is open to the public so that they can listen in on the opinions of the legislation. Hearings can also be held to explore certain topics or a current issue. It typically takes between two months up to two years to be published. This is one of those hearings.
Provides an in-depth overview of the Federal Reserve System, including information about monetary policy and the economy, the Federal Reserve in the international sphere, supervision and regulation, consumer and community affairs and services offered by Reserve Banks. Contains several appendixes, including a brief explanation of Federal Reserve regulations, a glossary of terms, and a list of additional publications.
The paper considers the merits of rules and discretion for monetary policy when the structure of the macroeconomic model and the probability distributions of disturbances are not well defined. It is argued that when it is costly to delay policy reactions to seldom-experienced shocks until formal algorithmic learning has been accomplished, and when time consistency problems are significant, a mixed strategy that combines a simple verifiable rule with discretion is attractive. The paper also discusses mechanisms for mitigating credibility problems and emphasizes that arguments against various types of simple rules lose their force under a mixed strategy.