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GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) plans to modernize its air traffic control computer system. GAO noted that FAA plans to acquire the Advanced Automation System (AAS) to: (1) increase controller productivity; (2) reduce its operating costs; (3) save fuel and passenger time; and (4) replace its aging air traffic control computer systems. GAO also noted that the FAA proposal for implementing AAS: (1) involved closing 180 terminal control facilities and moving their functions to 23 large centers; (2) did not fully analyze or properly compare a range of alternatives for AAS program elements; (3) had disadvantages in terms of increased vulnerability to loss of services in the event of catastrophe, personnel relocation problems, and the need for additional controllers during transitions from old to new facilities; and (4) used an unsound methodology to estimate AAS benefits. In addition, GAO noted that an alternative proposal involving replacement of equipment and new workstations: (1) reduced costs by over $750 million; and (2) alleviated many of the FAA proposal disadvantages. GAO believes that FAA should: (1) not award the multi-billion dollar AAS contract until it has identified the number and types of equipment necessary for a non-consolidation approach; and (2) fully analyze other terminal control facility alternatives.
GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) acquisition of the Advanced Automation System (AAS) to determine whether it is a technically and economically sound investment. GAO found that: (1) the current AAS acquisition strategy does not adequately mitigate technical risks and does not provide for suitable operational simulation of the advanced automation features; and (2) AAS, as currently planned, may not be economically justified. GAO believes that the FAA strategy has unacceptably high risks and may result in significant cost increases, schedule delays, and performance deficiencies. GAO also believes that: (1) a fixed price for untested hardware may result in higher costs because the contractor's risk may be reflected in higher fixed prices to compensate for the system's unproven producibility; (2) requirement changes to correct performance problems can lead to significant additional costs even in a fixed-price contract; (3) software, which constitutes a major portion of AAS development, and cost risk will be developed using a cost-plus type contract; and (4) having only one contractor during the concurrent development, test, and production phase limits risk-reduction opportunities typically achieved through cost and technical competition.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to acquire a more automated air traffic control system, including: (1) the Advanced Automation System (AAS) computer hardware and software replacement program; (2) the Automated En Route Air Traffic Control (AERA) program; and (3) the Mode S program. GAO found that: (1) FAA will not perform some planned simulation tests of the advanced automated functions of AERA prior to including the specifications in the AAS acquisition contract; (2) FAA plans to test and validate AERA specifications are uncertain at this time; and (3) FAA lacked adequate information to make a sound and objective AAS production decision. GAO also found that: (1) FAA selected an acquisition strategy which called for concurrent full-scale development, testing, and production; (2) awarding the acquisition contract without adequately validating advanced automation functions could lead to higher costs, schedule delays, and deployment of a system that does not perform in an operational environment; (3) problems in developing test software prevented most of the simulation tests; and (4) FAA does not plan to complete development of the AAS or its subsystems or demonstrate system performance capabilities because it will base its acquisition decision on information the contractors develop during the design competition phase.
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) plans to acquire the Advanced Automation System (AAS), focusing on FAA compliance with congressional direction to: (1) obtain more technical information and modify test plans before awarding the AAS acquisition contract; and (2) conduct a cost-benefit study. GAO found that FAA complied with congressional direction to obtain more technical information regarding AAS by: (1) directing design contractors to perform risk-reduction activities and demonstrate how their chosen hardware and software technologies would meet performance requirements; (2) requiring the completion of additional tests before authorizing full controller work station production; and (3) reviewing the need to simulate advanced en route automation functions and deciding not to simulate them before awarding the contract. GAO also found that the FAA cost-benefit study: (1) stated that modernizing the air traffic control computer system was a good investment; (2) concluded that the most cost-beneficial approach was to close about 180 terminal control facilities and consolidate their functions at 23 large centers; (3) did not fully analyze or properly compare a full range of alternatives, including nonconsolidation approaches, to its preferred system; (4) used an unsound methodology to estimate AAS benefits; (5) addressed potential safety improvements qualitatively; (6) estimated that AAS contract costs could total about $3.3 billion, $1.7 billion less than an independent cost analysis estimated; and (7) did not successfully control AAS design costs and opposed suggestions to adopt a design-to-cost goal to help control costs.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimates that it will need $13 billion over the next 7 years to continue its modernization program. However, persistent acquisition problems raise questions about the agency's ability to field new equipment within cost, schedule, and performance parameters. This report discusses how organizational culture has contributed to the persistent acquisition problems at the FAA. Presents a recommendation on the steps that FAA can take to strengthen its acquisition management by changing its organizational culture.
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