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In civil cases, the facts of the case are often decisive. This book provides a comparative analysis of the process of fact-finding in the litigation process. It offers theoretical insights on the distinctive features of the fact-finding arrangements in civil cases in Austria, the Netherlands, and the United States. It also examines the empirical data that sheds light on the operation of procedural rules in legal practice. The book studies specific fact-finding regulations as components of an entire system and places them in a broader context. It analyzes the history of fact-finding arrangements to elucidate the legal tradition that has shaped the mindset of practitioners and legislators. In addition, the relationship between procedural rules and the prevailing constitutional and political theory is discussed. Rules are commonly designed and adopted to promote procedural values, such as efficiency, legitimacy, accuracy, and fairness. Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation discusses the values
In the pursuit of justice, truth always plays a prominent role. In most legal systems, elaborate rules on the taking of evidence try to guarantee that an accurate, factual basis is used for the application of the law. Such rules are the core of most methods of adjudication and they are the main theme of the present volume, which focuses specifically on the rules of evidence within the context of efficiency in civil proceedings.
This dissertation investigates the manner in which facts are proven with specific emphasis on the role which the concept of probabilities' plays in achieving the burden of proof. It is illustrated that the concept of probabilities' plays a central role throughout the process of determining the accountability of a litigant, including fact-finding during the evaluation of the adduced evidence and the application of the burden of proof. This study distinguishes between the findings of individual facts, as opposed to the finding of whether the case of a party, as reflected by the cumulative effect of the individually proven facts, has been proven. It is submitted that, despite traditionally perceived views, the concept of probabilities' is applied in exactly the same manner to both these aspects of a legal dispute, the only variable being the degree of probabilities as determined by a specific stage and nature of the litigation. The research focuses on both criminal and civil cases. The dissertation is based on current South African practices as reflected in judgments in different law reports and, to some extent, on English and American legal practices. Copyright.
This thesis is an inquiry into the legitimacy of judicial fact-finding in civil litigation. Judges make authoritative factual findings in conditions of uncertainty and the decision-making process cannot, and does not, guarantee the accuracy of those outcomes. Given the inevitable risk of error, on what basis is the authority of judicial fact-finding legitimate? This project provides a framework of procedural legitimacy that bridges two unavoidable aspects of adjudication: factual indeterminacy and the need for justifiably authoritative dispute resolution. This work draws of the legal theories of Lon Fuller and Jurgen Habermas to substantiate the notion of procedural legitimacy in the context of judicial fact-finding. The framework of procedural legitimacy is then applied to three doctrinal discourses relevant to personal injury litigation: use of scientific evidence, proof of causation, and use of probabilistic reasoning in assessing damages awards.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
This book presents an in-depth discussion on two concepts from the field of philosophy and law, in order to improve our understanding of the relation between “fact” and “evidence” in judicial process. Since fact-finding is a difficult task for judges, proof by evidence has been devised to help them access the truth. However, in the process of judicial fact-finding, there is always a gap between fact and truth. This book covers a wide range of topics, from reflections on the concept of “fact,” “evidence” and “fact-finding” in the field of philosophy and law to individual case studies. As such it is a useful reference resource on the continuing research on the judicial proof process for students and scholars.
A global overview of evidentiary reasoning with contributions from leading authorities from different legal traditions and four continents.
This book examines systematically the underlying theory of evidence in Anglo-American legal systems and identifies the defining characteristics of adjudicative fact-finding. Stein develops a detailed innovative theory which sets aside the traditional vision of evidence law as facilitating the discovery of the truth. Combining probability theory, epistemology, economic analysis, and moral philosophy; he argues instead that the fundamental purpose of evidence law is to apportion the risk oferror in conditions of uncertainty. Stein begins by identifying the domain of evidence law.He then describes the basic traits of adjudicative fact-finding and explores the epistemological foundations of the concept. This discussion identifies the problem of probabilistic deduction that accompanies generalizations to which fact-finders resort. This problem engenders paradoxes which Stein proposes to resolve by distinguishing between probability and weight. Stein advances the principle of maximal individualization that does not allow factfinders to make a finding against a person when the evidence they use is not susceptible to individualized testing.He argues that this principle has broad application, but may still be overridden by social utility. This analysis identifies allocation of the risk of error as requiring regulation by evidence law. Advocating a principled allocation of the risk of error, Stein denounces free proof for allowing individual judges to apportion this risk asthey deem fit.He criticizes the UK's recent shift to a discretionary regime on similar grounds. Stein develops three fundamental principles for allocating the risk of error: the cost-efficiency principle which applies across the board; the equality principle which applies in civil litigation; and the equal best principle which applies in criminal trials. The cost-efficiency principle demands that fact-finders minimize the total cost of errors and error-avoidance.Under the equality principle,fact-finding procedures and decisions must not produce an unequal apportionment of the risk of error between the claimant and the defendant. This risk should be apportioned equally between the parties. The equal best principle sets forth two conditions for justifiably convicting and punishing a defendant. The state must do its best to protect the defendant from the risk of erroneous conviction and must not provide better protection to other individuals. Regulating both the admissibility of evidence and its sufficiency, these principles explain and justify many existing evidentiary rules. Alex Stein is Professor of Law at the Benjamin N.Cardozo School of Law,New York.