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This Festschrift celebrates Teddy Seidenfeld and his seminal contributions to philosophy, statistics, probability, game theory and related areas. The 13 contributions in this volume, written by leading researchers in these fields, are supplemented by an interview with Teddy Seidenfeld that offers an abbreviated intellectual autobiography, touching on topics of timeless interest concerning truth and uncertainty. Indeed, as the eminent philosopher Isaac Levi writes in this volume: "In a world dominated by Alternative Facts and Fake News, it is hard to believe that many of us have spent our life’s work, as has Teddy Seidenfeld, in discussing truth and uncertainty." The reader is invited to share this celebration of Teddy Seidenfeld’s work uncovering truths about uncertainty and the penetrating insights they offer to our common pursuit of truth in the face of uncertainty.
Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a noncooperative game. Most dynamic analyses of evolutionary games are based on their normal forms, despite the fact that many interesting games are specified more naturally through their extensive forms. Because every extensive form game has a normal form representation, some theorists hold that the best way to analyze an extensive form game is simply to ignore the extensive form structure and study the game in its normal form representation. This book rejects that suggestion, arguing that a game's normal form representation often omits essential information from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game theory.
This volume collects papers from Hugo Sonnenschein's students. It aims to demonstrate his tremendous impact as an advisor. The papers span decades and present some of the most important articles in microeconomic theory. Each paper is accompanied with a preface by the student providing background on the paper and indicating Hugo's influence on its genesis. The papers all lie in microeconomic theory, and moreover all make fundamental contributions to the foundations of the theory.
The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for two decades and this book explores this further by gathering specialists from different professional communities, i.e., economics, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. This volume considers the issues of knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, with each contribution evaluating the foundational issues. In particular, emphasis is placed on epistemic logic and the representative topics of backward induction arguments and syntax/semantics and the logical omniscience problem. Part I of this collection deals with iterated knowledge in the multi-agent context, and more particularly with common knowledge. The first two papers in Part II of the collection address the so-called logical omniscience problem, a problem which has attracted much attention in the recent epistemic logic literature, and is pertinent to some of the issues discussed by decision theorists under the heading 'bounded rationality'. The remaining two chapters of section II provide two quite different angles on the strength of S5 (or the partitional model of information)- and so two different reasons for eschewing the strong form of logical omniscience implicit in S5. Part III gives attention to application to game theory and decision theory.
Game Theory and Exercises introduces the main concepts of game theory, along with interactive exercises to aid readers’ learning and understanding. Game theory is used to help players understand decision-making, risk-taking and strategy and the impact that the choices they make have on other players; and how the choices of those players, in turn, influence their own behaviour. So, it is not surprising that game theory is used in politics, economics, law and management. This book covers classic topics of game theory including dominance, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, repeated games, perturbed strategie s, beliefs, perfect equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and replicator dynamics. It also covers recent topics in game theory such as level-k reasoning, best reply matching, regret minimization and quantal responses. This textbook provides many economic applications, namely on auctions and negotiations. It studies original games that are not usually found in other textbooks, including Nim games and traveller’s dilemma. The many exercises and the inserts for students throughout the chapters aid the reader’s understanding of the concepts. With more than 20 years’ teaching experience, Umbhauer’s expertise and classroom experience helps students understand what game theory is and how it can be applied to real life examples. This textbook is suitable for both undergraduate and postgraduate students who study game theory, behavioural economics and microeconomics.
During the last decade I have explored the consequences of what I have chosen to call the 'consistent preferences' approach to deductive reasoning in games. To a great extent this work has been done in coop eration with my co-authors Martin Dufwenberg, Andres Perea, and Ylva Sovik, and it has lead to a series of journal articles. This book presents the results of this research program. Since the present format permits a more extensive motivation for and presentation of the analysis, it is my hope that the content will be of interest to a wider audience than the corresponding journal articles can reach. In addition to active researcher in the field, it is intended for graduate students and others that wish to study epistemic conditions for equilibrium and rationalizability concepts in game theory. Structure of the book This book consists of twelve chapters. The main interactions between the chapters are illustrated in Table 0.1. As Table 0.1 indicates, the chapters can be organized into four dif ferent parts. Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the subsequent analysis by introducing the 'consistent preferences' approach, and by presenting ex amples and concepts that are revisited throughout the book. Chapters 3 and 4 present the decision-theoretic framework and the belief operators that are used in later chapters. Chapters 5, 6, 10, and 11 analyze games in the strategic form, while the remaining chapters-Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 12-are concerned with games in the extensive form.
Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form formulations of complex decision problems.