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Exploring Law's Empire is a collection of essays examining the work of Ronald Dworkin in the philosophy of law and constitutionalism. A group of leading legal theorists develop, defend and critique the major areas of Dworkin's work, including his criticism of legal positivism, his theory of law as integrity, and his work on constitutional theory. The volume concludes with a lengthy response to the essays by Dworkin himself, which develops and clarifies many of his positions on the central questions of legal and constitutional theory. The volume represents an ideal companion for students and scholars embarking on a study of Dworkin's work.
Interpretivist theories of law / Nicos Stavropoulos -- How facts make law / Mark Greenberg -- On the normative significance of brute facts / Ram Neta -- On practices and the law / Mark Greenberg -- Supervenience, value, and legal content / Enrique Villanueva -- Reasons without values? / Mark Greenberg -- Theory, practice and ubiquitous interpretation : the basics / Martin Stone -- Law as a reflective practice / Scott Hershovitz -- On reflective practices and 'substituting for God' / Martin Stone -- Metasemantics and objectivity / Ori Simchen -- Can objectivity be grounded in semantics? / Michael S. Moore -- A hybrid theory of claim-rights / Gopal Sreenivasan -- Is the will theory of rights superseded by the hybrid theory? / Horacio Spector -- In defense of the hybrid theory / Gopal Sreenivasan.
This new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers which impose a moral duty on participants to respect each other's contributions. Moreover this collaborative task will often involve citizens taking an active role in their interaction with the law.
Understood one way, the branch of contemporary philosophical ethics that goes by the label "metaethics" concerns certain second-order questions about ethics-questions not in ethics, but rather ones about our thought and talk about ethics, and how the ethical facts (insofar as there are any) fit into reality. Analogously, the branch of contemporary philosophy of law that is often called "general jurisprudence" deals with certain second order questions about law- questions not in the law, but rather ones about our thought and talk about the law, and how legal facts (insofar as there are any) fit into reality. Put more roughly (and using an alternative spatial metaphor), metaethics concerns a range of foundational questions about ethics, whereas general jurisprudence concerns analogous questions about law. As these characterizations suggest, the two sub-disciplines have much in common, and could be thought to run parallel to each other. Yet, the connections between the two are currently mostly ignored by philosophers, or at least under-scrutinized. The new essays collected in this book are aimed at changing this state of affairs. Dimensions of Normativity collects together works by metaethicists and legal philosophers that address a number of issues that are of common interest, with the goal of accomplishing a new rapprochement between the two sub-disciplines.
Presents a systematic, contemporary defence of the natural law outlook in ethics, politics and jurisprudence.
What is the nature of law and what is the best way to discover it? This book argues that law is best understood in terms of the social functions it performs wherever it is found in human society. In order to support this claim, law is explained as a kind of institution and as a kind of artefact. To say that it is an institution is to say that it is designed for creating and conferring special statuses to people so as to alter their rights and responsibilities toward each other. To say that it is an artefact is to say that it is a tool of human creation that is designed to signal its usability to people who interact with it. This picture of law's nature is marshalled to critique theories of law that see it mainly as a product of reason or morality, understanding those theories via their conceptions of law's function. It is also used to argue against those legal positivists who see law's functions as relatively minor aspects of its nature. This method of conceptualizing law's nature helps us to explain how the law, understood as social facts, can make normative demands upon us. It also recommends a methodology for understanding law that combines elements of conceptual analysis with empirical research for uncovering the purposes to which diverse peoples put their legal activities.
In a series of essays John Gardner has developed distinctive and engaging answers to the central questions of legal philosophy, cutting through the technicalities of the subject to clarify and reinvigorate the main arguments about the nature of law. This volume collects that work to provide a major contribution to the literature on jurisprudence.
Causation is a foundational concept in tort law: in claims for compensation, a claimant must demonstrate that the defendant was a cause of the injury suffered in order for compensation to be awarded. Proof of Causation in Tort Law provides a critical, comparative and theoretical analysis of the general proof rules of causation underlying the tort laws of England, Germany and France, as well as the exceptional departures from these rules which each system has made. Exploring the different approaches to uncertainty over causation in tort law, Sandy Steel defends the justifiability of some of these exceptions, and categorises and examines the kinds of exceptional rules suggested by the case law and literature. Critically engaged with both the theoretical literature and current legal doctrine, this book will be of interest to private law scholars, judges and legal practitioners.
A British colony of fifty souls in the Pacific Ocean, Pitcairn Island was settled by the Bounty mutineers and nineteen Polynesians in 1790. In 2004 six Pitcairn men were convicted of numerous offences against girls and young women, committed over a thirty year period, in what appears to have been a culture of sexual abuse on the island. This case has raised many questions: what right did the British government have to initiate these prosecutions? Was it fair to prosecute the defendants, given that no laws had been published on the island? Indeed, what, if any, law was there on this island? This collection of essays explores the many important issues raised by the case and by the situation of a small, isolated community of this kind. It starts by looking at the background to the prosecutions, considering the dilemma that faced the British government when the abuse was uncovered, and discussing the ways in which the judges dealt with the case, as well as exploring the history of the settlement and how colonial law affects it. This background paves the way for an exploration of the philosophical, jurisprudential, and ethical issues raised by the prosecutions: was it legitimate for the UK to intervene, given the absence of any common community between the UK and the island? Was the positivist 'law on paper' approach adopted by the British government and the courts appropriate, especially given the lack of promulgation of the laws under which the men were prosecuted? Would alternative responses such as payment of compensation to the female victims and provision of community support have been preferable? And should universal human rights claims justify the prosecutions, overriding any allegations of cultural relativism on the part of the UK?