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Eventually every conqueror, every imperial power, every occupying army gets out. Why do they decide to leave? And how do political and military leaders manage withdrawal? Do they take with them those who might be at risk if left behind? What are the immediate consequences of departure? For Michael Walzer and Nicolaus Mills, now is the time to ask those questions about exiting—and to worry specifically about the difficulties certain to arise as we leave—Iraq. Getting Out approaches these issues in two sections. The first, entitled "Lessons Learned," examines seven historical cases of how and how not to withdraw: Britain's departure from the American colonies and from India, the French withdrawal from Algeria, Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza, and the U.S. decision to leave (or not leave) the Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam. These cases offer a comparative perspective and an opportunity to learn from the history of political and military retreats. The second section, "Exiting Iraq," begins with an introduction to just how the United States got into Iraq and continues with an examination of how the U.S. might leave from a diversity of voices, ranging from those who believe that the Iraq war has produced no real good to those who hope for a decent ending. In addition to essays by volume editors Walzer and Mills, Getting Out features contributions by Shlomo Avineri, Rajeev Bhargava, David Bromwich, Frances FitzGerald, Stanley Karnow, Brendan O'Leary, George Packer, Todd Shepard, Fred Smoler, and Stanley Weintraub.
Within months of the United States and its coalition partners toppling Saddam Husseins government, the Cato Institute convened a special task force of scholars and policy experts to examine U.S. strategic interests in Iraq and to question the Bush administrations intention to 2stay as long as necessary. 3 The result of their efforts was a book of their analysis that was published near the one-year anniversary of the occupation -- Exiting Iraq. As the war now enters its fourth year, Exiting Iraq remains as clear and incisive as ever, with the added dimension of its being so prophetic in what it saw, predicted, and urgently recommended. In addition to the members (listed below) of the special task force calling for the military occupation to end they showed how the presence of troops in Iraq distracts attention from fighting al-Qaeda and emboldens a new class of terrorists to take up arms against the United States. Moreover, the report underscores how the occupation is enormously costly for American taxpayers, exposes our men and women in uniform to unnecessary risks, and undermines attempts to foster political and economic reform in the region. - Publisher.
Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. A former commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, he is a veteran of the Gulf War, having served on the USS Ticonderoga from 1990 to 1993.

U.S. Military Leaving Iraq

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations

Published: 2011

Total Pages: 70


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Former senator George McGovern and William R. Polk, a leading authority on the Middle East, offer a detailed plan for a speedy troop withdrawal from Iraq. During the phased withdrawal, to begin on December 31, 2006, and to be completed by June 30, 2007, they recommend that the Iraq government engage the temporary services of an international stabilization force to police the country. Other elements in the withdrawal plan include an independent accounting of American expenditures of Iraqi funds, reparations to Iraqi civilians for lives lost and property destroyed, immediate release of all prisoners of war, the closing of American detention centers, and offering to void all contracts for petroleum exploration, development, and marketing made during the American occupation.
Assesses what went wrong in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and outlines how the U.S. can restructure its foreign policy by following lessons learned in the Cold War.
U.S. military leaving Iraq: is the State Department ready? : hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session, March 2, 2011.
On 19 August 2010, the last combat unit - the 4th Stryker Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division - left Iraq as Operation Iraqi Freedom became Operation New Dawn. Already our troop strength is below 50,000 in Iraq. It's premature to say that we have won, but we are leaving an Iraq that is "not perfect, but good enough to leave," as the Washington Post's chief Iraqi correspondent Ernesto Londono put it recently. This is a remarkable turn of events from just a few years ago. Yet, we do not clearly understand just what we did that pulled a potential victory from the jaws of defeat. Conventional wisdom claims that we prevailed because of the American surge between 2007 and 2008 and an aggressive shift in tactical operations to effective counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. These COIN principles included changing our focus from killing and capturing insurgents to protecting the population and liberally funding economic development projects plus essential services. The additional manpower of the surge and placing small combat outposts among the population were critical to our success. The "Awakening" in 2006 removed a large pool of Sunni insurgents. Partnering with Iraqi Security Forces and the "Sons of Iraq" militia was also very effective. However, our nonlethal effects were far less important than is usually credited. This is especially true of the billions of dollars we spent on projects and services.
A Wall Street Journal Best Nonfiction Book of 2012 In this follow-up to their national bestseller Cobra II, Michael Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor deftly piece together the story of the most widely reported but least understood war in American history. This stunning account of the political and military struggle between American, Iraqi, and Iranian forces brings together vivid reporting of diplomatic intrigue and gripping accounts of the blow-by-blow fighting that lasted nearly a decade. Informed by brilliant research, classified documents, and extensive interviews with key figures—including everyone from the intelligence community to Sunni and Shi’ite leaders and former insurgents to senior Iraqi military officers—The Endgame presents a riveting chronicle of the occupation of Iraq to the withdrawal of American troops that is sure to remain the essential account of the war for years to come.
Situating Obama’s end-of-war discourse in the historical context of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Obama, the Media, and Framing the U.S. Exit from Iraq and Afghanistan begins with a detailed comparison with the Bush war-on-terror security narrative before examining elements of continuity and change in post-9/11 elite rhetoric. Erika King deftly employs two case studies of presidential and media framing - the weeks surrounding the formal announcements of Obama’s December 2009 'surge-then-exit' strategy from Afghanistan and the end of combat operations in Iraq in August 2010 - to explore the role of mass media in presenting presidential narratives of war and finds evidence of an interpretive disconnect between the media and a president seeking to present a more nuanced approach to keeping America safe. Eloquently scrutinizing Obama’s discourse on the U.S. exit from two post-9/11 wars and contrasting the presidential endgame frame with the U.S. mainstream media’s narratives of the wars’ meaning, accomplishments, and denouement provides a unique combination of qualitative content analysis and topical case studies and makes this volume an ideal resource for scholars and researchers grappling with the complicated and ever-evolving nexus of war, the president, and the media.