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The Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) holds more than $40 billion that is at the disposal of the US Secretary of the Treasury for use in foreign exchange intervention and international financial support operations. Its use in the Mexican rescue package of 1995 brought the ESF into the public spotlight for the first time in recent years, and it has been deployed in Brazil and several Asian crisis countries as well. Its availability for such packages and its total control by the Treasury secretary have therefore become very controversial. Randall Henning's study maintains that the Fund is an important element of US foreign policy and economic policy and that it should remain under the exclusive control of the Treasury, but that Congress should exercise effective oversight. Henning also covers the legislative history of the ESF and outlines the principles by which the Fund should be administered.
In 1958, 1976, and 1985, Argentina experienced severe imbalances of its external accounts, which led to attempts at economic stabilization through an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. This book examines these IMF-supported programs and their success in alleviating Argentina's economic problems. Luigi Manzetti explores three aspects of the issue: the programs' impact on the Argentine economy from a policy management perspective; the methods by which different political regimes coped with similar problems and the level of their success; and the relationship between economic stabilization and political institutions, with particular emphasis on why IMF-supported programs encounter problems and how these problems can be overcome. Exploring the previously overlooked relationship between economic and public policies, Manzetti begins his study by examining the balance of payments problems that afflict developing countries along with the role played by the IMF in solving them. He assesses IMF involvement both in terms of economic theory and policy recommendations, portraying the academic debate that for years has surrounded the IMF. The peculiarities of the Argentine case are outlined, as are contending interpretations of the country's chronic economic crises. A set of three chapters fully details the stabilization plans of the Frondizi, Videla, and Alfonsin administrations. Finally, a concluding chapter argues that wrong assumptions by the IMF and the mistakes of Argentina's policy makers were responsible for the limited success of the programs. This work will be an important reference tool for courses in economic development and Latin American studies, as well as a useful resource for academic and professional libraries.

The Argentinian Debt

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy

Published: 1984

Total Pages: 112


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The catastrophic crisis of late 2001 and early 2002 marks the tragic end to Argentina's initially successful, decade-long experiment with sound money and market-oriented economic reform. The IMF consistently Supported Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts in the decade leading up to the current crisis and often pointed to many of Argentina's policies as examples for other emerging-market economies to emulate. In this policy analysis, former IMF Chief Economist Michael Mussa addresses the obvious question: What went wrong in Argentina and what important errors did the IMF make in either supporting inappropriate policies or in failing to press for alternatives that might have avoided catastrophe? He emphasizes that the persistent inability of the Argentine authorities at all levels to run a responsible fiscal policy--even when the Argentine economy was performing very well--was the primary avoidable cause of the country's catastrophic financial collapse. The IMF failed to press aggressively for a more responsible fiscal policy. Mussa also addresses the role of the Convertibility Plan, which linked the Argentine peso rigidly at parity with the US dollar and played a central role in both the initial success and ultimate collapse of Argentina's stabilization and reform efforts. While the IMF accepted this plan as a basic policy choice of the Argentine authorities so long as it remained viable, it erred in the summer of 2001 by extending further massive support for unsustainable policies, rather than insisting on a new policy strategy that might have mitigated some of the damage from a crisis that had become unavoidable. Mussa lays out what needs to be done to restore economic andfinancial stability in Argentina and begin the process of recovery, including the proper role of the IMF and the international community. He also examines what the IMF can do to avoid repeating the types of mistakes it made in t
Despite a difficult economic context, President Macri’s administration, over the past two and a half years, has taken bold steps to eliminate a wide range of distortions in the economy. Efforts were also made to strengthen institutions (including the complete reconstruction of the statistics agency, in an effort to restore credibility to Argentine data), as well as an assertive effort to tackle corruption. Despite these efforts, a gradual approach to fiscal consolidation, combined with a tightening of global financial conditions, a poor harvest, and the introduction of a tax on nonresident holdings of short-term central bank paper, generated significant anxiety among market participants. Starting in mid-April, Argentina came under abrupt balance of payments pressures as both domestic and foreign investors decided to liquidate their position in onshore peso assets. To stem the outflows, the authorities significantly increased short-term interest rates, tightened fiscal policy, and sold foreign exchange. Shortly after taking these steps the government announced its intention to approach the IMF for an exceptional access Stand-By Arrangement.
In 2001- 02, Argentina experienced one of the worst economic crises in its history. A default on government debt, which occurred against the backdrop of a prolonged recession, sent the Argentine currency and economy into a tailspin. Although the economy has since recovered from the worst, the crisis has imposed hardships on the people of Argentina, and the road back to sustained growth and stability is long. The crisis was all the more troubling in light of the fact that Argentina was widely considered a model reformer and was engaged in a succession of IMF-supported programs through much of the 1990s. This Occasional Paper examines the origins of the crisis and its evolution up to early 2002 and draws general policy lessons, both for countries’ efforts to prevent crises and for the IMF’s surveillance and use of its financial resources.