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This book analyses Russia-Europe/EU relations by exploring their practical essence and conceptualizing them in terms of the main categories of international relations research. It argues that the liberal world order, established in Cold War days, whereby international relations are underpinned by a global balance of power and a highly institutionalized framework of international relations, thereby balancing power and morality, continued after the Cold War, with high hopes in the early 1990s for a new order of security and cooperation for all Europe, including Russia. It goes on to show how the liberal world order has broken down, one manifestation of this being the new conflict between Russia and Europe in recent years, a conflict resulting from the failure of European countries/the EU to acknowledge the actual balance of military, economic and political power, the lack of limits on the policy of European countries in terms of infringing on Russia’s interests, and Russia’s consequent revision, after 1999, of its policy of co-operation. Overall, the book provides huge insight into the nature of Europe-Russia relations.
This book contributes to the debate about a new German power in Europe with an analysis of Germany’s role in European Russia policy. It provides an up-to-date account of Germany’s “Ostpolitik” and how Germany has influenced EU-Russia relations since the Eastern enlargement in 2004 - partly along, partly against the interests and preferences of new member states. The volume combines a rich empirical analysis of Russia policy with a theory-based perspective on Germany’s power and influence in the EU. The findings demonstrate that despite Germany’s central role, exercising power within the EU is dependent on legitimacy and acceptance by other member states.
The cover shows one side of a medallion commemorating the 1807 Treaty of Tilsit, ending the War of the Fourth Coalition (1806-07), signed by Alexander I of Russia (right) and Napoleon I of France - symbolic representatives of Russia and Europe. The treaty called for self-interested cooperation, in place of warfare, between the two powers. Despite the amicable embrace of the emperors, the medallion conveys the lingering wariness between the two former, and future, opponents. In this book, Danilevskii speaks of the Treaty of Tilsit with regret, as a lost opportunity for Russia to pursue its national ambitions and historical destiny: to liberate the Slavs from Habsburg and Ottoman rule and unite them under its own protective hegemony. Instead, Danilevskii says, Russia put European interests ahead of its own, triggering the invasion of 1812 and its aftermath. It continued serving European rather than Russian interests from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 through its intervention in Hungary, to prop up Habsburg rule, in 1849. For this service it was repaid with ingratitude, when the European powers united against it in the invasion of Crimea in 1853. Danilevskii's attempt at an explanation for Europe's ingratitude and hostility toward Russia, is the starting point of this book. -- from back cover.
The end of the Soviet system and the transition to the market in Russia, coupled with the inexorable rise of nationalism, has brought to the fore the centuries-old debate about Russia's relationship with Europe. In Russia and the Idea of Europe Iver Neumann discusses whether the tensions between self-referencing romantic nationalist views and Europe-orientated liberal views can ever be resolved. Drawing on a wide range of Russian sources, Neumann outlines the argument as it has unfolded over the last two hundred years, showing how Russia is caught between the attraction of an economically, politically and socially more developed Europe, and the attraction of being able to play a European -style inperial role in less-developed Asia. Neumann argues that the process of delineating a European "other" from the Russian self is an active form of Russian identity formation. The Russian debate about Europe is also a debate about what Rusia is and should be.
When thinking about relations between Europe and Russia, International Relations scholars focus on why conflict has replaced cooperation. The "geostrategic debate" excludes the possible coexistence of cooperation and conflict. Tracking the evolution of conflict and cooperation patterns in three zones of contact (Estonia, Kaliningrad, Moldova) between 1991 and 2016, this edited volume argues that, although the standard narrative remains compelling, local patterns of cooperation and conflict are partly autonomous from the geostrategic level. To account for the coexistence of cooperation and conflict, the first chapter elaborates a theoretical proposition distinguishing fluid, rigid, and disputed symbolic boundaries, which have different impacts on the ground. The subsequent chapters address distinct dimensions of Euro-Russian relations, paying attention to local reality in Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine or Kaliningrad, different sectors from energy to peoples' movement, and across institutional contexts such as the EU and NATO. They confirm that the standard narrative holds in most cases, but also that Euro-Russian relations vary in crucial ways according to the interests and representations of actors immersed in specific geopolitical fields. Despite a deterioration of geostrategic relations between Europe and Russia since the end of the Soviet Union, Cooperation and Conflict between Europe and Russia explores the intriguing coexistence of conflict and cooperation at the local level and across sectors and institutions. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of the East European Politics.
Russia has never been able to escape its relationship with Europe, or Europe with Russia. Geography and history have conspired to make them both neighbors and unavoidable factors in each other s daily lives. From the early 1700s until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe and Moscow both relied on material power to balance against any threats emerging from East and West. More recently, Europe and the EU have adopted a different strategy: make Russia non-threatening by making it European, like "us." Meanwhile, Russia s resistance to Europe s assimilationist mission is increasingly robust, fuelled by energy exports to Europe and the world. Contributors to this volume wrestle with the question of whether the European project is feasible, desirable, or even ethical.
The optimistic vision of a “Europe whole and free” after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 has given way to disillusionment, bitterness, and renewed hostility between Russia and the West. In No Place for Russia, William H. Hill traces the development of the post–Cold War European security order to explain today’s tensions, showing how attempts to integrate Russia into a unified Euro-Atlantic security order were gradually overshadowed by the domination of NATO and the EU—at Russia’s expense. Hill argues that the redivision of Europe has been largely unintended and not the result of any single decision or action. Instead, the current situation is the cumulative result of many decisions—reasonably made at the time—that gradually produced the current security architecture and led to mutual mistrust. Hill analyzes the United States’ decision to remain in Europe after the Cold War, the emergence of Germany as a major power on the continent, and the transformation of Russia into a nation-state, placing major weight on NATO’s evolution from an alliance dedicated primarily to static collective territorial defense into a security organization with global ambitions and capabilities. Closing with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine, No Place for Russia argues that the post–Cold War security order in Europe has been irrevocably shattered, to be replaced by a new and as-yet-undefined order.
The relationship between Germany and Russia is Europe's most important link with the largest country on the continent. This book analyses how successive German governments from 1991 to 2014 have misread Russian intentions, until Angela Merkel sharply recalibrated German and EU policy towards Moscow.
Russian-European political relations have always been problematic and one of the main reasons for this is the different perspectives on even the very basic notions and concepts of political life. With a worldwide recession, the problems as well as the opportunities in Russian-European relations are magnified. While most works on Russian-European, Russian-American and Russian-West relations focus on current policies and explain them from a standard set of explanatory variables, this book penetrates deeper into the structural and ideational differences that tend to bring about misperceptions, miscalculations, misinterpretations and misdeeds in this two-directional relationship. It applies a very broad conceptual framework to analyse differences that are as relevant for Europe and the EU as it is to Russia’s immediate neighbours and, while doing so, identifies the key factors that will dominate Russia-EU ties in the next decade.
This timely book offers a multifaceted analysis of EU-Russian relations, drawing on the investigation of competing models of international society. Makarychev argues that the huge variety of interest-based and normative models is best explained through the study of foreign policy and identity discourses. His approach defies simplistic explanations of EU-Russian relations as either destined for cooperation or doomed to constant collisions. Instead, Makarychev unveils multiple alternatives that both the EU and Russia face in their policies toward each other. Assessing the repercussions ongoing EU-Russian discord has on Europe and the world, Makarychev's volume reveals the interconnectedness of the discourses dominating the EU and Russia while also accounting for the deep-seated disconnect between them.