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This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focused on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper develops for these planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCOM's area of responsibility-ethnic conflict caused by spillover from neighboring countries. This paper also attempts to counter critics in the January-February 2000 Foreign Affairs who maintained that our obtuse military ties are not sensible nor sustainable. They described our current activities as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities in Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations from authors Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, although mostly unfounded, are perceptions that senior economists and political scientists hold. This paper helps CENTCOM "fire for effect" in developing and implementing a dynamic engagement strategy in this important region.
This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focused on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper develops for these planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCOM's area of responsibility—ethnic conflict caused by spillover from neighboring countries. This paper also attempts to counter critics in the January–February 2000 Foreign Affairs who maintained that our obtuse military ties are not sensible nor sustainable. They described our current activities as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities in Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations from authors Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, although mostly unfounded, are perceptions that senior economists and political scientists hold. This paper helps CENTCOM “fire for effect” in developing and implementing a dynamic engagement strategy in this important region. This paper develops the theoretical framework of ethnic conflict, generated both internally and from spillover. This framework is then applied to Central Asia, illustrating it as a complex region of numerous ethnic groups in a bad neighborhood with some powerful bad neighbors. These neighbors, as well as the United States, have vital interests in engaging in this region. These interests—derived from the national security strategy—revolve around vital, important, and tertiary interests including humanitarian issues. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational drug smuggling are major threats, while Central Asian resources and US influence and credibility are major goals of US and CENTCOM involvement here. This involvement has been seemingly disjointed and even at odds with other governmental agencies. CENTCOM activities— currently limited to only three of the five republics—are rated on effect and analyzed into general courses of action. This paper sets the stage for all CENTCOM policies by establishing “bounding” questions that can be used to guide productive CENTCOM engagement through the complexities of Central Asia and its possible ethnic conflict.
This paper identifies a possible shortfall in US military planning, the experience of CENTCOM planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focused on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper will develop for these planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCOM's AOR ethnic conflict caused by spillover from neighboring countries. This paper will also attempt to counter critics in the January/February 2000 Foreign Affairs who maintain that our obtuse military ties are not sensible nor sustainable. They describe our current activities as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities in Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations from Jaffe and Manning, although most unfounded, are perceptions that senior economists and political scientists hold. This paper will help CENTCOM fire for effect in developing and implementing a dynamic engagement strategy in this important region. The paper develops the theoretical framework of ethnic conflict, generated both internally and from spillover. Then this framework is applied to Central Asia, illustrating it as a complex region of numerous ethnic groups in a bad neighborhood with some powerful bad neighbors. These neighbors, as well as the United States have vital interests in engaging in this region. Those interests, derived from the NSS, revolve around vital, important, and tertiary interests including humanitarian issues. WMD proliferation and transnational drug smuggling are major threats while Central Asian resources and US influence and credibility are major goals of US and CENTCOM involvement here. This involvement has been seemingly disjointed and even at odds with other governmental agencies. CENTCOM activities, currently limited to only three of the five republics is rated on effect and analyzed into general courses of action.
In the region of Central Asia and South Caucasus, what is the potential for armed conflict, and how might such outbreaks escalate to a level that could involve U.S. forces? The authors evaluate the key political, economic, and societal faultlines underlying the likelihood of conflict in the region, assessing their implications for regional stability and for U.S. interests and potential involvement over the next 10 to 15 years.
USCENTCOM will add the Central Asian nations of Kazaidistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan to its Area of Responsibility (AOR) effective October 1, 1999. The region's huge gas and oil reserves, ethnic and religious volatility, and immature governments (having only been in existence since the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse) mark it as a potential "flashpoint" for conflict as the millenium approaches. This analysis of geopolitics and demography highlights USCENTCOM's challenges. China, it is argued, represents more of a threat to Central Asian stability than Russia, though several states are competing for influence in a revival of last century's "great game." The U.S. imperative is to ensure that no regional hegemon emerges as Central Asian economies and, presumably, democracies mature. Proposals for USCENTCOM action as prelude to next years AOR adjustment include: 1) 1nstitutionalizing U.S. Atlantic Command's Central Asian Battalion peacekeeping exercise concept; 2) Establishing a cross-specialty HQUSCENTCOM Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (JTFAC) to consolidate and expand expertise on Central Asia, with a focus on rapid crisis response; 3) Sponsoring a forum to integrate the JTFAC with governmental and civilian representatives to include energy and technology industries, economic aid institutions, agriculture, environmental protection and restoration, cultural exchange, and law enforcement professionals; 4) Appointing USCENTCOM Security Assistance Officers to ambassadorial staffs in each of the Central Asian embassies; and 5) Offering expanded International Military Training and Education opportunities to Central Asian defense establishment personnel.
A leading authority on Central Asia offers a sweeping review of the region's path from independence to the post-9/11 world. The first decade of Central Asian independence was disappointing for those who envisioned a straightforward transition from Soviet republics to independent states with market economies and democratic political systems. Leaders excused political failures by pointing to security risks, including the presence of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. The situation changed dramatically after 9/11, when the camps were largely destroyed and the United States introduced a military presence. More importantly the international community engaged with these states to give them a "second chance" to address social and economic problems. But neither the aid-givers nor the recipients were willing to approach problems in new ways. Now, terrorists groups are once again making their presence felt and some states may be becoming global security risks. This book explores how the region squandered its second chance and what might happen next.
[Includes 12 maps and 4 tables] In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars. Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1801-59), the subjugation of Central Asia (1839-81), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army (1918-33), and the Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89). The history of these wars—especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed in them—offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.
Democracy promotion, security and energy are the predominant themes of US policy in Central Asia after the Cold War. This book analyses how the Bush administration understood and pursued its interests in the Central Asia states, namely Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan. It discusses the shift in US interests after September 11 and highlights key ideas, actors and processes that have been driving US policy in Central Asia. The author examines the similarities between the Bush and Obama administrations’ attitudes towards the region, and he points to the inadequacy of the personality focused, partisan accounts that have all too often been deployed to describe the two presidential administrations. To understand US Central Asian policy, it is necessary to appreciate the factors behind its continuities as well as the legacies of the September 11 attacks. Using case studies on the war on terror, energy and democracy, drawing on personal interviews with Americans and Central Asians as well as the fairly recent releases of declassified and leaked US Government documents via sources like the Rumsfeld Papers and Wikileaks, the author argues that the US approached Central Asia as a non-unitary state with an ambiguous hierarchy of interests. Traditionally domestic issues could be internationalised and non-state actors were able to play significant roles. The actual relationships between its interests were neither as harmonious nor as conflicted as the administration and some of its critics claimed. Shedding new light on US relations with Central Asia, this book is of interest to scholars of Central Asia, US Politics and International Relations.