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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that study the market for consumer information. The first chapter studies the role of information intermediaries and their impact on consumer privacy. The second chapter presents an analysis of signaling in credit and insurance markets through default and repayment decisions. The third chapter studies some special topics such the manipulation of credit histories by fake borrowing or deletion of records. It also identifies a learning mechanism through which uninformed consumers can endogenously learn the link between credit market behavior and insurance market outcomes.
This paper assesses the impact of information asymmetries on developing country financing and considers alternative techniques to reduce the adverse implications of such asymmetries. Following an introduction, Section II examines in general terms the role of information in financial markets and analyzes the incentive and risk sharing properties of alternative financial contracts. Information asymmetries which are present in domestic finance are more prevalent in international finance, in particular in developing country financing. Section III reviews measures aiming to resolve information asymmetries. Borrowing and creditor country regulations and policies, as well as innovative contractual agreements help to resolve a range of issues related to information asymmetries. However, despite their contribution, residual problems remain unresolved. The international financial institutions, and in particular the Fund, have an important role to play in alleviating information asymmetries.
This book contains a number of papers presented at a workshop organised by the World Bank in 1997 on the theme of 'Social Capital: Integrating the Economist's and the Sociologist's Perspectives'. The concept of 'social capital' is considered through a number of theoretical and empirical studies which discuss its analytical foundations, as well as institutional and statistical analyses of the concept. It includes the classic 1987 article by the late James Coleman, 'Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital', which formed the basis for the development of social capital as an organising concept in the social sciences.
Traditionally, economic growth and business cycles have been treated independently. However, the dependence of GDP levels on its history of shocks, what economists refer to as “hysteresis,” argues for unifying the analysis of growth and cycles. In this paper, we review the recent empirical and theoretical literature that motivate this paradigm shift. The renewed interest in hysteresis has been sparked by the persistence of the Global Financial Crisis and fears of a slow recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. The findings of the recent literature have far-reaching conceptual and policy implications. In recessions, monetary and fiscal policies need to be more active to avoid the permanent scars of a downturn. And in good times, running a high-pressure economy could have permanent positive effects.
Seventeen in a series of annual reports comparing business regulation in 190 economies, Doing Business 2020 measures aspects of regulation affecting 10 areas of everyday business activity.
World Bank Technical Paper No. 295. The progress made by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in privatizing state-owned enterprises has created millions of new shareholders. But for the citizenry to buy and sell shares, these countries must develop stock markets and related institutions such as brokerages, clearing and settling organizations, and regulatory agencies. This paper examines the role of capital markets in the new market economies of Central and Eastern Europe and to what extent governments in the region should encourage the development of such markets. The authors address questions of whether the capital markets will serve merely as a forum for trading stocks or become a source of new equity capital to help restructure the enterprises of the region and whether governments should take a hands-off approach by letting the necessary institutions develop as they are needed or should actively create stock exchanges and establish the overall legal and regulatory framework.
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.