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Cette thèse est composée de trois essais indépendants qui ont tous un contenu principalement empirique. En se référant aux modèles de "political economy", chacun de ces essais cherche à metttre en évidence l'influence des attitudes individuelles sur la politique migratoire. Le premier essai, en exploitant le système de démocratie directe suisse, présente une analyse des déterminants des choix de vote et de participation dans le contexte de votations demandant davantage de restrictions à l'immigration. En se basant sur des données de sondage, le deuxième essai tente d'identifier les principaux déterminants des attitudes envers les immigrants dans divers pays européens. S'appuyant sur le fédéralisme suisse, le troisième essai étudie les déterminants des taux d'imposition fixés par les communes du canton de Vaud et tente de mettre en évidence si la concurrence fiscale liée à la mobilité des individus a un effet négatif sur ces taux.
Cette thèse est composée de trois essais indépendants qui ont tous un contenu principalement empirique. En se référant aux modèles de "political economy", chacun de ces essais cherche à metttre en évidence l'influence des attitudes individuelles sur la politique migratoire. Le premier essai, en exploitant le système de démocratie directe suisse, présente une analyse des déterminants des choix de vote et de participation dans le contexte de votations demandant davantage de restrictions à l'immigration. En se basant sur des données de sondage, le deuxième essai tente d'identifier les principaux déterminants des attitudes envers les immigrants dans divers pays européens. S'appuyant sur le fédéralisme suisse, le troisième essai étudie les déterminants des taux d'imposition fixés par les communes du canton de Vaud et tente de mettre en évidence si la concurrence fiscale liée à la mobilité des individus a un effet négatif sur ces taux.
This Handbook discusses theoretical approaches to migration studies in general, as well as confronting various issues in international migration from a distinctive and unique international political economy perspective. With a focus on the relation bet
All observed government policies must pass through a political process. In many macroeconomic settings, the implemented policies affect the economy not only during the current period, but also the future path of the economy. In this dissertation, I investigate policies pertaining to immigration, redistribution, and poverty reduction. In the first chapter, I study how politics jointly determine the economy's redistribution and immigration policies. I develop a dynamic political economy model featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and retirees. The model also features both inter- and intra-generational redistribution, resembling a welfare state. To analyze multi-group political economy equilibria, I extend the class of dynamic political games featuring Subgame-perfect Markov as its equilibrium concept. The analysis allows for strategic voting behavior, where voters may vote for a candidate not directly representing their group. Because the policy preference of the unskilled workers is the most intermediate, other groups may choose to side with this policy choice in order to avoid their least preferred candidate. For the unskilled workers, inequality plays a key role in determining the degree of redistribution. Therefore, immigration ultimately affects the generosity of the welfare state by altering the level of inequality in the economy. The objectives of the second chapter are twofold. First, the chapter tries to understand the relationship between immigration and asset prices. The analysis reveals that the asset price responds positively to immigration. The immigration's influence goes through four channels: increasing saving, increasing marginal product of capital, decreasing marginal cost of investment, and raising population growth rate. After the preceding analysis, I study how different cohorts will harness these benefits through political interactions. This exercise reveals that the young cohort may have a strategic motive to influence the identity of the decisive voter in the next period to ensure the highest return on their savings in retirement. In addition, the model also predicts that the uncertainty in the population growth rate of the immigrants will lower these immigration quotas. The last chapter moves away from international policy arena and focuses domestically on escaping a poverty trap. Prior studies conclude that redistribution is a futile policy against this vicious cycle of poverty. I revisit this line of literature and show contrary to this conclusion that redistribution can help the economy escape the poverty trap. I characterize a necessary sequence of lump-sum taxes and transfers and show that this scheme will move the economy out of the poverty trap in finite time regardless of the economy's initial distribution of wealth. Unfortunately, I also show that neither basic democracy nor dictatorship can take the economy there with this policy scheme. The rationale for this is the following. The proposed escape route from poverty requires an economic input from the richer group. However, the shift in the decisive political influence during the path of development, from the hands of the poor to the hands of the rich, will put an end to this pro-poor policy scheme.
This thesis in four chapters focuses on political economy, migration, and public economics. The first chapter, joint with Vincent Pons and Clémence Tricaud, investigates the effects of campaign finance rules on electoral outcomes. In French departmental and municipal elections, candidates competing in districts above 9,000 inhabitants face spending limits and are eligible for public reimbursement. Using an RDD around the population threshold, we find that these rules increase competitiveness and benefit the runner-up of the previous race as well as new candidates, in departmental elections, while leaving the polarization and representativeness of the results unaffected. These results appear to be driven by the reimbursement of campaign expenditures, not spending limits. We do not find such effects in municipal elections, which we attribute to the use of a proportional list system instead of plurality voting. The second chapter, joint with Lars Ludolph, analyzes the effects of the migration wave from Central and Eastern European countries (AC-12) following their EU accession in 2004 on local level redistribution in England. We apply a difference-in-differences estimation strategy and find that greater migration flows led to spending on means-tested social care services to decrease in relative terms, while spending on education services increased. Our mechanisms suggest that, because of AC-12 migrants' young age at the time of arrival, the 2004 EU enlargement alleviated some of the pressure faced by social care spending in England. We find no evidence that spending shifts are driven by a change in the local willingness to redistribute income. The third chapter investigates the effect of ideological distance between EU Commissioners for Agriculture and Regional Policy and heads of governments on the allocation of agricultural and regional funds flowing to member states. Results show that ideological distance is a strong deterrent of funds being channeled. The effects are strongest in pre-election years, for countries providing the Commissioners in charge of the given portfolios, and for countries that are single-party-ruled as opposed to coalition-ruled. These results provide first hand evidence that the behavior of European Commissioners follows similar principles to national level elected politicians and can help the debate surrounding EU reforms and the political independence of its executive body. The fourth chapter, joint with Pietro Panizza, exploits a reform in Italy that granted mayors the right to run for a third consecutive term in towns below 3,000 inhabitants. We employ a difference-indiscontinuity design and find evidence of pandering effects by mayors in both their first and second term at the time of the reform. Results differ depending on the term of the mayor reflecting the importance of the horizon of when mayors' spending decisions pay off. We also find suggestive evidence of potential capture of first term mayors in the south of Italy.
Aquesta tesi es compon de quatre assaigs empírics que estudien l'economia política de l'heterogeneïtat social, la migració internacional i la qualitat institucional. El primer assaig analitza l'impacte dels xocs de preus dels productes bàsics i l'heterogeneïtat social sobre la incidència de conflictes civils. Amb l'ús de dades del panell per als països en desenvolupament, aquest assaig mostra que els xocs dels preus dels productes bàsics influeixen en els conflictes intraestatals en relació amb les estructures de diversitat social preexistents, així com els tipus de productes bàsics. El segon assaig analitza les tendències de la migració internacional centrades en els immigrants africans a Europa. Mitjançant dades de panell sobre migració bilateral, es mostra que els fluxos migratoris estan determinats per factors polítics i socials, a més de factors econòmics. Els resultats suggereixen que les intervencions polítiques per part de la Unió Europea i l'associació amb països africans haurien d'abordar els factors polítics i socials, a més dels econòmics, per gestionar les migracions internacionals. El tercer assaig examina l'impacte conjunt del capital d'infraestructura i la qualitat institucional en el creixement econòmic mitjançant un gran conjunt de dades de 120 països. Els resultats mostren que els termes d'interacció entre el capital d'infraestructura i la qualitat institucional tenen un impacte positiu i significatiu en el creixement econòmic. Això posa de manifest el paper de la qualitat institucional en la productivitat econòmica del capital d'infraestructura. Finalment, el quart assaig, que és un treball en curs, examina com els emigrants - concretament els emigrants africans, en aquest context - afecten l'estabilitat política i les reformes institucionals dels seus països d'origen. Junts, aquests assajos contribueixen a comprendre els conflictes civils, la migració internacional i la qualitat institucional en contextos caracteritzats per relacions multilaterals entre països.