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Essays on Money, Banking and Regulation honors the interests and achievements of the Dutch economist Conrad Oort. The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 - Fiscal and monetary policy - reviews a variety of topics ranging from the measurement of money to the control and management of government expenditures. Part 2 - International institutions and international economic policy - looks at the international dimension of monetary and fiscal policy, with extensive discussion of the International Monetary Fund and the European Monetary Union. Part 3 - The future of international banking and the financial sector in the Netherlands - is an insider's view of the strategic choices facing financial institutions in the near future. Finally, Part 4 - Taxation and reforms in the Dutch tax system - is closest to Oort's research and practice since he has become known as an architect of the 1990 Dutch tax reform; this part is dedicated in particular to the tax reforms suggested by Oort.
Forrest Capie is an eminent economic historian who has published extensively on a wide range of topics, with an emphasis on banking and monetary history, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also in other areas such as tariffs and the interwar economy. He is a former editor of the Economic History Review, one of the leading academic journals in this discipline. Under the steely editorship of Geoffrey Wood, this book brings together a stellar line of of contributors - including Charles Goodhart, Harold James, Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Charles Calomiris, and Anna Schwartz. The book analyzes many of the mainstream themes in economic and financial history - monetary policy, international financial regulation, economic performance, exchange rate systems, international trade, banking and financial markets - where historical perspectives are considered important. The current wave of globalisation has stimulated interest in many of these areas as ‘lessons of history’ are sought. These themes also reflect the breadth of Capie’s work in terms of time periods and topics.
The many forces that led to the economic crisis of 2008 were in fact identified, analyzed and warned against for many years before the crisis by economist Jane D�Arista, among others. Now, writing in the tradition of D�Arista's extensive work, the
Kevin Dowd asserts that state intervention into financial and monetary systems has failed, and that we would be better off if financial markets were left to regulate themselves. This collection will appeal to students, researchers and policy makers in the monetary and financial area.
"Lawrence H. White deals with a major issue of the 1990s—reprivatization of money. He makes a cogent argument and presents evidence that private, competing currencies would provide more monetary stability than do central banks. Surprisingly enough, modern private money may emerge first in Eastern Europe, where the gap between the economy's need and the government's money is greates." —Richard Rahn, Vice President and Chief Economists, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. "Boldly, White makes a persuasive case for free banking....In time, we may well look back and regard Competition and Currency as crucial in the development of the economy and economic thought of the future." — The New York City Tribune "White is a leading analyst of a laissez-faire monetary system featuring a privately issued money supply. HIs perceptive insights force a rethinking of our present regulated monetary system and of what kind of reforms will remedy its defects. Avery worthwhile collection of essays for all students of monetary theory." —Philip Cagan, Columbia University "White is a leading analyst of a laissez-faire monetary system featuring a privately issued money supply. HIs perceptive insights force a rethinking of our present regulated monetary system and of what kind of reforms will remedy its defects. A very worthwhile collection of essays for all students of monetary theory." —Phillip Cagan, Columbia University "Newcomers to the literature...would be recommended to start with White's volume, where each paper is self-contained in its handling of particular aspects of free banking...Highly recommended as clear, well-argued expositions of the case for free banking, challenging assumptions common to much of monetary economics. It is particularly apposite that these assumptions be questioned at a time when institutional reform is so much on the agenda." —Sheila C. Dow, The Economic Journal
Forrest Capie is an eminent economic historian who has published extensively on a wide range of topics, with an emphasis on banking and monetary history, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also in other areas such as tariffs and the interwar economy. He is a former editor of the Economic History Review, one of the leading academic journals in this discipline. Under the steely editorship of Geoffrey Wood, this book brings together a stellar line of of contributors - including Charles Goodhart, Harold James, Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Charles Calomiris, and Anna Schwartz. The book analyzes many of the mainstream themes in economic and financial history - monetary policy, international financial regulation, economic performance, exchange rate systems, international trade, banking and financial markets - where historical perspectives are considered important. The current wave of globalisation has stimulated interest in many of these areas as ‘lessons of history’ are sought. These themes also reflect the breadth of Capie’s work in terms of time periods and topics.
The broad goal of this dissertation is to further our understanding of the relationship between real and financial sectors of an economy, to identify inefficiencies in financial sector intermediation, and to design financial regulation policies that can address these inefficiencies. The three chapters of this dissertation contribute to specific aspects of the above goal. In the first chapter, I develop a general equilibrium macroeconomic model with a dynamic banking sector in order to characterize optimal size-dependent bank leverage regulation. Bank leverage choices are subject to the risk-return trade-off, and are inefficient due to financial frictions. I show that leverage regulation can generate welfare gains, and that optimal regulation is tighter relative to the benchmark and is bank-size dependent. In particular, optimal regulation is tighter for large banks relative to small banks, and it leads to the following welfare generating effects. First, as small banks take more leverage, they grow faster conditional on survival, leading to a selection effect. Second, small bank failures are less costly while entrants have higher relative efficiency, leading to a cleansing effect. Third, tighter regulation for large banks reduces their failure rate, which generates welfare since large banks are more efficient and costlier to replace, leading to a stabilization effect. The calibrated model rationalizes various steady state moments of the US banking industry, and points towards qualitatively similar but quantitatively tighter leverage regulation relative to the proposition in Basel III accords. In the second chapter, I study the financial contagion problem when banks in order to hedge against idiosyncratic shocks, engage in two-dimensional as opposed to one-dimensional interactions with other banks. To this end, I develop a double-edge interbank network model where banks engage in debt contract and securitization transactions with other banks. I show that the standard intuition of financial contagion does not translate from the one-dimensional case to the two-dimensional case i.e. financial contagion can either weaken or worsen depending on the network and parameter configuration. In particular, I derive parametrization for the case where financial contagion worsens. In the third chapter, we investigate whether countercyclical capital-ratio regulation (CCR) should be implemented strictly as a rule, or whether regulators should have discretion with respect to the timing and magnitude of changes in capital-ratio requirement. Using a simple model we prove the proposition that under information asymmetry, discretionary CCR leads to an increase in policy uncertainty relative to rule-based CCR. We prove a similar proposition for a general finite-horizon economy. Finally, we document that since discretionary CCR enables the regulator to respond to unexpected shocks, a benevolent regulator faces the welfare trade-off while choosing between rule-based and discretionary CCR.
During his distinguished career at the IMF, Jacques J. Polak served as both Director of Research and, subsequently as a member of the IMF Executive Board. His distinct contribution to the discipline of international financial policy is highlighted in this book edited by Jacob A. Frenkel and Morris Goldstein. The papers included were prepared for a conference, cosponsored by the Netherlands Bank and the IMF, held in Polak's honor in Washington, D.C., in January 1991.