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Economic and financial research on insurance markets has undergone dramatic growth since its infancy in the early 1960s. Our main objective in compiling this volume was to achieve a wider dissemination of key papers in this literature. Their significance is highlighted in the introduction, which surveys major areas in insurance economics. While it was not possible to provide comprehensive coverage of insurance economics in this book, these readings provide an essential foundation to those who desire to conduct research and teach in the field. In particular, we hope that this compilation and our introduction will be useful to graduate students and to researchers in economics, finance, and insurance. Our criteria for selecting articles included significance, representativeness, pedagogical value, and our desire to include theoretical and empirical work. While the focus of the applied papers is on property-liability insurance, they illustrate issues, concepts, and methods that are applicable in many areas of insurance. The S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School made this book possible by financing publication costs. We are grateful for this assistance and to J. David Cummins, Executive Director of the Foundation, for his efforts and helpful advice on the contents. We also wish to thank all of the authors and editors who provided permission to reprint articles and our respective institutions for technical and financial support.
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
From the Nobel Prize–winning economist and former chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve, a landmark book that provides vital lessons for understanding financial crises and their sometimes-catastrophic economic effects As chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve during the Global Financial Crisis, Ben Bernanke helped avert a greater financial disaster than the Great Depression. And he did so by drawing directly on what he had learned from years of studying the causes of the economic catastrophe of the 1930s—work for which he was later awarded the Nobel Prize. This influential work is collected in Essays on the Great Depression, an important account of the origins of the Depression and the economic lessons it teaches.
This dissertation consists of four distinct essays. In an essay entitled "Claim Timing and Ex Post Adverse Selection: Evidence from Dental 'Insurance, ' " I explore the impact of strategic timing on insurance market allocations. If people can delay a claim just long enough to buy more insurance coverage in anticipation of it, severe adverse selection may result, and in extreme cases, this can lead to the complete unraveling of an insurance market. I study these forces by analyzing dental treatments and insurance, with the goal of understanding insurance in the market for dental care and also revealing lessons that apply to insurance markets more broadly. Using rich claim-level data from a large firm, my analysis reveals that the strategic delay of treatment and the associated adverse selection may be an important factor in explaining why so few people have dental coverage in the US and why typical dental "insurance" contracts provide so little insurance. More generally, my results suggest that insurance products without contract features designed to limit coverage for strategically delayed costs (e.g., open-enrollment periods, pricing pre-existing conditions) may generate unraveling. An essay entitled "The Hated Property Tax: Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts" (with Caroline Hoxby), explores the relationship between the salience of the property tax and observed property tax rates. We hypothesize that high salience explains the unpopularity of the property tax, the level of the property tax, and prevalence of property tax revolts. To identify variation in the salience of the property tax over local jurisdictions and over time, we exploit conditionally random variation in tax escrow, a method of paying the property tax that makes it much less salient. We find that areas in which the property tax is less salient are areas in which property taxes are higher and property tax revolts are less likely to occur. In an essay entitled "Private Coverage and Public Costs: Identifying the Effect of Private Supplemental Insurance on Medicare Spending" (with Neale Mahoney), we explore the impact of private supplemental insurance on Medicare spending. Private supplemental insurance to "fill the gaps" of Medicare, known as Medigap, is very popular. We estimate the impact of this supplemental insurance on total medical spending using an instrumental variables strategy that leverages discontinuities in Medigap premiums at state boundaries. Our estimates suggest that Medigap increases medical spending by 57 percent---or about 40 percent more than previous estimates suggest. Back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that a 20 percent tax on premiums would generate combined revenue and savings of 6.2 percent of Medicare baseline costs. An essay entitled "The Effect of Insurance Coverage on Preventive Care" (with Mark Cullen), explores the effect of insurance coverage on preventive care utilization. Using health insurance claims data from a large company, this paper examines the implementation of an insurance benefit design which differentially increased the marginal price of curative care (non-preventive care) while decreasing the marginal price of prevention. We examine the effect of the differential price change on the use of preventive procedures. We reveal evidence consistent with an important negative cross-price effect; that is, increases in the price of curative care can depress preventive care utilization.
The central goal of this volume was to assemble outstanding scholars and policymakers in the field of financial markets and institutions and have them articulate significant market developments in their particular areas of expertise during the past few decades.Not just a celebratory volume, Public Policy and Financial Economics selected internationally recognized financial economists who have worked with Professor Kaufman during his years of scholarly research, and have a combined mastery of specialized financial markets themes and, very importantly, knowledge of public policies in the areas. All 15 chapters offer unique, innovative, and exciting expositions of several critical topics in financial economics.
"Petra Steinorth präsentiert in ihrer in englischer Sprache vorgelegten kumulativen Dissertationsschrift drei theoretische Modelle, die Versicherungsentscheidungen über mehrere Perioden und bei privater Information seitens der Versicherungsnehmer ökonomisch untersuchen. Die Dissertation leistet einen wichtigen Beitrag zur theoretischen Forschung im Bereich Versicherungsökonomie, da insbesondere zu mehrperiodigen Fragestellungen noch großer Forschungsbedarf besteht: Der Beitrag ""Impact of Health Savings Accounts on Precautionary Savings, Demand for Health Insurance and Prevention Effort"" untersucht den Einfluss von steuerlich begünstigten Gesundheitssparkonten auf das Sparverhalten, die Nachfrage nach Krankenversicherung und Prävention. Im zweiten Beitrag ""Yes, No, Perhaps - Explaining the Demand for Risk Classification Insurance with Imperfect Private Information"" wird untersucht, welche Granularität der Risikoklassifizierung optimal ist, wenn die Versicherungsnehmer unvollständige private Information über ihren zukünftigen Risikotyp haben. Der dritte Beitrag ""The Demand for Enhanced Annuities"" analysiert die Reaktion des Marktes auf die Einführung von sogenannten Enhanced Annuities. Dabei handelt es sich um Rentenversicherungsprodukte, die die individuelle Lebenserwartung bei der Tarifierung berücksichtigen. Die wissenschaftliche Arbeit ist auch für Mitarbeiter in Versicherungsunternehmen von Interesse, da sie wichtige Bereiche des Produktmanagements in der Lebens- und Krankenversicherung behandelt. Petra Steinorth ́s dissertation consists of three theoretical models, which all examine the economics of selected multi-period insurance decisions with private information on the part of the insured. The thesis makes an important contribution to insurance economics literature as multi-period problems have not yet been widely studied. The article ""Impact of Health Savings Accounts on Precautionary Savings, Demand for Health Insurance and Prevention Effort"" investigates how tax incentives like health savings accounts influence savings for medical costs, the demand for health insurance and ex ante moral hazard. The second article ""Yes, no, perhaps - Explaining the Demand for Risk Classification Insurance"" examines the optimal risk classification in case the insured have incomplete private information regarding their future risk type. The third article ""The Demand for Enhanced Annuities"" analyzes the market reaction to the introduction of so-called enhanced annuities, which are annuities that take individual factors influencing life expectancy into account for pricing. The scientific dissertation is also of interest to insurance practitioners as it examines important issues in the field of health and life insurance product management."
This collection of essays, coauthored with other distinguished economists, offers new perspectives on saving, intergenerational economic ties, retirement planning, and the distribution of wealth. The book links life-cycle microeconomic behavior to important macroeconomic outcomes, including the roughly 50 percent postwar decline in America's rate of saving and its increasing wealth inequality. The book traces these outcomes to the government's five-decade-long policy of transferring, in the form of annuities, ever larger sums from young savers to old spenders. The book presents new theoretical and empirical analyses of altruism that rule out the possibility that private intergenerational transfers have offset those by the government.While rational life-cycle behavior can explain broad economic outcomes, the book also shows that a significant minority of households fail to make coherent life-cycle saving and insurance decisions. These mistakes are compounded by reliance on conventional financial planning tools, which the book compares with Economic Security Planner (ESPlanner), a new life-cycle financial planning software program. The application of ESPlanner to U.S. data indicates that most Americans approaching retirement age are saving at much lower rates than they should be, given potential major cuts in Social Security benefits.
When a giant invades the peaceful kingdom of the Tatrajanni and takes the different-looking girl prisoner, it takes the combined efforts of the wise woman of the mountain, the Prince, and the girl herself to rid the kingdom of the intruder.
Why do people buy health insurance? Conventional theory holds that people purchase insurance because they prefer the certainty of paying a small premium to the risk of getting sick and paying a large medical bill. This book presents a new theory of consumer demand for health insurance. It holds that people purchase insurance to obtain additional "income" when they become ill.