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This dissertation studies both theoretically and empirically how the allocation of subsidies might matter for economic outcomes in a two-sided market framework. The first chapter establishes a non-neutrality result with respect to subsidy allocation in the price theory of two-sided markets with membership externalities building on the works of Rochet and Tirole (2006) and Armstrong (2006). There are many examples of two-sided (or more generally, multi-sided) markets in which two (or more) groups of agents interact via intermediaries or “platforms.” The distinguishing feature of these markets is the presence of cross-group externalities: the benefit enjoyed by a member on one side depends on the number of members on the other side of the market. Examples of two-sided markets include: video game platforms, news media, credit cards, and electric vehicles. A basic feature of two-sided markets established by Rochet and Tirole (2006) is the non-neutrality of price structure, that is, how usage fees or membership prices are allocated between the two sides of the market have an impact on economic outcomes like buyer demand. In this work, I consider whether this non-neutrality in the price allocation carries over to the case of subsidies (or taxes) in two-sided markets. Specifically, I develop a stylistic two-sided market model to show that subsidies to the different sides of the market are non-neutral, in the sense that one dollar spent on subsidies given to one side of the market has a different economic impact as the same amount spent on subsidies given to end-users on the other side of the market. This result is driven by a key feature of two-sided markets: the positive network externalities between the two sides of the market. The non-neutrality of the allocation of subsidies has important implications for such quickly growing industries like the electric vehicle market in which currently most governments are subsidizing both sides of the market. Therefore, if we really want to learn where to give subsidies to achieve the policy goal of increased electric vehicle sales the findings of this chapter show that we need to empirically estimate the impact of price subsidies to buyers versus direct subsidies to charging stations using a two-sided market framework. The second chapter, building on the non-neutrality result of the first chapter, provides an empirical analysis of the impact of electric vehicle incentives on electric vehicle adoption that highlights the importance of accounting for the network externalities present in this market. I model the electric vehicle sector as a two-sided market with network externalities to determine which side of the market is more efficient to subsidize depending on key vehicle demand and charging station supply primitives. I use new, large-scale vehicle registry data from Norway to empirically estimate the impact that different subsidies have on electric vehicle adoption when network externalities are present. I present descriptive evidence to show that electric vehicle purchases are positively related to both consumer price and charging station subsidies. I then estimate a structural model of consumer vehicle choice and charging station entry, which incorporates flexible substitution patterns and allows me to analyze out-of-sample predictions of electric vehicle sales. In particular, the counterfactuals compare the impact of direct purchasing price subsidies to the impact of charging station subsidies. I find that between 2010 and 2015 every 100 million Norwegian kroner (around 12.39 million USD) spent on station subsidies alone resulted in 835 additional electric vehicle purchases compared to a counterfactual in which there are no subsidies on either side of the market. The same amount spent on price subsidies led to only an additional 387 electric vehicles being sold compared to a simulated scenario where there were no electric vehicle incentives. However, the relation inverts with increased spending, as the impact of station subsidies on electric vehicle purchases tapers off faster.
This book honours Partha Dasgupta, and the field he helped establish; environment and development economics. It concerns the relationship between social systems and natural systems. Above all, it concerns the poverty-environment nexus: the complex pathways by which people become or remain poor, and resources become or remain overexploited.
This book, first published in 1988, provides an overview of the diverse work that was being done in applied and theoretical environmental and resource economics. Some essays reflect upon the background of the work of John Krutilla, one of the founders of Resources for the Future and a leading scholar of environmental economics, and the development of the field to date. Other essays examine and convey findings on particular resource problems and theoretical issues and resource policies and the practice of applied welfare economics. This title will be of interest to students of economics and environmental studies.
This is a selection of recent essays from an author established in the environmental economics field. The book explains the development of Pearce's career in the subject; shows how environmental economics can play a part in policy-making; and argues against some other schools of thought.
Chapter 1: Tradable Permits under Environmental and Cost-reducing R & D: This chapter models simultaneous investments in both environmental and cost-reducing R & D by asymmetric Cournot duopolist. Pollution rights (emission permits) are allocated by the regulator and can be traded between firms. Both R & D competition and cooperation are considered. In a three-stage game, firms first invest in R & D, then trade permits, and then compete in output. The strategic interaction between different types of R & D investments is analyzed. It is found that giving more permits to one firm induces it to conduct more cost-reducing but less environmental R & D. The second-best optimal allocation of pollution rights is also analyzed. This allocation matters for social welfare under R & D competition, but is irrelevant under R & D cooperation. Moreover, the optimal allocation depends on R & D spillovers. This paper also studies the grandfathering of permits based on historical output. Compared with the second-best optimal allocation, the higher the emissions reduction level, the more likely that grandfathering allocates too few permits to the large firm and too many permits to the small firm. Adding an R & D budget constraint leads firms to under-invest in cost-reducing R & D relative to environmental R & D. Chapter 2: Tradable Permits under Environmental R & D between Upstream and Downstream Industries: This chapter models the simultaneous investments in environmental R & D by both downstream and upstream industries, with two symmetric firms within each industry competing à la Cournot. Pollution rights are allocated by the regulator, and firms can trade permits. R & D competition, intra-industry (horizontal), inter-industry (vertical) and both intra- and inter-industry (generalized) R & D cooperations are considered. In a four-stage game, firms first invest in R & D, then trade permits, then upstream firms compete in intermediate good production, and finally downstream firms compete in final food production. The strategic interactions between R & D investments are analyzed. It is found that an increase in either vertical or horizontal R & D spillovers reduce the permit price but increase production, but the spillover effects on R & D investments are ambiguous and they depend on the number of permits that a firm receives from the government. However, firms undertake more R & D under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation, irrespective of spillovers and the allocation of permits, and this results in higher social welfare under generalized cooperation than vertical cooperation. The optimal allocation of pollution rights by the regulator is also considered. This allocation matters for social welfare under R & D competition and horizontal cooperation, but is irrelevant under vertical and generalized cooperations. Chapter 3: Is There a Principle of Targeting in Environmental Taxation?: This chapter studies whether the "principle of targeting", which is referred to by Dixit (1985) as the tax formulae for dirty goods have "additivity property" (Sandmo 1975) and externality-generating sources should be directly targeted (Bhagwati and Johnson 1960), can be applicable in the presence of a uniform commodity tax with an additional emissions tax. We consider three perfectly competitive markets, one of them produces a non-polluting good and the other two produce polluting goods. The regulator chooses optimal taxes on all three markets to maximize social welfare and finances an exogenous public expenditure. First all, it is found that the additivity property does not hold under differentiated taxes, and is even further weakened with a uniform commodity tax. It is also shown that the Pigouvian tax is unlikely to apply on the top of the uniform commodity tax. Furthermore, if there is only tax instrument available -- i.e. either the uniform commodity tax or the emissions tax -- then the uniform commodity tax (emissions tax) induces higher social welfare when marginal social damage is low (high).
These papers cover such topics as: the effects of environmental and resources policies on income distribution; the incorporation of distribution effects into environmental policy analysis; the role of economic incentives in environmental policy; the economic valuation of environment changes; and the consideration of risk and uncertainty in economic valuation and policy making. The book also includes papers on the ethical basis of environmental economics and the economic approach to environmental policy.