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This volume collects research papers addressing topical issues in economics and management with a particular focus on dynamic models which allow to analyze and foster the decision making of firms in dynamic complex environments. The scope of the contributions ranges from daily operational challenges firms face to strategic choices in dynamic industry environments and the analysis of optimal growth paths. The volume also highlights recent methodological developments in the areas of dynamic optimization, dynamic games and meta-heuristics, which help to improve our understanding of (optimal) decision making in a fast evolving economy.
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This book presents a variety of advanced research papers in optimization and dynamics written by internationally recognized researchers in these fields. As an example of applying optimization in sport, it introduces a new method for finding the optimal bat sizes in baseball and softball. The book is divided into three parts: operations research, dynamics, and applications. The operations research section deals with the convergence of Newton-type iterations for solving nonlinear equations and optimum problems, the limiting properties of the Nash bargaining solution, the utilization of public goods, and optimizing lot sizes in the automobile industry. The topics in dynamics include special linear approximations of nonlinear systems, the dynamic behavior of industrial clusters, adaptive learning in oligopolies, periodicity in duopolies resulting from production constraints, and dynamic models of love affairs. The third part presents applications in the fields of reverse logistic network design for end-of-life wind turbines, fuzzy optimization of the structure of agricultural products, water resources management in the restoration plans for a lake and also in groundwater supplies. In addition it discusses applications in reliability engineering to find the optimal preventive replacement times of deteriorating equipment and using bargaining theory to determine the best maintenance contract. The diversity of the application areas clearly illustrates the usefulness of the theory and methodology of optimization and dynamics in solving practical problems.
Decision & Control in Management Science analyzes emerging decision problems in the management and engineering sciences. It is divided into five parts. The first part explores methodological issues involved in the optimization of deterministic and stochastic dynamical systems. The second part describes approaches to the model energy and environmental systems and draws policy implications related to the mitigation of pollutants. The third part applies quantitative techniques to problems in finance and economics, such as hedging of options, inflation targeting, and equilibrium asset pricing. The fourth part considers a series of problems in production systems. Optimization methods are put forward to provide optimal policies in areas such as inventory management, transfer-line, flow-shop and other industrial problems. The last part covers game theory. Chapters range from theoretical issues to applications in politics and interactions in franchising systems. Decision & Control in Management Science is an excellent reference covering methodological issues and applications in operations research, optimal control, and dynamic games.
This 2-volume work includes approximately 1,200 entries in A-Z order, critically reviewing the literature on specific topics from abortion to world systems theory. In addition, nine major entries cover each of the major disciplines (political economy; management and business; human geography; politics; sociology; law; psychology; organizational behavior) and the history and development of the social sciences in a broader sense.
This research investigates three issues related to the economic performance of oligopolistic markets where firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. First of all, this dissertation uses a Markov Perfect Equilibrium approach with fixed periods of commitment of actions to answer the question of what prices a duopolists will charge in equilibrium if they produce horizontally differentiated products, move alternatingly, and compete in prices forever. It is found that firms charge prices which are higher than Nash equilibrium prices but lower than the fully collusive equilibrium prices. Also, contrasted with the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot constituent game, the firm having the significantly higher demand responsiveness to its own price always charges a lower price than the other firm does although it has higher marginal cost. The dissertation then proceeds to study whether a firm can overcome its cost disadvantage by upgrading its product over the rival's, and if so, whether there exists a profit-division which will induce the low cost firm and the high cost firm to collude and no one has an incentive to cheat. The results show that (1) the ability of upgrading the product over the rival's can allow a high cost firm to earn higher profit than a cost advantaged low cost firm; (2) there exists at least one profit-division which can sustain full collusion; and (3) in the collusive equilibrium firms enlarge their quality differences to alleviate the price tension between their products. Finally, this work investigates the welfare effect of mergers which occur in an oligopolistic industry where firms produce differentiated products. It is shown that for the merger to be socially beneficial, the number of the merging firms must be less than the total number of firms in the industry minus the ratio of the products' own elasticity to cross elasticity. The analysis indicates that the welfare effect of a merger of a specific size depends on the substitutability among products of the industry.