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My dissertation examines competition, cooperation, and efficiency in three market settings in which a population of economic agents interact, either directly with each other in pairwise matches, directly with firms, or with firms via a platform. In one chapter I consider a population of customers who have different valuations for a good sold by competing merchants, as well as varying preferences over the merchant from which to purchase the good and the payment form with which to make the purchase, and examine what the effects might be if a merchant placed an additional surcharge on transactions completed with a payment form that is more costly for the merchant. The cost for the merchant can vary dramatically depending on the payment form used. For example, a credit card transaction is generally more expensive for the merchant than a debit card transaction, even if the transaction is completed using the same technology and is processed over the same network (e.g., a MasterCard signature debit transaction and a MasterCard credit card transaction). Historically, with limited exceptions, merchants have been prohibited, both by law and by the contract permitting the acceptance of that network's cards, from charging customers different prices for transactions completed using different payment cards, despite the different costs these transactions impose on them. Recent concessions made by several major payment networks in response to legal challenges raises the possibility that this paradigm might change in the future. This chapter examines what the effects might be if merchants were permitted to charge customers different prices based on the payment form and whether these effects depend on differences between the merchants, such as differences in the marginal cost of providing the good. In another chapter, I consider a population of individuals made up of more-patient and less-patient types who interact directly with each other in a repeated prisoner's dilemma embedded in a search model. A player is matched anonymously with another player to play a prisoner's dilemma game repeatedly until the match is ended, either exogenously or endogenously by one of the players, at which point each player may receive another random match. I first determine when it is feasible to achieve the best outcome in which all players cooperate. When it is not possible to achieve full cooperation, I examine how welfare can be improved over the outcome in which no players cooperate. When conditions are such that less-patient players choose not to cooperate, I first examine how separation by action within a single market can increase welfare for all players over the uncooperative equilibrium, with more-patient players choosing to cooperate in hopes of forming a cooperative relationship, despite the risk of being matched with a less-patient player who chooses not to cooperate. I then examine how full separation of the more- and less-patient players, made possible by introduction of a second market, can increase the welfare of the more-patient players without harming the less-patient players. In a third chapter, customers choose to purchase a good from one of several competing firms in a setting in which network congestion and firms' investment in capacity plays an important role in firm costs and product quality, e.g., the wireless industry. Wireless carriers (e.g., Verizon) compete not only on the price of their service but also on its quality. The quality of a carrier's service is determined in part by the quantity of customers it serves and by investment in capacity with which to serve them. While the primary effect of a carrier increasing its capacity is an increase in that carrier's service quality, there are also externality effects on other wireless carriers. For example, if carrier A increases its capacity, thereby increasing its service quality, and causes some customers to leave a competing carrier B, the service quality experienced by customers who remain with carrier B will increase as a result of the decreased congestion in carrier B's network. This chapter examines the interplay between these effects alongside traditional price competition in this oligopoly setting.
Market Evolution: Competition and Cooperation is a selection of papers presented at the recent meeting of the European Association of Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE). The volume brings together twenty high-quality papers reflecting frontier research in modern industrial organization. The contributions cover a broad spectrum of increasing theoretical, empirical and policy issues, including analyses of the nature of the firm, product differentiation, research and development, strategic alliances, information sharing in the banking sector, exchange rate pass-through in international competition, labor unionization and product rivalry, buyer-supplier bargaining, multimarket competition and related entry, entry and exit processes, multinational enterprises in the Third World, European integration and the restructuring of Eastern Europe. From a theoretical perspective, many chapters apply game theory to the analysis of firm behaviors and market competition. Moreover, a large number of the studies contain a significant empirical part, mainly by employing econometric techniques, to test the hypotheses derived from modern industrial organization theories. Data from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the European Union are presented and analyzed.
This thesis consists of three essays on the theory of networks and its applications to markets. The first essay develops a new model for studying repeated games in buyer-seller networks, and explores the connection between network structure and cooperation. The second essay introduces new techniques to analyze the effect of Word-Of-Mouth (WOM) on cooperation in networked markets. The third essay studies how network structure affects the timing of hiring in networked markets. Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers choose whether to cooperate or deviate and 'cheat' their buyers, and buyers decide whether to re-purchase from different sellers. In the first chapter I model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and suggest a framework for studying repeated games in such networks. I derive conditions that determine whether a network is a Steady State Cooperation Network (SSCN)--a network that is consistent with trade and trust between every buyer and seller that are connected. In particular, three network features increase the incentives for cooperation: sparseness, moderate competition, and segregation.
This dissertation consists of three essays on trade, market structure and agricultural cooperative financing. In my first essay, we explore how public investment in commercial infrastructure affects the composition of trade between countries. We find that, ceteris paribus, greater public investment in commercial infrastructure raises general labor productivity, leading to gains in workers’ real income. However, workers must be taxed to finance the infrastructure improvements, so that the net benefits of increased public investment are rendered ambiguous. In my second essay, we explore the relationship between wage premia and market structure. We find that the wage premium is not the result of relative labor endowments between the two trading countries, as past literature has suggested, but is the result of differences in market structure. More specifically, the wage premium is higher under oligopolistic competition than under monopolistic competition. In my third essay, we examine how capital constraints affect the growth of agricultural cooperatives and whether external sources of capital relieve capital constraint problems. We find that long-term debt use, cash flow, unallocated equity and long-term debt financing are critical contributors to asset growth for small and medium-sized cooperatives.
Competition, Efficiency and Welfare contains a collection of papers in honor of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar, whose accomplishments have enriched various fields of economics. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann's work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nürnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nürnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays. The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann's primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.
Competition in Europe, which has been chosen as the title for the Essays in Honour of Henk W. de Jong, contains two key concepts, that characterize his scientific contribution to Industrial Organisation. Professor H.W. de Jong is in the first place an economist who is highly inspired by the dynamics of markets in general and the dynamics and conditions of compe tition in particular. In the second place, H.W. de Jong is a real European economist, not in the sense that his theoretical insights are limited to Europe, but in the sense that his ideas and policy suggestions - especially those concerning competition policy - reflect his sincere involvement in the European inte gration process and the economic conditions and perspectives of a Common Market for the European Community. In his many illustrations of the evolution of markets and the performance of enterprises in different business environments, H.W. de Jong also demonstrates his knowledge of historical and political aspects of different economies in Europe, often in comparison with the United States and Japan.
This book collects sixteen essays that provide clarification to issues pertinent to contemporary cooperatives. Twenty three internationally recognized scholars of agricultural cooperatives from a variety of disciplines such as industrial organization, finance, sociology, networks, and political theory contributed theoretical work and empirical observations from different countries.
Market Evolution: Competition and Cooperation is a selection of papers presented at the recent meeting of the European Association of Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE). The volume brings together twenty high-quality papers reflecting frontier research in modern industrial organization. The contributions cover a broad spectrum of increasing theoretical, empirical and policy issues, including analyses of the nature of the firm, product differentiation, research and development, strategic alliances, information sharing in the banking sector, exchange rate pass-through in international competition, labor unionization and product rivalry, buyer-supplier bargaining, multimarket competition and related entry, entry and exit processes, multinational enterprises in the Third World, European integration and the restructuring of Eastern Europe. From a theoretical perspective, many chapters apply game theory to the analysis of firm behaviors and market competition. Moreover, a large number of the studies contain a significant empirical part, mainly by employing econometric techniques, to test the hypotheses derived from modern industrial organization theories. Data from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the European Union are presented and analyzed.