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In addition to making original contributions to the fields of applied labor economics and labor studies, it is our hope that they also offer frameworks upon which future research in these areas can build.
This book addresses collective bargaining in an intertemporal monetary macroeconomy of the aggregate supply–aggregate demand (AS–AD) type with overlapping generations of consumers and with a public sector. The results are presented in a unified framework with a commodity market that clears competitively. By analyzing the implications of three variants of collective bargaining – efficient bargaining in a uniform and a segmented labor market and “right-to-manage” wage bargaining – it identifies the quantity of money, price expectations, union power, and union size as the determinants of temporary equilibria. In the three scenarios, it characterizes and compares the temporary equilibria using both analytical and numerical techniques, with an emphasis on allocations, welfare, and efficiency. It also discusses the dynamic evolution under rational expectations and its steady states in nominal and real terms. Lastly, it demonstrates conditions for stability regarding a balanced monetary expansion of the economy.
Monographic compilation of essays on trends in labour economics and labour relations in the USA - discusses declining collective bargaining trade union power, the Marxism theoretical approach to trade union structure and trade union behaviour, success and failure of economic policies directed to full employment, impact of labour market rigidities on inflation and low productivity, monetary policy and fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand and employment creation, etc. Graphs and references.
In twenty-three original essays this book surveys the course of labor economics over the more than two centuries since the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. It fully examines the contending theories, changing environmental contexts, evolving issues, and varied policies affecting labor's participation in the economy. Beginning with George P. Shultz, who provides the foreword, the contributors are among the most distinguished scholars in labor economics and industrial relations. These essays represent some of their finest work and apply the ideas for which they are best known. Highlights include John T. Dunlop on internal labor markets, John Kenneth Galbraith on power relationships in the economy, Robert M. Solow on explanation of unemployment, Jacob Mincer on human capital, Lloyd G. Reynolds on labor in developing countries, Richard A. Lester on wage differentials, Edward F. Denison on productivity, Richard Freeman on union/non-union differentials, F. Ray Marshall on human resource development, and Thomas A. Kochan on policy making. While the intellectual framework of the book looks partly to the past - explaining the labor factor in classical and neoclassical systems - its emphasis is on contemporary problems that will figure prominently in future developments, such as the operation of internal labor markets, dispute resolution, concession bargaining, equal employment opportunity, and individual labor contracting. This book is required reading for students and scholars of labor economics.
In 1930, W.H. Hutt demonstrated several spectacular points: labor unions cannot lift wages overall; their earnings come at the expense of the consumer; their effect is to cartelize business and reduce free competition to the detriment of everyone. He demonstrated these points with intricate logic that took on the main economic arguments for labor unions. In 1954, this little volume was published in the United States, with a very complimentary essay by none other than Ludwig von Mises, who saw Hutt's work as valid for the ages. Now this great essay is back in print, and all his points still hold true, particularly the least intuitive one that unions actually benefit some producers at the expense of others, and always harm the consumer. The brevity of this essay is as notable as its power to persuade.
Eleven essays addressing a concern for depressed and exploited labor in a global economy and seeking alternatives to the traditional capitalist models. The contributing economic and political scholars analyze global competition and the labor movement, deregulation, privatization, mass production, the office of the future, management resistance, legal challenges, community property rights, and case studies from Sweden and the US Coal industry. Paper edition (unseen) $24.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Compilation of essays in economic theory on the supply of and demand for labour force - comprises 16 articles covering (1) labour demand, (2) the supply of labour, (3) trade unions, (4) collective bargaining, (5) the allocation of work, (6) wages differentials, (7) unemployment, (8) full employment and inflation, and (9) labours share in the national income. Bibliography pp. 380 and 381, and references.
This dissertation consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory, with a particular focus on market design and information economics. The papers develop and study applied theoretical models in order to: 1) Identify the unintended welfare effects of interventions in various markets and improve their design. 2) Understand how strategic actors take advantage of information revelation processes. The first chapter looks at the effect of wage caps on collective bargaining in the world of professional sports. Professional sports in the United States generate over 35 billion dollars yearly in revenue, which is divided between players and owners via collective bargaining. Given the stakes, some leagues instituted maximum contracts, limiting individual compensation to a percentage of team salary caps. Combining a model of a sports league with one of bargaining, I demonstrate that while these contracts limit salaries of star players, they can increase the welfare of all players. Maximum contracts reduce earning inequality and harmonize players' interests, improving collective bargaining power. The model highlights the welfare gains to be had if a heterogeneous group agrees to concessions that increase the alignment of their individual interests. My second chapter studies strategic targeting over networks. Persuaders, such as advertisers and political parties, expend vast resources targeting agents who amplify the persuaders' messages through their social network. Who should they target? To answer this, I develop a model of targeting on a network where agent beliefs evolve via a DeGroot process permitting persistence of initial beliefs. As a result, each agent is identified by their centrality and initial belief. Persuaders that want to steer the average belief of the agents in a particular direction take into account both features. Absent competition, a persuader trades-off an agent's centrality with the dissimilarity of her belief from that of the agent. With competition, a persuader considers the distribution of agents' interactions with its competitors. When competition is intense, the incentive to deter one's rival dominates. Equilibria where persuaders target those with similar beliefs arise, increasing polarization. This is in contrast to the canonical model where persuaders care only about the fraction of impressions they generate. In that case, targeting is based entirely on agent centrality. The final chapter of my dissertation examines the phenomenon of market unraveling. Labor markets are said to unravel if the matches between workers and firms occur inefficiently early, based on limited information. I argue that a significant determinant of unraveling is the transparency of the secondary market, where firms can poach workers employed by other firms. I propose a model of interviewing and hiring that allows firms to hire on the secondary market as well as at the entry-level. Unraveling arises as a strategic decision by low-tier firms to prevent poaching. While early matching reduces the probability of hiring a high type worker, it prevents rivals from learning about the worker, making poaching difficult. As a result, unraveling can occur even in labor markets without a shortage of talent. When secondary markets are very transparent, unraveling disappears. However, the resulting matching is still inefficient due to the incentives of low-tier firms to communicate that they have not hired top-quality workers. Coordinating the timing of hiring does not mitigate the inefficiencies because firms continue to act strategically to prevent poaching.