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This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.
This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium AnalysisIn game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic ValuesIt is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.
This book reflects the state of the art in nonlinear economic dynamics, providing a broad overview of dynamic economic models at different levels. The wide variety of approaches ranges from theoretical and simulation analysis to methodological study. In particular, it examines the local and global asymptotical behavior of both macro- and micro- level mathematical models, theoretically as well as using simulation. It also focuses on systems with one or more time delays for which new methodology has to be developed to investigate their asymptotic properties. The book offers a comprehensive summary of the existing methodology with extensions to the more complex model variants, since considerations on bounded rationality of complex economic behavior provide the foundation underlying choice-theoretic and policy-oriented studies of macro behavior, which impact the real macro economy. It includes 13 chapters addressing traditional models such as monopoly, duopoly and oligopoly in microeconomics and Keynesian, Goodwinian, and Kaldor–Kaleckian models in macroeconomics. Each chapter presents new aspects of these traditional models that have never been seen before. This work renews the past wisdom and reveals tomorrow's knowledge.
This book outlines the core concept of the theory of mixed oligopoly and presents recent results that have arisen in a mixed oligopolistic market. The wave of privatization since the 1980s has taken the development of the theory of mixed oligopoly in several directions. Although the main concern of the theory of mixed oligopoly focuses on the effect of regime change—especially privatization of a public firm—on social welfare, existing studies have not considered the difference in economic environments. With drastic changes in economic environments along with economic development in recent years, the domestic and foreign markets have become more and more integrated, firms have become concerned about corporate social responsibility, and governments or politicians have had various interests and preferences. Against that background, this book revisits the question of how privatization affects social welfare by incorporating regional and international interdependency and investigates how firms’ activities for corporate social responsibility, governments’ preferences, and political economic situations affect the market circumstance in a mixed oligopoly. The dynamic aspect of privatization is also investigated.
This contributed volume contains fourteen papers based on selected presentations from the European Conference on Game Theory SING11-GTM 2015, held at Saint Petersburg State University in July 2015, and the Networking Games and Management workshop, held at the Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Petrozvavodsk, Russia, also in July 2015. These papers cover a wide range of topics in game theory, including recent advances in areas with high potential for future work, as well as new developments on classical results. Some of these include A new approach to journal ranking using methods from social choice theory; A differential game of a duopoly in which two firms are competing for market share in an industry with network externalities; The impact of information propagation in the model of tax audits; A voting model in which the results of previous votes can affect the process of coalition formation in a decision-making body; The Selten-Szidarovsky technique for the analysis of Nash equilibria of games with an aggregative structure; Generalized nucleoli and generalized bargaining sets for games with restricted cooperation; Bayesian networks and games of deterrence; and A new look at the study of solutions for games in partition function form. The maturity and vitality of modern-day game theory are reflected in the new ideas, novel applications, and contributions of young researchers represented in this collection. It will be of interest to anyone doing theoretical research in game theory or working on one its numerous applications.
This book analyses decision-making in dynamic economic environments. By applying a wide range of methodological approaches, combining both analytical and computational methods, the contributors examine various aspects of optimal firm behaviour and relevant policy areas. Topics covered include optimal control, dynamic games, economic decision-making, and applications in finance and economics, as well as policy implications in areas such as pollution regulation. This book is dedicated to Christophe Deissenberg, a well-known and distinguished scholar of economic dynamics and computational economics. It appeals to academics in the areas of optimal control, dynamic games and computational economics as well as to decision-makers working in policy domains such as environmental policy.
This state-of-the art collection of papers analyses various aspects of the theory of externalities and public goods. The contributions employ new analytical techniques like the aggregative game approach, and discuss the philosophical underpinnings of the theory. Furthermore, they highlight a range of topical empirical applications including climate policy and counterterrorism. This contributed volume was written in memory of Richard C. Cornes, a pioneer in the theory of externalities and public goods.
This volume examines important topical issues in normative trade theory and welfare economics. In particular, it seeks to investigate how far the potential gainfulness of international trade can be extended in an increasingly globalized world. The first section focuses on the gains from trade in the presence of time-consuming consumption and external increasing returns to scale, which are often neglected in traditional trade theory. The next section considers a range of issues that have practical and policy relevance, including trade liberalization, tax reform, tourism, and international migration. The last section examines the impact of income transfers, both from domestic and international perspectives, and of economic policy making. All chapters of the book are contributed by internationally well-known researchers, including Murray Kemp, Henry Wan, Ngo Van Long and some of Murray Kemp's many colleagues and former students around the world. This book, with its up-to-date information and analysis, will be essential to academics and graduate students in the field of international economics. Trade theorists in research institutions and practicing economists in governmental departments will also find this book of great interest. ​