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With this volume of the series Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science edited by S. Rahman et al. a challenging dialogue is being continued. The series’ first volume argued that one way to recover the connections between logic, philosophy of sciences, and sciences is to acknowledge the host of alternative logics which are currently being developed. The present volume focuses on four key themes. First of all, several chapters unpack the connection between knowledge and epistemology with particular focus on the notion of knowledge as resulting from interaction. Secondly, new epistemological perspectives on linguistics, the foundations of mathematics and logic, physics, biology and law are a subject of analysis. Thirdly, several chapters are dedicated to a discussion of Constructive Type Theory and more generally of the proof-theoretical notion of meaning.Finally, the book brings together studies on the epistemic role of abduction and argumentation theory, both linked to non-monotonic approaches to the dynamics of knowledge.
This book addresses some of the key questions that scientists have been asking themselves for centuries: what is knowledge? What is information? How do we know that we know something? How do we construct meaning from the perceptions of things? Although no consensus exists on a common definition of the concepts of information and communication, few can reject the hypothesis that information – whether perceived as « object » or as « process » - is a pre-condition for knowledge. Epistemology is the study of how we know things (anglophone meaning) or the study of how scientific knowledge is arrived at and validated (francophone conception). To adopt an epistemological stance is to commit oneself to render an account of what constitutes knowledge or in procedural terms, to render an account of when one can claim to know something. An epistemological theory imposes constraints on the interpretation of human cognitive interaction with the world. It goes without saying that different epistemological theories will have more or less restrictive criteria to distinguish what constitutes knowledge from what is not. If information is a pre-condition for knowledge acquisition, giving an account of how knowledge is acquired should impact our comprehension of information and communication as concepts. While a lot has been written on the definition of these concepts, less research has attempted to establish explicit links between differing theoretical conceptions of these concepts and the underlying epistemological stances. This is what this volume attempts to do. It offers a multidisciplinary exploration of information and communication as perceived in different disciplines and how those perceptions affect theories of knowledge.
This book presents theoretical and empirical work pertaining to personal epistemology in the classroom and consider its broader educational implications.
Marková offers a dialogical perspective to problems in daily life and professional practices involving communication, care, and therapy.
This book was intended as a companion volume to my Mataphysics : an introduction. That book interprets thirty universal characteristics of existence in polar pairs, and compares five theories for each pair. It interpreted polarity as involving interdependence and dialectical interaction. This book, embodying influences from studies in Indian and Chinese philosophies, interprets interdependence of opposite poles as involving mutual immanence. -- Back cover.
Epistemology had to come to terms with “the social” on two different occasions. The first was represented by the dispute about the epistemological status of the “social” sciences, and in this case the already well established epistemology of the natural sciences seemed to have the right to dictate the conditions for a discipline to be a science. But the social sciences could successfully vindicate the legitimacy of their specific criteria for scientificity. More recently, the impact of social factors on the construction of our knowledge (including scientific knowledge) has reversed, in a certain sense, the old position and promoted social inquiry to the role of a criterion for evaluating the purport of cognitive (including scientific) statements. But this has undermined the traditional characteristics of objectivity and rigor that seem constitutive of science. Moreover, in order to establish the real extent to which social conditionings have an impact on scientific knowledge one must credit sociology with a sound ground of reliability, and this is not possible without a preliminary “epistemological” assessment. These are some of the topics discussed in this book, both theoretically and with reference to concrete cases.
The acquisition of knowledge is not a single unrelated occasion but rather an adaptive process in which past acquisitions modify present and future ones. In Part I of this essay in epistemology it is argued that coping with knowledge is not a passive affair but dynamic and active, involving its continuance into the stages of assimilation and deployment. In Part II a number of specific issues are raised and discussed in order to explore the dimensions and the depths of the workings of adaptive knowing. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS "Activity as A Source of Knowledge" first appeared in Tulane Studies in Philosophy, XII, 1963; "Knowing, Doing and Being" in Ratio, VI, 1964; "On Beliefs and Believing" in Tulane Studies, XV, 1966; "Absent Objects" in Tulane Studies, XVII, 1968; "The Reality Game" in Tulane Studies, XVIII, 1969; "Adaptive Responses and The Ecosys tem" in Tulane Studies, XVIII, 1969; "The Mind-Body Problem" in the Philosophical Journal, VII, 1970; and "The Knowledge of The Known" in the International Logic Review, I, 1970. PART I COPING WITH KNOWLEDGE CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE I. THE CHOSEN APPROACH You are about to read a study of epistemology, one which has been made from a realistic standpoint. It is not the first of such interpre tations, and it will not be the last.
Helen Longino seeks to break the current deadlock in the ongoing wars between philosophers of science and sociologists of science--academic battles founded on disagreement about the role of social forces in constructing scientific knowledge. While many philosophers of science downplay social forces, claiming that scientific knowledge is best considered as a product of cognitive processes, sociologists tend to argue that numerous noncognitive factors influence what scientists learn, how they package it, and how readily it is accepted. Underlying this disagreement, however, is a common assumption that social forces are a source of bias and irrationality. Longino challenges this assumption, arguing that social interaction actually assists us in securing firm, rationally based knowledge. This important insight allows her to develop a durable and novel account of scientific knowledge that integrates the social and cognitive. Longino begins with a detailed discussion of a wide range of contemporary thinkers who write on scientific knowledge, clarifying the philosophical points at issue. She then critically analyzes the dichotomous understanding of the rational and the social that characterizes both sides of the science studies stalemate and the social account that she sees as necessary for an epistemology of science that includes the full spectrum of cognitive processes. Throughout, her account is responsive both to the normative uses of the term knowledge and to the social conditions in which scientific knowledge is produced. Building on ideas first advanced in her influential book Science as Social Knowledge, Longino brings her account into dialogue with current work in social epistemology and science studies and shows how her critical social approach can help solve a variety of stubborn problems. While the book focuses on epistemological concerns related to the sociality of inquiry, Longino also takes up its implications for scientific pluralism. The social approach, she concludes, best allows us to retain a meaningful concept of knowledge in the face of theoretical plurality and uncertainty.
Hegel and Schopenhauer were to become the last great system-builders in philosophy. The last philosophers who dealt with understanding everything as an entirety. Since then, all we have seen is fragmentation. Sociology, linguistics, psychology, and other aspects of the theory of knowledge. Each individually presented as separate from each other with coherent frameworks that are difficult to identify. As such many of the developments in these fields owe their origins to the theoretical systems of Schopenhauer and Hegel. They have since segregated and grown outside of the scope of what once was. The frameworks and concepts have become re-imagined and rephrased according to internal coherence and lost their position in the grand scheme of things. In this book, the epistemological theories of Schopenhauer and Hegel engages in a dialogue with Leibniz’s ontology to build a coherent causal framework for understanding the taxonomies of knowledge creation. The intent is to open a discussion on how taxonomies of knowledge shapes knowledge creation. To understand how knowledge can be perceived as a being with agency in its own right.
The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of epistemic beliefs and knowledge representations in cognitive and metacognitive processing and conceptual change when learning about physics concepts through text. Specifically, I manipulated the representation of physics concepts in texts about Newtonian mechanics and explored how these texts interacted with individuals' epistemic beliefs to facilitate or constrain learning. In accordance with definitions from Royce's (1983) framework of psychological epistemology, texts were developed to present Newtonian concepts in either a rational or a metaphorical format. Seventy-five undergraduate students completed questionnaires designed to measure their epistemic beliefs and their misconceptions about Newton's laws of motion. Participants then read the first of two instructional texts (in either a rational or metaphorical format), and were asked to think aloud while reading. After reading the text, participants...