Download Free Epistemic Uncertainty And Legal Theory Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Epistemic Uncertainty And Legal Theory and write the review.

Crossing the usual boundaries of abstract legal theory, this book considers actual charter systems - legal systems with explicitly posited moral-political rights, such as those of Canada and the United States - as well as cases in constitutional adjudication. It shows the worth of careful reflection on methodological and meta-theoretical issues for a comprehensive account of a present-day legal system which is fast becoming the norm. The author explicitly connects the ongoing Methodology Debate within legal philosophy to constitutional adjudication and Canadian law. By drawing out the implications of the Methodology Debate and the challenge of giving a proper account of constitutional adjudication in a general theory of law, the study examines how a descriptive, morally and politically neutral legal theory can deal with epistemic uncertainty - uncertainty about the actual status of moral-political legal provisions and their jurisprudential function - in a thoroughgoing manner. It also demonstrates the merits of a minimalist version of Legal Positivism with regard to the practical importance of charters in charter systems and societies.
Some legal theorists argue that legal determinations apparently based on moral arguments actually involve an appeal to extra-legal standards because legal reasoning and the conceptual structure of a legal system necessarily excludes morality (Exclusive Legal Positivism). Others argue that moral principles can be incorporated into legal systems (Inclusive Legal Positivism), or must be so incorporated (Dworkinian Interpretivism), where they operate as legal rules. Does Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms actually incorporate the moral principle of equality, or does it merely authorize judges to appeal to that extra-legal principle as a legitimate reason for invalidating those laws which violate it? To answer that question the philosophical legal theorist must evaluate and develop an account of juridical law in the face of epistemic uncertainty about the relation between law and morality (i.e. whether it is necessary or contingent). In this work I first consider the meta-theoretical characteristics of legal theories, particularly their methodologies and the evaluative criteria applied to them, so as to identify and make explicit the source of legal-theoretical epistemic uncertainty. I then argue for an approach to describing and explaining law whereby we neither ignore epistemic uncertainty nor dispense with it by means of a stipulative definition. This inclusive positivist approach, however, also requires that we abandon the ideal of a presuppositionless inquiry. Accordingly, I demonstrate how a descriptive-explanatory philosophical account of law can make use of a presupposition and, ultimately, offer a sound defence for it. Finally, through an analysis of some aspects of Canadian constitutional adjudication, I show that inclusive positivism is most able to describe and explain the legal-moral uncertainty exhibited by participants in legal systems of a certain type, and so offers the best philosophical account of legal practices as they are understood by those who instantiate them.
This encyclopedia, magnificently edited by Byron Kaldis, will become a valuable source both of reference and inspiration for all those who are interested in the interrelation between philosophy and the many facets of the social sciences. A must read for every student of the humanities.--Wulf Gaertner, University of Osnabrueck, Germany "Byron Kaldis′ Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences is a triumph. The entries are consistently good, the coverage is amazing, and he has managed to involve the whole scholarly community in this field. It shows off the field very well, and will be a magnificent resource for students and others." -- Stephen Turner, USF, USA " Like all good works of reference this Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences is not to be treated passively: it provides clear and sometimes controversial material for constructive confrontation. It is a rich resource for critical engagement. The Encyclopedia conceived and edited by Byron Kaldis is a work of impressive scope and I am delighted to have it on my bookshelf."-- David Bloor, Edinburgh, UK "This splendid and possibly unique work steers a skilful course between narrower conceptions of philosophy and the social sciences. It will be an invaluable resource for students and researchers in either or both fields, and to anyone working on the interrelations between them." -- William Outhwaite, Newcastle, UK "A work of vast scope and widely gathered expertise, the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences is a splendid resource for anyone interested in the interface between philosophy and the social sciences." --Nicholas Rescher, Pittsburgh This encyclopedia is the first of its kind in bringing together philosophy and the social sciences. It is not only about the philosophy of the social sciences but, going beyond that, it is also about the relationship between philosophy and the social sciences. The subject of this encyclopedia is purposefully multi- and inter-disciplinary. Knowledge boundaries are both delineated and crossed over. The goal is to convey a clear sense of how philosophy looks at the social sciences and to mark out a detailed picture of how the two are interrelated: interwoven at certain times but also differentiated and contrasted at others. The Entries cover topics of central significance but also those that are both controversial and on the cutting-edge, underlining the unique mark of this Encyclopedia: the interrelationship between philosophy and the social sciences, especially as it is found in fresh ideas and unprecedented hybrid disciplinary areas. The Encyclopedia serves a further dual purpose: it contributes to the renewal of the philosophy of the social sciences and helps to promote novel modes of thinking about some of its classic problems. "The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences edited by Byron Kaldis, provides a unique, needed, and invaluable resource for researchers at every level. Unique because nothing else offers the breadth of coverage found in this work; needed because it permits researchers to find longer but also relatively brief, clear, but nonetheless expert articles introducing important topics; and invaluable because of the guidance offered to both related topics and further study. It should be the place that any interested person looks first when seeking to learn about philosophy and the social sciences." Paul Roth, UC Santa Cruz, USA "The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences edited by Byron Kaldis covers an enormous range of topics in philosophy and the social sciences and the entries are compact overviews of the essential issues" Harold Kincaid, University of Alabama at Birmingham, USA
Oxford Studies in Private Law Theory is a biennial forum for some of the best new work in private law theory by scholars from around the world. The essays range widely over issues in general private law theory as well as specific fields, including the theoretical analysis of tort law, property law, contract law, fiduciary law, trust law, remedies and restitution, and the law of equity. OSPLT will be essential reading for academic lawyers, philosophers, political scientists, economists, and historians who wish to keep up with the latest developments in the flourishing field of private law theory. Volume II ranges widely over a diverse array of topics, including the standing to enforce private rights, the power-constraining role of equity, the grounds and limits of repair, dimensions of liability, the fiduciary duties of lawyers, as well as broader questions concerning the place of autonomy and democracy in private law and the justification of private law itself.
A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence is the first-ever multivolume treatment of the issues in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence, from both a theoretical and a historical perspective. The work is aimed at jurists as well as legal and practical philosophers. Edited by the renowned theorist Enrico Pattaro and his team, this book is a classical reference work that would be of great interest to legal and practical philosophers as well as to jurists and legal scholar at all levels. The work is divided in two parts. The theoretical part (published in 2005), consisting of five volumes, covers the main topics of the contemporary debate; the historical part, consisting of six volumes (Volumes 6-8 published in 2007; Volumes 9 and 10, published in 2009; Volume 11 published in 2011 and Volume 12 forthcoming in 2016), accounts for the development of legal thought from ancient Greek times through the twentieth century. Volume 12 Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World Volume 12 of A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, titled Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil-Law World, functions as a complement to Gerald Postema’s volume 11 (titled Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Common Law World), and it offers the first comprehensive account of the complex development that legal philosophy has undergone in continental Europe and Latin America since 1900. In this volume, leading international scholars from the different language areas making up the civil-law world give an account of the way legal philosophy has evolved in these areas in the 20th century, the outcome being an overall mosaic of civil-law legal philosophy in this arc of time. Further, specialists in the field describe the development that legal philosophy has undergone in the 20th century by focusing on three of its main subjects—namely, legal positivism, natural-law theory, and the theory of legal reasoning—and discussing the different conceptions that have been put forward under these labels. The layout of the volume is meant to frame historical analysis with a view to the contemporary theoretical debate, thus completing the Treatise in keeping with its overall methodological aim, namely, that of combining history and theory as a necessary means by which to provide a comprehensive account of jurisprudential thinking.
This volume puts forward a sustained philosophical exploration of the capacity of the modern liberal democratic legal system to understand the thought and practice of those culturally different minorities who come before it as claimants, defendants or witnesses.
This book presents arguments and proposals for constraining criminalization, with a focus on the legal limits of the criminal law. The book approaches the issue by showing how the moral criteria for constraining unjust criminalization can and has been incorporated into constitutional human rights and thus provides a legal right not to be unfairly criminalized.
Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. As such, their use in legal texts is virtually inevitable. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and places judges in the position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderline cases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value. In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the last two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes "soritical " vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. There is a vast literature that discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differences between the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy that are grouped under the heading of "vagueness ", let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena. Bringing together leading scholars working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, this book fosters a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars by examining how philosophers conceive vagueness in law from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness. The chapters of the book are organized into three parts. The first part addresses the import of different theories of vagueness for the law, referring to a wide range of theories from supervaluationist to contextualist and semantic realist accounts in order to address the question of whether the law can learn from engaging with philosophical discussions of vagueness. The second part of the book examines different vagueness phenomena. The contributions in part 2 suggest that the greater awareness to different vagueness phenomena can make lawyers aware of specific issues and solutions so far overlooked. The third part deals with the pragmatic aspects of vagueness in law, providing answers to the question of how to deal with vagueness in law and with the professional, political, moral, and ethical issues such vagueness gives rise to.
This study explores the ways in which theological ideas regarding the nature of God shaped the jurisprudential and legal landscape of Islam. Focusing on the traditionalist theological and jurisprudential thought of Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751/1350), this study traces the way in which these towering scholars critiqued the dominant theological-jurisprudential tradition of their day, which was influenced by dialectical theology. Against the dialectical theologians, Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim argued that an authentically fideist, consistent and rational theory of Islamic law could only emerge from an acceptance of the reality of God’s voluntary attributes.