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This fifth peer review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance analyses the supervision and enforcement of rules and practices relating to related party transactions (RPTs), takeover bids and shareholder meetings.
Abstract: "Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books, or voluntary codes is key to effective corporate governance, at least in transition and developing countries. Corporate governance and enforcement mechanisms are intimately linked as they affect firms' ability to commit to their stakeholders, in particular to external investors. Berglof and Claessens provide a framework for understanding these links and how they are shaped by countries' institutional contexts. When the general enforcement environment is weak and specific enforcement mechanisms function poorly, as in many developing and transition countries, few of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms are effective. The principal consequence in these countries is a large blockholder, but there are important potential costs to this mechanism. A range of private and public enforcement 'tools' can help reduce these costs and reinforce other supplementary corporate governance mechanisms. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private tools are more effective than public forms of enforcement in the typical environment of most developing and transition countries. However, public enforcement is necessary regardless, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Furthermore, in some countries at least, bottom-up, private-led tools preceded and even shaped public laws. Political economy constraints resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, however, often prevent improvements in the general enforcement environment, and adoption and implementation of public laws in these countries. This paper a product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Department is part of a larger effort in the department to help improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"--World Bank web site.
This research handbook provides a state-of-the-art perspective on how corporate governance differs between countries around the world. It covers highly topical issues including corporate purpose, corporate social responsibility and shareholder activism.
This book focuses on the federalization of corporate governance in the United States from both historical and contemporary perspectives. Although the states traditionally have regulated the sphere of corporate governance - encompassing the relations among and between the subject corporation, its directors, its officers, its stockholders, and other stakeholders - federal law today impacts the governance of publicly-traded companies to a greater degree than ever before in U.S. history. This book discusses the evolution and development of corporate governance from a federal law perspective from the commencement of the twentieth century to the present. It examines the tension between state company law and federal law, analyzes the federal historical developments, explains the ramifications of the federal legislation enacted during the past two decades, and recommends corrective measures that should be implemented. The book accordingly provides an original, historical, and contemporary analysis of the federalization of corporate governance - a subject that impacts this country's economic well-being in a very fundamental way.
This book assembles the world's most authoritative specialists for a comparative analysis of the enforcement of corporate and securities laws in thirteen national jurisdictions. It examines the enforcement of corporate and securities laws across the globe and across different legal and political systems from an in-depth comparative perspective.
Corporate law and corporate governance have been at the forefront of regulatory activities across the world for several decades now, and are subject to increasing public attention following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Law and Governance provides the global framework necessary to understand the aims and methods of legal research in this field. Written by leading scholars from around the world, the Handbook contains a rich variety of chapters that provide a comparative and functional overview of corporate governance. It opens with the central theoretical approaches and methodologies in corporate law scholarship in Part I, before examining core substantive topics in corporate law, including shareholder rights, takeovers and restructuring, and minority rights in Part II. Part III focuses on new challenges in the field, including conflicts between Western and Asian corporate governance environments, the rise of foreign ownership, and emerging markets. Enforcement issues are covered in Part IV, and Part V takes a broader approach, examining those areas of law and finance that are interwoven with corporate governance, including insolvency, taxation, and securities law as well as financial regulation. The Handbook is a comprehensive, interdisciplinary resource placing corporate law and governance in its wider context, and is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and policymakers in the field.
In this timely book, the law and economics of corporate governance is approached from a range of angles. This study reveals that perspectives are changing: they differ between the economic and the legal standpoint; they vary across countries; they evolve over time. A group of leading scholars offer their views some provide fresh empirical evidence on existing theories and others attempt to develop new theoretical insights based on empirical puzzles. They all analyse the economics of corporate governance with a view to how it should, or should not, be regulated. Economic analysis of law proves to be the common language for understanding corporate governance on both sides of the Atlantic. The law and economics approach is applied to topical issues in the international debate, such as the harmonization of company laws; regulatory competition; determinants of separation of ownership and control; enforcement of investor protection; and the political economy of corporate governance.
Florence Thépot provides the first systematic account of the interaction between competition law and corporate governance. She challenges the 'black box' conception of the firm- or 'undertaking' - in competition law, as applied to increasingly complex corporate relations. The book opens the 'black box' of the firm to understand the internal drivers of collusive behaviour, and proposes a unified approach to cartel enforcement, based on the agency theory. It explores key issues including corporate compliance programmes, the attribution of liability in corporate groups, and structural links between competitors, and should be read by anyone interested in how the evolution of the corporate landscape impacts competition law.
This sixth peer review of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance analyses the corporate governance framework and practices relating to corporate risk management, in the private sector and in state-owned enterprises. The review covers 26 jurisdictions and is based on a general survey of all participating jurisdictions in December 2012, as well as an in-depth review of corporate risk management in Norway, Singapore and Switzerland. The report finds that while risk-taking is a fundamental driving force in business and entrepreneurship, the cost of risk management failures is often underestimated, both externally and internally, including the cost in terms of management time needed to rectify the situation. The reports thus concludes that corporate governance should ensure that risks are understood, managed, and, when appropriate, communicated.
Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.