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This book, based on recently declassified documents in Britain and the USA, is the first detailed account of Britain's East of Suez decision, which was taken by the Harold Wilson Government in 1967-68. Contrary to received opinion, the author argues that the decision was not taken hastily as a result of the November 1967 devaluation. Nor is there any hard evidence to support the notion that there existed a 'Pound-Defence' deal with the USA. Despite Washington's pressure to maintain Britain's East of Suez role, the decision was taken by the Labour Government on the basis of a long-term effort to re-examine Britain's world role since 1959, and it marked the end of an era for postwar Britain.
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP) is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial rule and the context in which this took place. This publication is the first of three volumes which examine the years 1964 to 1971, during which period ten territories became independent and all but one (Aden) became new members of the Commonwealth. Issues considered include: the symbolic significance of the recall of British troops from East of Suez, and the circumstances of Britain's withdrawl from Aden; a reappraisal of British interests in South-East Asia in the context of Singapore's secession from Malaysia; the ending of confrontation with Indonesia; British views on the Vietnam conflict; the end of Britain's treaties of protection in the Persian Gulf and the creation of the UAE.
In a bold reinterpretation of history, Ike's Gamble shows how the 1956 Suez Crisis taught President Eisenhower that Israel, not Egypt, would have to be America's ally in the region. In 1956 President Nasser of Egypt moved to take possession of the Suez Canal, bringing the Middle East to the brink of war. Distinguished Middle East expert Michael Doran shows how Nasser played the United States, invoking America's opposition to European colonialism to his own benefit. At the same time Nasser made weapons deals with the USSR and destabilized other Arab countries that the United States had been courting. In time, Eisenhower would realize that Nasser had duped him and that the Arab countries were too fractious to anchor America's interests in the Middle East. Affording deep insight into Eisenhower and his foreign policy, this fascinating and provocative history provides a rich new understanding of the tangled path by which the United States became the power broker in the Middle East. -- Back cover.
A fast-paced short history that moves between London, Washington, and Cairo to reveal the crisis that brought down a prime minister. Includes photos, a timeline, and a special afterword examining the parallels with the 2003 Iraq war In 1956, Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, ending nearly a century of British and French control over the crucial waterway. Ignoring U.S. diplomatic efforts and fears of a looming Cold War conflict, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden misled Parliament and the press to take Britain to war alongside France and Israel. In response to a secretly planned Israeli attack in the Sinai, France and Britain intervened as “peacemakers.” The invasion of Egypt was supposed to restore British and French control of the canal and reaffirm Britain’s flagging prestige. Instead, the operation spectacularly backfired, setting Britain and the United States on a collision course that would change the balance of power in the Middle East. The combined air, sea, and land battle witnessed the first helicopter-borne deployment of assault troops and the last large-scale parachute drop into a conflict zone by British forces. French and British soldiers fought together against the Soviet-equipped Egyptian military in a short campaign that cost the lives of thousands of soldiers—along with innocent civilians. This book, by a prominent historian specializing in the Middle East, tells the story.
Originally published in 1901, 'East of Suez' was Alice Perrin's first collection of short stories. Her fascinating and thought-provoking tales of Anglo-Indian life rival the best work of Kipling, and were hugely successful in their day. Perrin tells stories of illicit love against a beautifully-drawn backdrop of the mystical east, interweaving the supernatural with exquisite details of her characters' lives. This scholarly edition includes: a critical introduction; author biography; suggestions for further reading; explanatory notes; contextual material on representations of the British Raj; illustrations from 'The Illustrated London News' and 'The Windsor Magazine'.
In 1964 Britain's defence presence in Malaysia and Singapore was the largest and most expensive component of the country's world-wide role. Yet within three and a half years the Wilson Government had announced that Britain would be withdrawing from its major Southeast Asian bases and abandoning any special military role 'East of Suez'. Drawing upon previously classified government records P.L. Pham examines and explains how the Wilson Government came to this conclusion, one of the most significant decisions in the decline of British global power after the Second World War. Substantially revising earlier accounts, Pham exposes the inner workings of government, the close but strained relations between the United Kingdom and the United States in the midst of Cold War tensions, and how politicians and policy makers managed the decline of British power, providing an in-depth and comprehensive study of British policy processes of the era.
At the heart of this book is the problem of war termination. Britain won an almost unbroken string of tactical military victories during an undeclared war against the Republic of Indonesia in the 1960s, yet it proved difficult to translate this into strategic success. Using conflict termination theories, this book argues that British strategy during Confrontation was both exemplary and flawed, both of which need not be mutually exclusive. The British experience in Indonesia represents an illuminating case study of the difficulties associated with strategy and the successful termination of conflicts. The value of this book lies in two areas: as a contribution to the literature on British counter-insurgency operations and as a contribution to the debates on the problems of war termination in the context of strategic thought.
This book is a major and wide-ranging re-assessment of Anglo-American relations in the Middle Eastern context. It analyses the process of ending of empire in the Middle East from 1945 to the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Based on original research into both British and American archival sources, it covers all the key events of the period, including the withdrawal from Palestine, the Anglo-American coup against the Musaddiq regime in Iran, the Suez Crisis and its aftermath, the Iraqi and Yemeni revolutions, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. It demonstrates that, far from experiencing a ‘loss of nerve’ or tamely acquiescing in a transfer of power to the United States, British decision-makers robustly defended their regional interests well into the 1960s and even beyond. It also argues that concept of the ‘special relationship’ impeded the smooth-running of Anglo-American relations in the region by obscuring differences, stymieing clear communication, and practising self-deception on policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic who assumed a contiguity which all too often failed to exist. With the Middle East at the top of the contemporary international policy agenda, and recent Anglo-American interventions fuelling interest in empire, this is a timely book of importance to all those interested in the contemporary development of the region.