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Complying with the forthcoming tightening of CO2 emission allocations in the EU may mean big bills for the industries affected. In this special issue of Climate Policy journal, leading experts examine the impacts on competitiveness and the commercial incentives available from the CO2 allowance allocations under the methodologies, and whether - and if so at what stage - the ETS itself may need to be amended. The study is multidisciplinary, combining economic, legal and policy analysis with specific studies of impacts on electricity, cement and other industrial sectors and the allocation issues. It brings together the results of research conducted over the past two year from various research centres and consultancies in Europe, and in particular, work commissioned by the Carbon Trust and Climate Strategies Network. Through these, it presents the most comprehensive and detailed set of analyses yet conducted of the impacts of allocation on competitiveness - one of the most critical issues for the sectors affected and for the operation of the ETS.
First Published in 2006. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
The first detailed description and analysis of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.
Brookings Trade Forum provides comprehensive analysis on current and emerging issues of international trade and macroeconomics. Practitioners and academics contribute to each volume, with papers that provide an in-depth look at a particular topic. The 2008/2009 edition focuses on climate policy and its impact on trade. Contents include • Five "Gs": Lessons for Governing Global Climate from World Trade William Antholis (Brookings) • International Trade Law and the Economics of Climate Policy: Evaluating the Legality and Effectiveness of Proposals to Address Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns Jason E. Bordoff (Brookings) • Technology Transfers and Climate Change: International Flows, Barriers, and Frameworks Thomas L. Brewer (Georgetown University) •Addressing the Leakage / Competitiveness Issue in Climate Change Policy Proposals Jeffrey A. Frankel (Harvard University) • The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy Warwick J. Mckibbin and Peter J.Wilcoxen (Brookings) • The Climate Commons and a Global Environment Organization (GEO) C. Ford Runge (University of Minnesota)
This book presents a selection of papers from an international workshop co-sponsored by the OECD and Concerted Action on Tradeable Emissions Permits (CATEP), to discuss key research and policy issues relating to the design and implementation of these instruments.
This literature review analyses the impacts of the EU ETS on competitiveness focussing on existing simulation studies. We have identified the choice of the reference scenario as the most critical issue for an appropriate analysis of the relevant literature. We find, however, that effects of the scheme on competitiveness are modest, even given the business as usual case that does not take the legally binding framework of the Kyoto Protocol into account. Furthermore, the impacts of the EU ETS are smaller than the impacts of alternative Kyoto-based regulation scenarios. Compared to these other regulation methods ETSs can have positive competitiveness effects. However, the EU ETS is not designed to boost Europe's economy. Its prime purpose and justification is to ensure that Europe's CO2 emissions are brought down and Kyoto targets are reached at minimal costs. To our opinion, it is therefore important that the system as well as modifications to it do not undermine the environmental goals associated with this policy instrument.
Carbon pricing should be a central element of climate mitigation strategies, helping countries transition to ‘net zero’ greenhouse gas emissions over the next three decades. Policymakers considering introducing or scaling up carbon pricing face technical choices between carbon taxes and emissions trading systems (ETSs) and in their design. This includes administration, price levels, relation to other mitigation instruments, use of revenues to address efficiency and distributional objectives, supporting measures to address competitiveness concerns, extension to broader emissions sources, and coordination at the global level. Political economy considerations also affect the choice and design of instruments. This paper discusses such issues in the choice between and design of carbon taxes and ETSs, providing guidance, broader considerations, and quantitative analyses. Overall, carbon taxes have significant practical advantages over ETSs (especially for developing countries) due to ease of administration, price certainty to promote investment, the potential to raise significant revenues, and coverage of broader emissions sources—but ETSs can have significant political economy advantages.
Emissions trading systems have come to the fore as the most economically efficient mechanisms that can be employed to bring about an optimal greenhouse gas reduction goal. Even though much has been written about the advantages and disadvantages of these systems, one element of crucial importance and– emission allowance allocation and– has not been considered in adequate depth until the present study. Such an analysis takes on increased importance as it seems likely that market-based auctioning will become the default allocation method throughout the EU under a proposed amendment to the Emissions Trading System (ETS) established by Directive 2003/87/EC. Taking a law and economics approach and– that is, using a combined perspective of industrial economics and legal analysis and– this important book examines the potential for anticompetitive distortion that may result from auctioning emission allowances. Among the issues investigated in depth are the following: whether the current setup of the EU ETS fosters allocative efficiency or whether this allocative efficiency is hindered by legal impediments or constraints; whether EU competition law can serve to remedy anticompetitive effects stemming from Member State actions taken pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC; which allocation formats are most desirable from an allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness point of view; the importance of initial allocation and adjustment of out-of-equilibrium situations under the amended ETS; whether auctioning allowances serves the attainment of market equilibrium even in the continuing presence of and‘polluter havensand’; the effect of the ECJand’s so-called and‘joint application jurisprudenceand’ on the ETS; and the allocation of allowances from a state aid perspective. The book provides both a coherent typology of emission allowance allocation mechanisms and the main characteristics of the present emissions trading system, setting the gained insights into a broader perspective. It examines how various assignment mechanisms deal with issues such as price determination, allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness. It considers how market-based allocation mechanisms compare with administrative allocation mechanisms, particularly those based on the widely applied grandfathering method. And perhaps most important and– and of especial value to practitioners and policymakers and– it identifies the auction design challenges that must be addressed by the Commission in its implementing regulation due by 30 June 2010.