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This book offers a vision of economics in which there is no place for universal laws of nature, and even for laws of a more probabilistic character. The author avoids interpreting the practice of economics as something that leads to the formulation of universal laws or laws of nature. Instead, chapters in the book follow the method of contemporary philosophy of science: rather than formulating suggestions for practicing scientists of how they should do research, the text describes and interprets the very practice of scientific research. This approach demonstrates how economists can explain economic phenomena not by subsuming them under general laws, but rather by building models of these phenomena, by referring to causes, or even by investigating what is in the nature of given factors, events, or circumstances to produce.
Publisher Fact Sheet Examines the relationship between economics & the law.
This book is a comprehensive and often controversial survey of economic methodology.
By providing readers with a noncritical description of the broad contours of each school of thought, Mercuro and Medema convey a strong sense of the important elements of each of these interrelated yet varied traditions.
In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central banking and the use of capital controls, fighting corruption in China, rural credit markets in India, pawnshops in the United States, the limitations of antitrust law, and the role of international monetary regimes. Collectively, the essays in Law, Economics, and Conflict rethink how the insights of law and economics can inform policies that provide individuals with the space and means to work, innovate, and prosper—while guiding states and international organization to regulate in ways that limit conflict, reduce national and global inequality, and ensure fairness. Contributors: Kaushik Basu; Kimberly Bolch; University of Oxford; Marieke Bos, Stockholm School of Economics; Susan Payne Carter, US Military Academy at West Point; Peter Cornelisse, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Gaël Giraud, Georgetown University; Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University; Robert C. Hockett; Karla Hoff, Columbia University and World Bank; Yair Listokin, Yale Law School; Cheryl Long, Xiamen University and Wang Yanan Institute for Study of Economics (WISE); Luis Felipe López-Calva, UN Development Programme; Célestin Monga, Harvard University; Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School; Anand V. Swamy, Williams College; Erik Thorbecke, Cornell University; James Walsh, University of Oxford. Contributors: Kimberly B. Bolch, Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter, Peter A. Cornelisse, Gaël Giraud, Nicole Hassoun, Karla Hoff, Yair Listokin, Cheryl Long, Luis F. López-Calva, Célestin Monga, Paige Marta Skiba, Anand V. Swamy, Erik Thorbecke, James Walsh
This book considers three relationships: law and economics; economics and game theory; and game theory and law. Economists teach lawyers that economic principles cut across and integrate seemingly different legal subjects such as contracts, torts, and property. Correspondingly, lawyers teach economists that legal rationality is a separate and distinct decision-making process that can be formalized by behavioral rules that are parallel to and comparable with the behavioral rules of economic rationality, that efficiency often must be constrained by legal goals such as equal protection of the laws, due process, and horizontal and distributional equity, and that the general case methodology of economics vs. the hard case methodology of law for determining the truth or falsity of economic theories and theorems sometimes conflict. Economics and Game Theory: Law and economics books focus on economic analysis of judges’ decisions in common law cases and have been mostly limited to contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and suit and settlement. There is usually no discussion of the many areas of law that require cooperative action such as is needed to provide economic infrastructure, control public “bad” type externalities, and make legislation. Game theory provides the bridge between competitive markets and the missing discussion of cooperative action in law and economics. How? Competitive markets are examples (subset) of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, which explains the conflict between individual self-interested behavior and cooperation both in economic markets and in legislative bodies and demonstrates the need for social infrastructure and regulation of pollution and global warming. Game Theory and Law: Lawsuits usually involve litigation between two parties, not the myriad participants in markets, so the assumption of self-interest constrained by markets does not carry over to legal disputes involving one-on-one bargaining in which the law gives one party superior bargaining power. Game theory models predict the effect of different legal institutions, rights, and rules on the outcome of such bargaining. Game theory also has a natural four-model framework which is used in this book to analyze the law and economics of civil obligation, which consists of torts (negligence), contracts, and unjust enrichment.
"[This book] argues that the traditional economic analysis of the law has significant flaws and has failed to answer certain critical questions satisfactorily. Why are good laws drafted but never implemented? When laws are unenforced, is it a failure of the law or the enforcers? And, most important, considering that laws are simply words on paper, why are they effective? Basu offers a provocative alternative to how the relationship between economics and real-world law enforcement should be understood. Basu summarizes standard, neoclassical law and economics before looking at the weaknesses underlying the discipline. Bringing modern game theory to bear, he develops a 'focal point' approach, modeling not just the self-interested actions of the citizens who must follow laws but also the functionaries of the state: the politicians, judges, and bureaucrats enforcing them. He demonstrates the connections between social norms and the law and shows how well conceived ideas can change and benefit human behavior. For example, bribe givers and takers will collude when they are treated equally under the law. And in food support programs, vouchers should be given directly to the poor to prevent shop owners from selling subsidized rations on the open market. Basu provides a new paradigm for the ways that law and economics interact: a framework applicable to both less developed countries and the developed world"--Jacket.
Economics in Three Lessons Henry Hazlitt's 1946 book Economics in One Lesson sold more than a million copies. It is perhaps the best selling economics book of all time. In this volume, Hunter Lewis, a Hazlitt admirer and student, provides a sequel and update. The great merit of this volume is its simplicity. Anyone can read and understand it. It is an ideal introduction to economics. One Hundred Economic Laws In this groundbreaking volume, Lewis does what no one has attempted to do. It collects in one place some of the most important laws of economics. Everyone understands the importance of the laws of physics. Are there also laws of economics? Can understanding them also make our lives better? This volume answers with a resounding yes. This short book is also a complete course in economics written in a lively and sparkling style.
What effects do laws have? Do individuals drive more cautiously, clear ice from sidewalks more diligently, and commit fewer crimes because of the threat of legal sanctions? Do corporations pollute less, market safer products, and obey contracts to avoid suit? And given the effects of laws, which are socially best? Such questions about the influence and desirability of laws have been investigated by legal scholars and economists in a new, rigorous, and systematic manner since the 1970s. Their approach, which is called economic, is widely considered to be intellectually compelling and to have revolutionized thinking about the law. In this book Steven Shavell provides an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the economic approach to the building blocks of our legal system, namely, property law, tort law, contract law, and criminal law. He also examines the litigation process as well as welfare economics and morality. Aimed at a broad audience, this book requires neither a legal background nor technical economics or mathematics to understand it. Because of its breadth, analytical clarity, and general accessibility, it is likely to serve as a definitive work in the economic analysis of law.
A leading economist trains a lens on his own discipline to uncover when it fails and when it works.