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From a law-and-economics perspective the primary goal of (legal) remedies is to enhance social welfare by minimising social costs. Remedies help to achieve cost internalisation since they provide means by which third parties who are negatively affected by the respective action are entitled to veto the action (property rule) or to claim compensation for their losses (liability rule).Examples from German stock corporation law illustrate the respective strengths and weakenesses of both types of rules. The right of each single shareholder to claim the rescission of an (allegedly) unlawful shareholders' resolution by which the shareholder can effectively stall the execution of the underlying transaction (property rule) can lead to very expensive holdout problems. Liability rules like the shareholder's appraisal remedy, on the other hand, may suffer from valuation problems. Additional incentive issues occur where the law employs the shareholder to protect the interests of the company, i.e. the interests of the shareholders in their entirety.
In recent years there has been a revival of interest in the philosophical study of contract law. In 1981 Charles Fried claimed that contract law is based on the philosophy of promise and this has generated what is today known as 'the contract and promise debate'. Cutting to the heart of contemporary discussions, this volume brings together leading philosophers, legal theorists, and contract lawyers to debate the philosophical foundations of this area of law. Divided into two parts, the first explores general themes in the contract theory literature, including the philosophy of promising, the nature of contractual obligation, economic accounts of contract law, and the relationship between contract law and moral values such as personal autonomy and distributive justice. The second part uses these philosophical ideas to make progress in doctrinal debates, relating for example to contract interpretation, unfair terms, good faith, vitiating factors, and remedies. Together, the essays provide a picture of the current state of research in this revitalized area of law, and pave the way for future study and debate.
Corporations classes present students with two related problems: First, many students have trouble understanding the cases studied because they do not understand the transactions giving rise to those cases. Second, Corporations classes at many law schools are taught from a law and economics perspective, which many students find unfamiliar and/or daunting. Yet, with few exceptions, corporate law treatises and other study aids have essentially ignored the law and economics revolution. This book is intended to remedy these difficulties. The pedagogy is up-to - date, with a strong emphasis on the doctrinal issues taught in today's Corporations classes and, equally important, a mainstream economic analysis of the major issues in the course. As such, the text is coherent and cohesive: It provides students not only with an overview of the course, but also (and more importantly) with a unifying method of thinking about the course. Using a few basic tools of law and economics-price theory, game theory, and the theory of the firm literature-students will come to see corporate law as the proverbial "seamless web." Finally, the text is highly readable: The style is simple, direct, and reader- friendly. Even when dealing with complicated economic or financial issues, the text seeks to make those issues readily accessible.
This text argues that the rules and practices of corporate law mimic contractual provisions that parties involved in corporate enterprise would reach if they always bargained at zero cost and flawlessly enforced their agreements. It states that corporate l
This is a collection of both classic and recent scholarship on the economics of remedies in tort and contract law.
In The Corporation, Law and Capitalism, Grietje Baars offers a radical Marxist perspective on law, tracing the corporation from colonial times to the present multinational. ‘Corporate accountability’ is shown to be a red herring in the struggle for another world.
This monograph provides a comprehensive analysis of corporate opportunities doctrines from a comparative perspective. It looks at both common law and civil law rules and relies to a large extent on a law and economics approach. This book broadens the conventional view on corporate opportunities, a vital step in light of the adoption of corporate opportunities rules in civil law jurisdictions and in light of investors' ever-changing strategies. This approach considers institutional complementarities and especially industrial complementarities. The book thus explores several jurisdictions and their economic and industrial environments, whilst also assessing the impact of globalisation onto legal reform. Furthermore, it analyses the problems related to the application of corporate opportunities rules to cross-border venture capital. In normative terms, the book advances one main stance, articulated in three points: first, it proposes different sanctions for undisclosed and disclosed misappropriations, supporting the core idea that sanctions should be set against disclosure and not authorisation. Secondly, it advances the idea that sanctions against undisclosed misappropriations should be more severe than the ones presently applied. Thirdly, it considers the possibility of a more flexible treatment of disclosed misappropriations. This study is positioned at the intersection of several fields, providing a lens into a much broader range of dynamics that will be of interest to a varied international readership, and offering a window into the broader institutional dynamics at work in centres of innovation (eg Silicon Valley and industrial districts in other jurisdictions). It is rooted in law and economics, but the emphasis is placed on how corporate opportunities rules fit within a broader set of institutional dynamics that affect innovation, industrial efficiency, and economic competitiveness.
“Efficient breach” is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined.
After 2008, private-sector spending took a decade to recover. Yair Listokin thinks we can respond more quickly to the next meltdown by reviving and refashioning a policy approach, used in the New Deal, to harness law’s ability to function as a macroeconomic tool, stimulating or relieving demand as required under certain crisis conditions.
This book analyzes the conflict that emerges between parties after a breach of contract and how different legal remedies can best reduce conflict. Causes for conflict include equity, efficiency, and ethical reasons that parties might consider and use to blame the other or to justify breach. In the end, if not resolved through apologies or renegotiation, conflict leads to aggrievement and behavioral reactions in form of retaliation by the victim against the promisor in breach. The book provides empirical evidence from laboratory experiments for how individuals react to perceived wrongful acts such as breach of contract and for the function of legal remedies to reduce retaliation by disappointed promisees in providing them compensation. It reveals how the inequality in the outcome, and not the inefficiency of breach of contract, causes aggrievement and retaliation by victims. The book concludes with a comparative law and economic analysis of remedies for breach of contract adopted in different leading jurisdictions, with important normative implications for the American insistence on expectation damages, the French expansion of specific performance with "astreinte", the German junction of specific performance, expectation damages, and disgorgement damages, and the British timid acceptance of partial disgorgement damages. The book will appeal to scholars, researchers, and students of economics and law, interested in a better understanding of remedies for breach of contract.