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"That's not a statement of the amount forcibly redistributed, but of the amount spent in effecting the forcible transfer of resources. And, as the authors show, this is a very conservative estimate of the deadweight losses associated with the transfer society.".
In recent years the definition of an economic transfer—a payment to an individual or institution that does not arise out of current productive activity—has been subject to even wider interpretation. This volume addresses that trend and introduces new methods of measuring transfers in the American economy. Social security, private pension benefits, housing, and health care are traditional kinds of transfers. Accurate measurements of the degree and effect of these and of other, newly interpreted transfers are vital to economic policy making. Though this volume is not directly concerned with policy-making issues, it does impinge on many areas of current public concern; methods of transfer valuation, for example, may affect how we view the status of the aged. Researchers, policy analysts, and those who compile statistics on which social programs are based on will value the diverse approaches of these ten papers and their accompanying comments. Taken together the essays give great insight into the complexities of defining transfers and provide a wealth of new analytic methods. They were developed from material presented at the Income and Wealth Conference on Social Accounting for Transfers held at Madison, Wisconsin, in 1982.
This article studies the involuntary transfer of property rights by theft - a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should obtain title to the good if he/she has purchased it in good faith. As described in the article different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. The traditional theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs of protecting the good and the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown, the rule of law concerning this issue significantly affects parties' incentives. Specifically, it is shown that a rule of law where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule where good faith may protect an innocent buyer. Thus, an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights. JEL Classification: K11, K14 and K42 Keywords: property right law, theft, good faith and game theory.
Despite claims that school districts need flexibility in teacher assignment to allocate teachers more equitably across schools and improve district performance, the power to involuntarily transfer teachers across schools remains hotly contested. Little research has examined involuntary transfer policies or their effects on schools, teachers, or students. This article uses administrative data from Miami-Dade County Public Schools to investigate the implementation and effects of the district's involuntary transfer policy, including which schools transferred and received teachers, which teachers were transferred, what kinds of teachers replaced them in their former schools, and how their performance--as measured by their work absences and value-added in math and reading--compared before and after the transfer. We find that, under the policy, principals in the lowest-performing schools identified relatively low-performing teachers for transfer who, based on observable characteristics, would have been unlikely to leave on their own. Consistent with an equity improvement, we find that involuntarily transferred teachers were systematically moved to higher-performing schools. Efficiency impacts are mixed; although transferred teachers had nearly 2 fewer absences per year in their new schools, transferred teachers continued to have low value-added in their new schools.
In some special but frequently occurring situations, such as adverse possession, eminent domain, regulatory takings, and taxation, the law allows, or effects, involuntary transfers of rights. Property belonging to one person shifts to another even though the former owner has not relinquished his claim. These involuntary reallocations of rights raise issues of efficiency. Scholars looking at law through an economic lens have made the positive claim that the common law is efficient and have advanced the normative claim that the law should be efficient. The purpose of this essay is to show how the application of results from psychological experiments can enhance both the positive and normative economic analysis of law. On the positive front, the notion of loss aversion may, for example, help us to understand the adverse possession and takings doctrines. In the normative domain, the experiments expose an additional limitation on the application of the Coase theorem, suggest some improvements to the law of just compensation, and indicate that some modes of legal change may be better than others.
This paper analyses the role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfers and wage subsidies. It is argued that public welfare programs can be viewed as a crime-preventing or disruption-preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunity cost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in the presence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, the optimal size of the public welfare program is found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income (not lump-sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary. The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee on congested public goods and transfers can be thought of as productive public goods subject to congestion. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation between transfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.
This open access book asks whether cash-transfer programs for very low-income households promote social and economic citizenship and, if so, under what conditions. To this end, it brings together elements that are too often considered separately: the transformation of social and economic citizenship rights in a market-centered context, and the increasing popularity of cash transfer as an instrument both of social policy and humanitarian action. We link these by juxtaposing theoretical treatment of citizenship and inclusion with concrete policy case studies set in contemporary Turkey. Cases are taken both from domestic social policy and international relief efforts aimed at Syrian refugees. Theoretical discussion and case studies lead to the conclusion that cash transfer programs can promote economic and social inclusion – if deployed at an appropriate scale; if sufficient financial, technical, and social resources are available; and if program design and implementation promotes market inclusion of beneficiaries both as consumers and workers.