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Why hasn't the emergence of capitalism led China's citizenry to press for liberal democratic change? This book argues that China's combination of state-led development, late industrialization, and socialist legacies have affected popular perceptions of socioeconomic mobility, economic dependence on the state, and political options, giving citizens incentives to perpetuate the political status quo and disincentives to embrace liberal democratic change. Wright addresses the ways in which China's political and economic development shares broader features of state-led late industrialization and post-socialist transformation with countries as diverse as Mexico, India, Tunisia, Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, and Vietnam. With its detailed analysis of China's major socioeconomic groups (private entrepreneurs, state sector workers, private sector workers, professionals and students, and farmers), Accepting Authoritarianism is an up-to-date, comprehensive, and coherent text on the evolution of state-society relations in reform-era China.
Annotation Local-level study of a rural Tunisian town that illustrates why market-oriented economic reforms have not necessarily led to politicl liberalization. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies Mark Tessler, general editor.
A conceptually rich, historically informed study of the contested politics emerging out of decades of authoritarian neoliberalism in Egypt.
Based on a detailed study of 35 cases in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and post-communist Eurasia, this book explores the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes between 1990 and 2008. It finds that where social, economic, and technocratic ties to the West were extensive, as in Eastern Europe and the Americas, the external cost of abuse led incumbents to cede power rather than crack down, which led to democratization. Where ties to the West were limited, external democratizing pressure was weaker and countries rarely democratized. In these cases, regime outcomes hinged on the character of state and ruling party organizations. Where incumbents possessed developed and cohesive coercive party structures, they could thwart opposition challenges, and competitive authoritarian regimes survived; where incumbents lacked such organizational tools, regimes were unstable but rarely democratized.
Authoritarian Neoliberalism explores how neoliberal forms of managing capitalism are challenging democratic governance at local, national and international levels. Identifying a spectrum of policies and practices that seek to reproduce neoliberalism and shield it from popular and democratic contestation, contributors provide original case studies that investigate the legal-administrative, social, coercive and corporate dimensions of authoritarian neoliberalism across the global North and South. They detail the crisis-ridden intertwinement of authoritarian statecraft and neoliberal reforms, and trace the transformation of key societal sites in capitalism (e.g. states, households, workplaces, urban spaces) through uneven yet cumulative processes of neoliberalization. Informed by innovative conceptual and methodological approaches, Authoritarian Neoliberalism uncovers how inequalities of power are produced and reproduced in capitalist societies, and highlights how alternatives to neoliberalism can be formulated and pursued. The book was originally published as a special issue of Globalizations.
Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises, while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed? In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises produce regime change.
Contrary to other world regions, political regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) remain largely authoritarian. While the search for explanations is still ongoing, Christian Neugebauer draws attention to a hitherto underresearched factor: economic liberalization. Being part of a global shift from state-led development towards structural adjustment in the economy, these policies also deeply affected the countries of the MENA region. This makes the resilience of authoritarianism in the region all the more puzzling, as a large part of the scientific community expected economic liberalization to undermine authoritarian regimes. Neugebauer strives to solve the puzzle with a comparative case study that covers four countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco) and their political regimes, from independence in the 1950s to the Arab Spring in 2011. He shows that two specific policies of economic liberalization might in fact have been relevant for regime stability: consumer-price liberalization and privatization.
Analyzes Muslim countries' contemporary problems, particularly violence, authoritarianism, and underdevelopment, comparing their historical levels of development with Western Europe.
This book examines the economic reforms and material progress made since the Central Asian republics became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991. Without some of the neo-liberal reforms recommended by the "Washington Consensus" and with an authoritarian presidency, Uzbekistan, the largest of these countries, has nevertheless achieved modest economic growth, stability, and a relatively impressive degree of income equality. The country has also preserved its economic and political independence from the great powers — Russia, China, and the USA — who are rivals for influence and energy in Central Asia. Human rights have been poorly enforced, though occasional thaws have also taken place. In second half of the book features a comparative analysis of four Central Asian states, all super-presidential authoritarianisms but with very different resource endowments and external commitments. A separate chapter deals with the energy resources of the region and the challenges of bringing oil and gas to the world market, and the question of whether Central Asian states will return to the Russian sphere of influence or seek closer ties with Asia or Europe is examined. The book concludes with prospects for future political and economic progress in the key Central Asian states.
This book argues that - in terms of institutional design, the allocation of power and privilege, and the lived experiences of citizens - democracy often does not restart the political game after displacing authoritarianism. Democratic institutions are frequently designed by the outgoing authoritarian regime to shield incumbent elites from the rule of law and give them an unfair advantage over politics and the economy after democratization. Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy systematically documents and analyzes the constitutional tools that outgoing authoritarian elites use to accomplish these ends, such as electoral system design, legislative appointments, federalism, legal immunities, constitutional tribunal design, and supermajority thresholds for change. The study provides wide-ranging evidence for these claims using data that spans the globe and dates from 1800 to the present. Albertus and Menaldo also conduct detailed case studies of Chile and Sweden. In doing so, they explain why some democracies successfully overhaul their elite-biased constitutions for more egalitarian social contracts.