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The United States’ National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) is a congressionally-mandated policy framework that is intended to foster a defence free-trade area among the defence-related research and development sectors of the United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. To date, however, the NTIB has only managed to facilitate limited bilateral cooperation between some members, falling well short of its goal. The US defence export control regime is one of the biggest barriers to NTIB integration. Specifically, bureaucratic fragmentation, its failure to treat trusted allies differently from other partners and its leaders’ reluctance to attempt politically costly reform are significant barriers to progress. Canberra’s ability to maintain its own competitive military advantage and to serve as an effective ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific is threatened by real and growing opportunity costs in an age of rapid strategic and technological change that Australia and Australian industry face as a result of slow NTIB implementation. Australian leaders should elevate NTIB progress to the political level and accelerate efforts to make a strategic case in Washington as to why extensive and ambitious implementation of NTIB’s original vision is urgently needed.
There is a long history of the United States drawing upon the defence industrial bases of its allies when in need. The strategic challenges facing Australia and the United States in the Indo-Pacific today, along with the global diffusion of technological and industrial power, present a renewed case for close US allies to seek innovative ways to aggregate their collective defence industrial capabilities. The expansion of the NTIB to include Australia and the United Kingdom has laid the groundwork for larger reform and integration with allies. But while allies and officials within the United States can continue to press for further reform, it will ultimately take political will in Washington to push for a major overhaul of the US defence export control regime to bring it in line with the requirements of great power competition. Breaking down barriers and incentivising trusted allies with the R&D, knowledge and resources to continue working with the United States should be a critical priority.
The 30th round of the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) will soon take place amid immense global disruption and unprecedented domestic pressures accelerated by the spread of SARS-CoV-2 (also known as coronavirus or COVID-19). Our Indo-Pacific neighbourhood should be at the top of the agenda. It is hard to imagine a more urgent time for the Australia-United States alliance to provide strong and collaborative regional leadership — and to bolster the resilience of the Indo-Pacific across all of its dimensions: from health security and economic development to the balance of military power and strategic resilience. It is equally hard to imagine a more difficult environment for our alliance to concentrate its energies on regional policy. With the United States enduring a pandemic-fuelled health crisis, nationwide social unrest, escalating national debt and a general election in November, and with Australia still tentatively emerging from the first wave of the pandemic, both countries have pressing and politically-charged distractions at home. Nonetheless, our shared national interests in fostering a healthy, stable and resilient Indo-Pacific region cannot be postponed and must be wholeheartedly embraced at AUSMIN 2020. Three principles should guide this year’s deliberations. First, helping our Indo-Pacific neighbours to sustainably recover from the pandemic is the most urgent priority and is in all of our interests. With more than 600,000 cases of COVID-19 throughout the region — coupled with a rapidly deteriorating health, economic and developmental outlook that will see regional growth fall to near zero per cent while 24 million people remain in poverty — the scale of the crisis in our region vastly outstrips our current capacity to respond. This places a premium on the need to invest more alliance resources into human security challenges, both at present and preventatively, and to pursue innovative, high-quality solutions to developmental challenges, including through better industry partnerships. As our economic and security interests hinge on the health of stable, resilient and sovereign regional nations, supporting their post-pandemic recovery will assist our own. Second, strengthening the alliance’s contribution to deterring aggression and coercive statecraft in the Indo-Pacific must proceed in spite of the pandemic. In recent years, the strategic landscape has been rapidly deteriorating due to the United States’ declining capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power and China’s increasingly assertive use of coercive statecraft backed by its growing conventional military power. The pandemic is only exacerbating these trends. New economic burdens are limiting the capacity of regional nations to counterbalance Chinese power: putting downward pressure on defence budgets, placing the imperatives of domestic recovery ahead of geopolitical concerns and leaving some more vulnerable to Beijing’s strategic largesse than before. In the United States, the tumultuous health, economic and socio-political consequences of the pandemic are sharpening preferences for self-strengthening at home and will quicken the decline of resources for defence. Beijing, by contrast, is taking advantage of regional distractions to advance its expansive geopolitical agenda from Hong Kong and the Sino-Indian border to Northeast Asia, the South China Sea and the Pacific. This situation calls for the alliance to invest more heavily in supporting its regional partners through collective defence initiatives and to urgently prioritise the Indo-Pacific relative to outdated security concerns in the Middle East. Finally, signalling Australian and American policy preferences for how our respective Indo-Pacific strategies should evolve over the coming years is critical for domestic and regional audiences. This will entail a focus on differences as well as shared interests within the alliance. Although the United States and Australia have many common objectives in strengthening a stable, prosperous and rules-governed regional order, they have quietly diverged in recent years on multilateralism, global institutions, international trade, regional diplomacy and other issues. Differences over China policy are perhaps the most sensitive. Whereas Washington has adopted an increasingly strident public tone in casting China as an ideological threat, Canberra seeks a less politicised approach and has publicly supported engagement alongside a firming of China policy settings. These distinctions do not undermine our alliance solidarity. Indeed, as Australia’s internationalist outlook is more in keeping with regional preferences in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Canberra should lean into it during and after AUSMIN 2020 — using current points of difference with Washington as markers for how Australia would like to work with the United States in the future, and how it will continue to work with the region until then. With this forward-looking agenda in mind, the United States Studies Centre has assembled a list of ten policy recommendations for the upcoming AUSMIN meeting. Drawing on the expertise of our researchers, including from their published and ongoing research projects, these recommendations combine analytical judgements with new policy thinking in an effort to stimulate bilateral discussion around a mix of achievable and moon-shot initiatives. This collection does not purport to be a comprehensive agenda but aims to provide a useful contribution to the policy planning process around bolstering the resilience of our Indo-Pacific region at this critical juncture.
Key judgements 1. The Biden administration’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has so far lacked focus and urgency. Despite its deep regional expertise and the region’s high expectations, it has failed to articulate a comprehensive regional strategy or treat the Indo-Pacific as its decisive priority. 2. The Biden administration’s focus on bringing normalcy back to US regional policy has restored the status quo, but not advanced its standing in the Indo-Pacific. 3. The Biden administration’s approach to competition with China has focused on the domestic and global arenas, rather than on competing for influence within the Indo-Pacific. 4. The Biden administration’s focus on long-term systems competition with China overlooks the urgency of near-term competition in the Indo-Pacific. 5. The Biden administration has placed strategic competition with China at the top of its foreign and security policy agenda. It has sought to balance US-China rivalry with opportunities for cooperation and efforts to stabilise the regional order. 6. The Biden administration views its Indo-Pacific allies as regional and international “force multipliers.” It has largely trained these alliances on global order issues, with few new initiatives at the regional level and insufficient focus on empowering allies to meet their own security needs. 7. The Biden administration sees the United States as being in a “systems competition” between democracy and autocracy. By making ideological competition with China an organising principle for US foreign policy, Washington risks undermining its attractiveness as a partner for politically diverse Indo-Pacific countries. 8. The Biden administration cannot compete against China effectively in the Indo-Pacific without prioritising engagement with Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. It has recognised the need to do more in Southeast Asia, but its success may be limited by its approach to competition with China and lack of an economic strategy. 9. The Biden administration, like its predecessors, lacks an economic strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. This major weakness in regional policy is driven by US protectionist trade preferences at home. Proposed initiatives on digital trade and infrastructure cannot compensate for the absence of a comprehensive trade-based economic approach. 10. The Biden administration views China as a predominantly long-term military challenge. Its efforts to minimise spending on US forward posture in the region suggest it may be less committed to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression. Recommendations for the Biden administration To compete for influence in the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration should: 1. Clearly identify the Indo-Pacific region as its foreign and defence policy priority and marshal resources accordingly. 2. Articulate clear goals for its relationship with China and its strategic position in the Indo-Pacific region. 3. Avoid emphasising ideological competition with China and instead focus on maximising its influence by responding to regional needs. 4. Signal its commitment to a strategy of deterrence by denial to prevent Chinese aggression and bolster its investments in Western Pacific military posture to reinforce its credibility. 5. Empower its allies to assume greater responsibility for their own defence requirements by reducing legislative and political obstacles to allied self-strengthening. 6. Pay special attention to Southeast Asia as a region of strategic importance, given its geography, size and the fluidity of its alignment dynamics. 7. Clearly signal that it is committed to mutually beneficial economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific and adopt trade and investment strategies that reinforce its role as an indispensable resident economic power.
Technology is now the defining element of the Trump administration’s self-professed “strategic competition” with China. Washington is highly attuned to the long-term consequences and links between scientific progress, technological adaptation and national power in burgeoning US-China competition. Policymakers are attempting to balance efforts to maintain the open and global foundations of US and allied research and development systems, while deterring those that abuse its accessible and integrated nature. While President Donald Trump has been highly inconsistent on technological issues, Congress and the executive branch have slowly moved forward in executing the 2017 National Security Strategy and protecting what it termed the US National Security Innovation Base. Congress and the Trump administration have embarked on a ponderous — and at times heavy-handed — effort to protect America’s technological advantage across multiple domains and through actions by several branches of government. Congress has expanded the powers of the Committee of Foreign Investment to review non-controlling investments in technology companies. New export controls are being rolled out which feature vastly more expansive definitions of “foundational” and “emerging” technologies, broadening their scope and potential reach. The Department of Justice has launched a major criminal justice campaign labelled the “China Initiative”, with the goal of prosecuting technology theft and enforcing existing regulations in every US state. Draft bills indicate the likely expansion of Congressional reform to halting the flow of US government funds flowing to overseas partners also involved in joint high-tech research and development (R&D) with China, affecting third parties like Australia. Australia will be significantly affected by Washington’s unravelling of the US-China technological relationship, owing to its deep enmeshment with America’s scientific infrastructure. To navigate these changes in the national interest, Canberra must consider the following. Australia will face growing pressure to limit its science and technology interaction with China in critical dual-use fields in order to maintain technological collaboration with the United States in some emerging technologies, and may even be required to adopt restrictive export control policies. Australian research by universities, defence industry, business and government agencies will be seriously impacted by the United States’ expanded export control reform. Canberra should continue to lobby US policymakers on solutions, such as providing exemptions under the National Technology and Industrial Base framework. As the global technological ecosystem becomes more nationalised, securitised and difficult to navigate for industry and governments alike, Australia should implement a national research and development strategy that builds its own technological ‘counterweight.’
The Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment examines key regional security issues relevant to the policy-focused discussions of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier defence summit convened by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. It is published each year in association with the Dialogue and the issues analysed within its covers are central to discussions at the event. Among the topics explored are: US Indo-Pacific strategy, alliances and security partnerships; Chinese perspectives on regional security; Taiwan’s security and the possibility of conflict; the continuing challenges posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes; the nuclear dynamics of Sino-American security relations; air and naval operations in the Asia-Pacific; Sino-American technology competition; Japan’s competition and cooperation with China; India’s role in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad); the evolving regional security engagement of European states and the European Union; China’s role as an upstream state in the Mekong sub-region; and the climate crisis and Asia-Pacific security. As this volume goes to press, the war in Ukraine overshadows the international security landscape and many chapters in this volume touch on the conflict’s ramifications for security in the Asia-Pacific. Authors include leading regional analysts and academics at the forefront of research and analysis: Aidan Foster-Carter, James Crabtree, Peter A. Dutton, Brian Eyler, Michael Green, Sheryn Lee, Jeffrey G. Lewis, Tanvi Madan, Jeffrey Mazo, Ben Schreer, Yun Sun, Nicholas Szechenyi, Brendan Taylor, Ashley Townshend and Paul Triolo.
Informed by senior policymakers with extensive expertise in defense, this book provides a comprehensive regional and functional perspective on US policy toward the People's Republic of China. Confronting China addresses the central security questions of our generation: How best can the United States deter Chinese aggression and win the peace? China's pursuit of global hegemony reflects a patient yet determined effort to reshape the international order in its favor. Deterring Chinese aggression and winning the peace necessitates an integrated approach that draws upon all instruments of US national power. Drawing on the insightful analysis of more than a dozen senior national security practitioners, chapters discuss the China challenge from multiple perspectives. Contributors examine the different dimensions of China's growing power and assess how well they advance the Chinese Communist Party's political ambitions and what must be done to counter them. Drawing upon each writer's particular areas of expertise, chapter authors provide concrete, strategy-based, and resource-informed policy recommendations. In the concluding chapter, the editors review common threads and key insights from the preceding chapters, placing them in a larger strategic context.
In light of Section 881 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which expanded the legal definition of the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to include the United Kingdom and Australia, this report informs NTIB partners on barriers and opportunities for effective integration. The expansion of the NTIB is based on the principle that defense trade between the United States and its closest allies enables a host of benefits, including increased access to innovation, economies of scale, and interoperability. In order to reap the greatest benefits of a new era of NTIB, this report uses the lessons learned from study of the present state of integration to identify areas of opportunity for policy reforms and greater cooperation.
A major shift in the paradigm undergirding relations between Australia and China has become clear in the early 2020s, with geopolitical concerns trumping economic considerations. Canberra has implemented a range of new policies in response to the risks it perceives in Australia’s economic relations with China, the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to exert political influence in Australia, the expanding capabilities and presence of the People’s Liberation Army, and Beijing’s economic and diplomatic gains in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. China’s policies towards Australia have become more coercive in economic as well as diplomatic terms. However, Australia has withstood Beijing’s punitive trade measures without suffering significant economic damage. China’s more assertive regional posture has prompted far-reaching changes to Australia’s defence and alliance policy settings, including new capability acquisitions and strategic initiatives such as AUKUS. In this Adelphi book, Euan Graham argues that Australia has provided an imperfect but nevertheless useful exemplar of how governments may respond effectively to multifarious security challenges from China. In particular, the Australian case shows how measures to address domestic vulnerabilities may serve as the foundation for a successful China policy at the international level.