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This paper investigates the presence of depositor discipline in the U.S. banking sector. We test whether depositors penalize (discipline) banks for poor performance by withdrawing their uninsured deposits. While focusing on the movements in uninsured deposits, we also account for the possibility that banks may be forced to pay a risk premium in the form of higher interest rates to induce depositors not to withdraw their uninsured deposits. Our results support the existence of depositor discipline: a weak bank may not necessarily be able to stop a deposit drain by raising its uninsured deposit interest rates.
This paper investigates the presence of depositor discipline in the U.S. banking sector. We test whether depositors penalize (discipline) banks for poor performance by withdrawing their uninsured deposits. While focusing on the movements in uninsured deposits, we also account for the possibility that banks may be forced to pay a risk premium in the form of higher interest rates to induce depositors not to withdraw their uninsured deposits. Our results support the existence of depositor discipline: a weak bank may not necessarily be able to stop a deposit drain by raising its uninsured deposit interest rates.
This paper investigates the presence of depositor discipline in the U.S. banking sector. We test whether depositors penalize (discipline) banks for poor performance by withdrawing their uninsured deposits. While focusing on the movements in uninsured deposits, we also account for the possibility that banks may be forced to pay a risk premium in the form of higher interest rates to induce depositors not to withdraw their uninsured deposits. Our results support the existence of depositor discipline: a weak bank may not necessarily be able to stop a deposit drain by raising its uninsured deposit interest rates.
Leading academics and policymakers address the theory of market discipline and consider evidence across different industries and countries. The effectiveness of market discipline -- the strong built-in incentives that encourage banks and financial systems to operate soundly and efficiently -- commands much attention today, particularly in light of recent accounting scandals. As government discipline, in the form of regulation, seems to grows less effective as the banking industry and financial markets grow more complex, the role of market discipline becomes increasingly important. In this collection, which grew out of a conference cosponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland, a diverse group of academics and policymakers address different aspects of the ability of market discipline to affect corporate behavior and performance. A major purpose of the book is to develop evidence on how market discipline operates across non-government regulated industries and in different countries, how successful it has been, and how it may transfer to a regulated industry. The chapters examine such topics as the theory of market discipline, evidence of market discipline in banking and other industries, evidence of market discipline for countries, the current state of corporate governance, and the interaction of market discipline and public policy.
We bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.
Papers presented at the Forecasting Financial Markets in India, held at Kharagpur during 29-31 December 2008.
The aim of this research is to ascertain whether Pakistan’s financial system is conducive to market discipline. We measure the potential of depositors to induce market discipline in the commercial banking sector. A comprehensive survey of over six thousand respondents was used to gauge their propensity to discipline bank management in response to deteriorating financial conditions. Our results portray that depositors are likely to withdraw funds in response to a reduction in profitability, an increase in non-performing loans, and a reduction in total assets. We identify that banks with better service quality are less sensitive to deposit withdrawals in the event of a reduction in their financial performance. Among other findings, the presence of contractual guarantees by the government desensitizes depositors to market information, making them less likely to be involved in imposing market discipline.
The banking crises in 2007-10 are not exceptional. There have been many such crises in the past in both developed countries and emerging economies. A banking crisis can be related to solvency or liquidity (or both). This book focuses on banking crisis and liquidity. This book starts from basics and gradually builds up with very few technicalities. Though the analysis is primarily theoretical, we provide a historical background, a macroeconomic perspective, and policy implications for both closed and open economies.
Understanding the interaction between bank solvency and funding cost is a crucial pre-requisite for stress-testing. In this paper we study the sensitivity of bank funding cost to solvency measures while controlling for various other measures of bank fundamentals. The analysis includes two measures of bank funding cost: (a) average funding cost and (b) interbank funding cost as a proxy of wholesale funding cost. The main findings are: (1) Solvency is negatively and significantly related to measures of funding cost, but the effect is small in magnitude. (2) On average, the relationship is stronger for interbank funding cost than for average funding cost. (3) During periods of stress interbank funding cost is more sensitive to solvency than in normal times. Finally, (4) the relationship between funding cost and solvency appears to be non-linear, with higher sensitivity of funding cost at lower levels of solvency.