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This book argues that a complete dissolution of the Gettier problem is possible using Jaakko Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology, with its emphasis on questioning as a knowledge-seeking procedure. The key to accomplishing this task is to treat Gettier’s counterexamples as a game of inquiry where epistemic agents deal with various pieces of information, employ different moves, and make different choices or strategies (such as bracketing or unbracketing an item of information) in determining for themselves what to believe in, or what they can claim to have knowledge of. This book will appeal to both undergraduate and graduate students, as well as post-graduate researchers, as it offers a novel perspective for understanding the Gettier problem and a cogent explanation for the failures of previously proposed solutions to it. All this is made possible by going beyond analysis and dealing with the experiences of epistemic agents in actual problem-solving scenarios.
The "Gettier Problem" has shaped most of the fundamental debates in epistemology for more than fifty years. Before Edmund Gettier published his famous 1963 paper (reprinted in this volume), it was generally presumed that knowledge was equivalent to true belief supported by adequate evidence.Gettier presented a powerful challenge to that presumption. These led to the development and refinement of many prominent epistemological theories: internalism, externalism, evidentialism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. The debate about the appropriate use of intuition as providing evidencein all areas of philosophy began as a debate about the epistemic status of the "Gettier intuition". The differing accounts of epistemic luck are all rooted in responses to the Gettier Problem. The discussions about the role of false beliefs in the production of knowledge are directly traceable toGettier's paper, as are the debates between fallibilists and infallibilists. The "knowledge first" view was, in large part, provoked by the supposed failure of all solutions to the Gettier Problem. Indeed, it is fair to say that providing a satisfactory response to the Gettier Problem has become alitmus test of any adequate account of knowledge - even those accounts that hold that the Gettier Problem rests on mistakes of various sorts.This volume presents a collective examination by twenty-six experts, including some of the most influential philosophers of our time, of the various issues that arise from Gettier's challenge to the analysis of knowledge. Explaining Knowledge sets the agenda for future work on the central problem ofepistemology.
This book centers on two dominant trends within contemporary epistemology: first, the dissatisfaction with the project of analyzing knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions and, second, the surging popularity of virtue-theoretic approaches to knowledge. Church argues that the Gettier Problem, the primary reason for abandoning the reductive analysis project, cannot viably be solved, and that prominent approaches to virtue epistemology fail to solve the Gettier Problem precisely along the lines his diagnosis predicts. Such an outcome motivates Church to explore a better way forward: non-reductive virtue epistemology. In so doing, he makes room for virtue epistemologies that are not only able to endure what he sees as inevitable developments in 21st-century epistemology, but also able to contribute positively to debates and discussions across the discipline and beyond.
Confronting the scientific revolution’s dismissal of Aristotle’s physics and epistemology, Nathan R. Colaner revives this foundational philosopher’s work to expose within it the underpinnings of modern philosophers’ most common intuitions about knowledge. After Aristotle’s picture of reality had been judged obsolete by the physics of the scientific revolution, modern Western epistemologists fumbled along with doctrines that had little to do with everyday life. These included Descartes’ notion of the evil genius, Hume’s claim that we can’t know anything that we are not presently observing, and Kant’s rescue of knowledge in the context of idealism. In Aristotle on Knowledge of Nature and Modern Skepticism, Colaner articulates a notion of knowledge that is characteristically Aristotelian without being dependent on his metaphysics. Simultaneously, Colaner places Aristotle in dialogue with modern thinkers to create a bridge between classical and modern philosophy and reinstate Aristotle’s prominence in the discipline of epistemology.
When we make claims to each other, we're asserting. But what does it take to assert well? Do we need to know what we're talking about? This book argues that we don't. In fact, it argues that in some special contexts, we can lie.
This exposition aims at sketching a systematic philosophy which, will include solutions to questions found within disciplines ranging from metaphysics and epistemology to psychology and theology. Of all the philosophic problems answered within this book, the most important is that of the relationship between consciousness and the body. Herein I solve the aforesaid problem through an endorsement and defense of ontological idealism. Specifically, I expound upon a position of personalistic, absolute idealism. It is a viewpoint which is much in line with that of Mary Calkins; and, its demonstration is inspired by the work of the 19th century philosopher J.F. Ferrier.
Epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, is at the core of many of the central debates and issues in philosophy, interrogating the notions of truth, objectivity, trust, belief and perception. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology provides a comprehensive and the up-to-date survey of epistemology, charting its history, providing a thorough account of its key thinkers and movements, and addressing enduring questions and contemporary research in the field. Organized thematically, the Companion is divided into ten sections: Foundational Issues, The Analysis of Knowledge, The Structure of Knowledge, Kinds of Knowledge, Skepticism, Responses to Skepticism, Knowledge and Knowledge Attributions, Formal Epistemology, The History of Epistemology, and Metaepistemological Issues. Seventy-eight chapters, each between 5000 and 7000 words and written by the world’s leading epistemologists, provide students with an outstanding and accessible guide to the field. Designed to fit the most comprehensive syllabus in the discipline, this text will be an indispensible resource for anyone interested in this central area of philosophy. The Routledge Companion to Epistemology is essential reading for students of philosophy.
Some key aspects of contemporary epistemology deserve to be challenged, and How to Know does just that. This book argues that several long-standing presumptions at the heart of the standard analytic conception of knowledge are false, and defends an alternative, a practicalist conception of knowledge. Presents a philosophically original conception of knowledge, at odds with some central tenets of analytic epistemology Offers a dissolution of epistemology’s infamous Gettier problem — explaining why the supposed problem was never really a problem in the first place. Defends an unorthodox conception of the relationship between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, understanding knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how.
Most current work in epistemology deals with the evaluation and justification of information already acquired. In this book, Jaakko Hintikka instead discusses the more important problem of how knowledge is acquired in the first place. His model of information-seeking is the old Socratic method of questioning, which has been generalized and brought up-to-date through the logical theory of questions and answers that he has developed.
David Hume is often considered to have been a sceptic, particularly in his conception of the individual's knowledge of the external world. However, a closer examination of his works gives a much different impression of this aspect of Hume's philosophy, one that is due for a thorough scholarly analysis. This study argues that Hume was, in fact, a critical realist in the early twentieth-century sense, a period in which the term was used to describe the epistemological and ontological theories of such philosophers as Roy Wood Sellars and Bertrand Russell. Carefully situating Hume in his historical context, that is, relative to Aristotelian and rationalist traditions, Fred Wilson makes important and unique insights into Humean philosophy. Analyzing key sections of the Treatise, the Enquiry, and the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Wilson offers a deeper understanding of Hume by taking into account the philosopher's theories of the external world. Such a reading, the author explains, is not only more faithful to the texts, but also reinforces the view of Hume as a critical realist in light of twentieth-century discussions between externalism and internalism, and between coherentists and foundationalists. Complete with original observations and ideas, this study is sure to generate debates about Humean philosophy, critical realism, and the limits of perceptual knowledge.