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"Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO's irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan's history and culture, the region's contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government's strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government's structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats."--Publisher's website.
This book addresses the relationship between the 'liberal' values of Anglo-Saxon cultures and the way that they conduct themselves when they are fighting - or preparing to fight - wars. The United States and the United Kingdom are characterised by a consensus that their social and political arrangements are, in a very broad sense, ‘liberal’. Liberalism is not pacifism; nor are liberals necessarily respectful of traditional prohibitions that have set out to moderate excessive violence. But liberals do seek to understand their violent actions as part of a wider project of defending or expanding liberal freedoms. The perceived alternative is to undermine the will to keep on fighting. Sustaining a liberal picture of what is going on is an indispensable part of a liberal strategy. Contributors with disciplinary backgrounds in history, international relations, and strategic studies discuss what ‘liberalism’ means in this particular context and how it might relate to ‘strategy’, both in the recent past and in the future. The chapters consider how liberal states understand the wars they fight, the constraints liberal values place on these states, the role of public opinion and the appropriate strategies for modern liberal states. Topics addressed include civilian bombing, the nature of US military culture, the British ‘Iraq inquiries’, the effects of the erosion of Westphalian sovereignty and the rise of new ideas about ‘globalization’, and the decline in popular involvement. This book will be of much interest to students of strategic studies, political philosophy, foreign policy, security studies and IR in general.
A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in Afghanistan: the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic
This classic text provides a rich and nuanced discussion of American national security policymaking. American National Security remains the ideal foundational text for courses in national security, foreign policy, and security studies. Every chapter in this edition has been extensively revised, and the book includes discussion of recent security policy changes in the Trump administration. Highlights include: • An updated look at national security threats, military operations, and homeland security challenges • An analysis of the evolving roles of the president, Congress, the intelligence community, the military, and other institutions involved in national security • A revised consideration of the strengths, limitations, and employment of instruments of national power, including diplomacy, information, economic tools, and armed forces • An exploration of the economic and national security implications of globalization • An enhanced examination of the proliferation of transnational threats, including security challenges in space and in cyberspace • A new assessment of how international, political, and economic trends may change US leadership of the post–World War II international order • A comprehensive update on changing dynamics in key states and regions, including Russia, China, East Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America An authoritative book that explains US national security policy, actors, and processes in a wide-ranging yet understandable way, American National Security addresses key issues, including challenges to the free and open international order, the reemergence of strategic competition among great powers, terrorism, economic and fiscal constraints, and rapid advances in information and technology.
India and Pakistan will be among the most important countries in the twenty-first century. In Avoiding Armageddon, Bruce Riedel clearly explains the challenge and the importance of successfully managing America's affairs with these two emerging powers and their toxic relationship. Born from the British Raj, the two nations share a common heritage, but they are different in many important ways. India is already the world's largest democracy and will soon become the planet's most populous nation. Pakistan, soon to be the fifth most populous country, has a troubled history of military coups, dictators, and harboring terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. The longtime rivals are nuclear powers, with tested weapons. They have fought four wars with each other and have gone to the brink of war several times. Meanwhile, U.S. presidents since Franklin Roosevelt have been increasingly involved in the region's affairs. In the past two decades alone, the White House has intervened several times to prevent nuclear confrontation on the subcontinent. South Asia clearly is critical to American national security, and the volatile relationship between India and Pakistan is the crucial factor determining whether the region can ever be safe and stable. Based on extensive research and Riedel's role in advising four U.S. presidents on the region, Avoiding Armageddon reviews the history of American diplomacy in South Asia, the crises that have flared in recent years, and the prospects for future crisis. Riedel provides an in-depth look at the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008, the worst terrorist outrage since 9/11, and he concludes with authoritative analysis on what the future is likely to hold for America and the South Asia puzzle as well as recommendations on how Washington should proceed.
The United States has repeatedly used drones to kill terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen in an effort to decrease terrorism and the vitality of terrorist groups. Targeted killing through the use of drones has become a foreign policy weapon to keep the United States safe from further terrorist attacks. However, it is suspected that these killings has actually led to an increase in terrorist group recruitment, terrorist attacks, and empathy for the terrorist group from the local population in addition to several other unwanted repercussions. The two part research question this book attempts to answer is, “What is the effect of drone targeted killing on Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen? And is it a successful method in the War on Terror?”
This book traces the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) during the Suez Crisis, one of the most infamous episodes of British foreign policy. In doing so it identifies broader lessons not only about the events of 1956, but about the place of intelligence in strategy itself. It provides both an exploration of the relationship between intelligence and strategy at the conceptual level, and also a historical account, and strategic analysis of, the performance of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Secret Intelligence Service during this time. Focusing on the period immediately before, during, and after the crisis, Danny Steed brings together a complete picture of intelligence story in Britain that has so far eluded comprehensive treatment in the Suez historiography. Through extensive consultation of declassified archival sources, a re-examination of often referred to sources, and the employment of oral history, this study identifies the most significant lessons about the use of intelligence revealed by the Suez Crisis.
"Afghan civil society is deeply upset with disunity and detachment of Taliban groups - those who are tied to regional states agendas. This detachment has also left negative impacts on their fighting capabilities and public support. Regional states, the United States, NATO, Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan are active stakeholders who want peace on their own terms, while Taliban are not an independent entity to decide the future of Afghanistan, or outline long-term peace proposals. This has created a deep problem in finding a solution to the peace problem in Afghanistan. This book is a collection of various articles written by eminent researchers on the aspects of finding a solution to the peace prospects in troubled Afghanistan."
It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adapt. The book further compares the organizational adaptation of the Iraqi insurgency with the organizational adaptation of the Afghan insurgency. This is done to refine the findings of the Iraq case and to present a more robust analysis of the adaptive cycles of two large and diverse covert networked insurgencies. The book finds that the Afghan insurgency, although still ongoing, has adapted more successfully than the Iraqi insurgency because it has been better able to leverage the strengths and counter the weaknesses of its chosen organizational form.
This book offers a fresh assessment of George W. Bush’s foreign policies. It is not designed to offer an evaluation of the totality of George W. Bush’s foreign policy. Instead, the analysis will focus on the key aspects of his foreign and security policy record, in each case considering the interplay between principle and pragmatism. The underpinning contention here is that policy formulation and implementation across Bush’s two terms can more usefully be analysed in terms of shades of grey, rather than the black and white hues in which it has often been painted. Thus, in some key policy areas it will be seen that the overall record was more pragmatic and successful than his many critics have been prepared to give him credit for. The president and his advisers were sometimes prepared to alter and amend their policy direction, on occasion significantly. Context and personalities, interpersonal and interagency, both played a role here. Where these came together most visibly – for instance in connection with dual impasses over Iraq and Iran – exigencies on the ground sometimes found expression in personnel changes. In turn, the changing fortunes of Bush’s first term principals presaged policy changes in his second. What emerges from a more detached study of key aspects of the Bush administration – during a complicated and challenging period in the United States’ post-Cold War history, marked by the dramatic emergence of international Islamist terrorism as the dominant international security threat – is a more complex picture than any generalization can ever hope to sustain, regardless of how often it is repeated. This book will be of much interest to students of US foreign policy, international politics and security studies.