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One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.
A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.
Local uniqueness and smooth dependence of the endogenous variables from the exogenous ones are studied using a version of a so-called parametric transversality theorem. In a standard general equilibrium model, all equilibria are efficient, but that is not the case if some imperfection, like incomplete markets, asymmetric information, strategic interaction, is added. Then, for almost all economies, equilibria are inefficient, and an outside institution can Pareto improve upon the market outcome. Those results are proved showing that a well-chosen system of equations has no solutions."
This is the first economics work of its kind offering the economist the opportunity to acquire new and important analytical tools. It introduces the reader to three advanced mathematical methods by presenting both their theoretical bases and their applications to a wide range of economic models. The mathematical methods presented are ordinary differential equations, stability techniques and chaotic dynamics. Topics such as existence, continuation of solutions, uniqueness, dependence on initial data and parameters, linear systems, stability of linear systems, two dimensional phase analysis, local and global stability, the stability manifold, stability of optimal control and empirical tests for chaotic dynamics are covered and their use in economic theory is illustrated in numerous applications. These applications include microeconomic dynamics, investment theory, macroeconomic policies, capital theory, business cycles, financial economics and many others. All chapters conclude with two sections on miscellaneous applications and exercises and further remarks and references. In total the reader will find a valuable guide to over 500 selected references that use differential equations, stability analysis and chaotic dynamics. Graduate students in economics with a special interest in economic theory, economic researchers and applied mathematicians will all benefit from this volume.
Although the application of differential equations to economics is a vast and vibrant area, the subject has not been systematically studied; it is often treated as a subsidiary part of mathematical economics textbooks. This book aims to fill that void by providing a unique blend of the theory of differential equations and their exciting applications to dynamic economics. Containing not just a comprehensive introduction to the applications of the theory of linear (and linearized) differential equations to economic analysis, the book also studies nonlinear dynamical systems, which have only been widely applied to economic analysis in recent years. It provides comprehensive coverage of the most important concepts and theorems in the theory of differential equations in a way that can be understood by any reader who has a basic knowledge of calculus and linear algebra. In addition to traditional applications of the theory to economic dynamics, the book includes many recent developments in different fields of economics.
A collection of papers dealing with a broad range of topics in mathematical economics, game theory and economic dynamics. The contributions present both theoretical and applied research. The volume is dedicated to Mordecai Kurz. The papers were presented in a special symposium co-hosted by the Stanford University Department of Economics and by the Stanford Institute of Economic Policy Research in August 2002.
and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.
A lot of economic problems can formulated as constrained optimizations and equilibration of their solutions.Various mathematical theories have been supplying economists with indispensable machineries for these problems arising in economic theory. Conversely, mathematicians have been stimulated by various mathematical difficulties raised by economic theories. The series is designed to bring together those mathematicians who were seriously interested in getting new challenging stimuli from economic theories with those economists who are seeking for effective mathematical tools for their researchers.
Game theory has revolutionised our understanding of industrial organisation and the traditional theory of the firm. Despite these advances, industrial economists have tended to rely on a restricted set of tools from game theory, focusing on static and repeated games to analyse firm structure and behaviour. Luca Lambertini, a leading expert on the application of differential game theory to economics, argues that many dynamic phenomena in industrial organisation (such as monopoly, oligopoly, advertising, R&D races) can be better understood and analysed through the use of differential games. After illustrating the basic elements of the theory, Lambertini guides the reader through the main models, spanning from optimal control problems describing the behaviour of a monopolist through to oligopoly games in which firms' strategies include prices, quantities and investments. This approach will be of great value to students and researchers in economics and those interested in advanced applications of game theory.
This book contains a collection of original and state-of-the-art contributions in rational choice and general equilibrium theory. Among the topics are preferences, demand, equilibrium, core allocations, and testable restrictions. The contributing authors are Daniel McFadden, Rosa Matzkin, Emma Moreno-Garcia, Roger Lagunoff, Yakar Kannai, Myrna Wooders, James Moore, Ted Bergstrom, Luca Anderlini, Lin Zhou, Mark Bagnoli, Alexander Kovalenkov, Carlos Herves-Beloso, Michaela Topuzu, Bernard Cornet, Andreu Mas-Colell and Nicholas Yannelis.