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Graduate-level text surveys games of fixed duration, games of pursuit and evasion, the computation of saddle points, games of survival, games with restricted phase coordinates, and N-person games. 1971 edition.
A comprehensive, self-contained survey of the theory and applications of differential games, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing economics and management problems which are characterised by both multiperiod and strategic decision making. Although no prior knowledge of game theory is required, a basic knowledge of linear algebra, ordinary differential equations, mathematical programming and probability theory is necessary. Part One presents the theory of differential games, starting with the basic concepts of game theory and going on to cover control theoretic models, Markovian equilibria with simultaneous play, differential games with hierarchical play, trigger strategy equilibria, differential games with special structures, and stochastic differential games. Part Two offers applications to capital accumulation games, industrial organization and oligopoly games, marketing, resources and environmental economics.
Game theory is the theory of social situations, and the majority of research into the topic focuses on how groups of people interact by developing formulas and algorithms to identify optimal strategies and to predict the outcome of interactions. Only fifty years old, it has already revolutionized economics and finance, and is spreading rapidly to a wide variety of fields. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games is an assessment of the state of the art in its field and the first modern book on linear-quadratic game theory, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing strategic decision making problems in economics and management. Linear quadratic dynamic models have a long tradition in economics, operations research and control engineering; and the author begins by describing the one-decision maker LQ dynamic optimization problem before introducing LQ differential games. Covers cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and treats the standard information structures (open-loop and feedback). Includes real-life economic examples to illustrate theoretical concepts and results. Presents problem formulations and sound mathematical problem analysis. Includes exercises and solutions, enabling use for self-study or as a course text. Supported by a website featuring solutions to exercises, further examples and computer code for numerical examples. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games offers a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of this extensively used class of economic models, and will appeal to applied mathematicians and econometricians as well as researchers and senior undergraduate/graduate students in economics, mathematics, engineering and management science.
Definitive work draws on game theory, calculus of variations, and control theory to solve an array of problems: military, pursuit and evasion, athletic contests, many more. Detailed examples, formal calculations. 1965 edition.
The goal of this textbook is to introduce students to the stochastic analysis tools that play an increasing role in the probabilistic approach to optimization problems, including stochastic control and stochastic differential games. While optimal control is taught in many graduate programs in applied mathematics and operations research, the author was intrigued by the lack of coverage of the theory of stochastic differential games. This is the first title in SIAM?s Financial Mathematics book series and is based on the author?s lecture notes. It will be helpful to students who are interested in stochastic differential equations (forward, backward, forward-backward); the probabilistic approach to stochastic control (dynamic programming and the stochastic maximum principle); and mean field games and control of McKean?Vlasov dynamics. The theory is illustrated by applications to models of systemic risk, macroeconomic growth, flocking/schooling, crowd behavior, and predatory trading, among others.
Game theory has revolutionised our understanding of industrial organisation and the traditional theory of the firm. Despite these advances, industrial economists have tended to rely on a restricted set of tools from game theory, focusing on static and repeated games to analyse firm structure and behaviour. Luca Lambertini, a leading expert on the application of differential game theory to economics, argues that many dynamic phenomena in industrial organisation (such as monopoly, oligopoly, advertising, R&D races) can be better understood and analysed through the use of differential games. After illustrating the basic elements of the theory, Lambertini guides the reader through the main models, spanning from optimal control problems describing the behaviour of a monopolist through to oligopoly games in which firms' strategies include prices, quantities and investments. This approach will be of great value to students and researchers in economics and those interested in advanced applications of game theory.
This volume contains fifteen articles on the topic of differential and dynamic games, focusing on both theory and applications. It covers a variety of areas and presents recent developments on topics of current interest. It should be useful to researchers in differential and dynamic games, systems and control, operations research and mathematical economics.
The theory of two-person, zero-sum differential games started at the be­ ginning of the 1960s with the works of R. Isaacs in the United States and L. S. Pontryagin and his school in the former Soviet Union. Isaacs based his work on the Dynamic Programming method. He analyzed many special cases of the partial differential equation now called Hamilton­ Jacobi-Isaacs-briefiy HJI-trying to solve them explicitly and synthe­ sizing optimal feedbacks from the solution. He began a study of singular surfaces that was continued mainly by J. Breakwell and P. Bernhard and led to the explicit solution of some low-dimensional but highly nontriv­ ial games; a recent survey of this theory can be found in the book by J. Lewin entitled Differential Games (Springer, 1994). Since the early stages of the theory, several authors worked on making the notion of value of a differential game precise and providing a rigorous derivation of the HJI equation, which does not have a classical solution in most cases; we mention here the works of W. Fleming, A. Friedman (see his book, Differential Games, Wiley, 1971), P. P. Varaiya, E. Roxin, R. J. Elliott and N. J. Kalton, N. N. Krasovskii, and A. I. Subbotin (see their book Po­ sitional Differential Games, Nauka, 1974, and Springer, 1988), and L. D. Berkovitz. A major breakthrough was the introduction in the 1980s of two new notions of generalized solution for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, namely, viscosity solutions, by M. G. Crandall and P. -L.
Numerical Optimization presents a comprehensive and up-to-date description of the most effective methods in continuous optimization. It responds to the growing interest in optimization in engineering, science, and business by focusing on the methods that are best suited to practical problems. For this new edition the book has been thoroughly updated throughout. There are new chapters on nonlinear interior methods and derivative-free methods for optimization, both of which are used widely in practice and the focus of much current research. Because of the emphasis on practical methods, as well as the extensive illustrations and exercises, the book is accessible to a wide audience. It can be used as a graduate text in engineering, operations research, mathematics, computer science, and business. It also serves as a handbook for researchers and practitioners in the field. The authors have strived to produce a text that is pleasant to read, informative, and rigorous - one that reveals both the beautiful nature of the discipline and its practical side.
This book uses a small volume to present the most basic results for deterministic two-person differential games. The presentation begins with optimization of a single function, followed by a basic theory for two-person games. For dynamic situations, the author first recalls control theory which is treated as single-person differential games. Then a systematic theory of two-person differential games is concisely presented, including evasion and pursuit problems, zero-sum problems and LQ differential games.The book is intended to be self-contained, assuming that the readers have basic knowledge of calculus, linear algebra, and elementary ordinary differential equations. The readership of the book could be junior/senior undergraduate and graduate students with majors related to applied mathematics, who are interested in differential games. Researchers in some other related areas, such as engineering, social science, etc. will also find the book useful.